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China or the Middle Kingdom has always been one of the most significant civilisations of 
the world in the past five thousand years. Based on its splendid culture, technology, and 
economy the country dominated East Asia for millennia, and the central position of China 
was natural to the region before the arrival of Western powers in the late 18th century. In 
the last two hundred years, however, the industrial revolution, colonisation and human 
development of the West have overshadowed the achievements of the Middle Kingdom, 
and even led to the century of humiliation, when China was semi-colonised and partially 
dismembered first by European powers and later by the United States (US) and Japan. The 
decades of defeats and destruction meant a shock and social trauma to the Chinese people, 
and led to internal turmoil, uprisings, and civil wars. The first attempt to revitalise the 
nation was the so-called Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898, but its failure eventually led to 
the fall of the empire in 1911, the birth of the Republic of China and the war against 
Imperial Japan. Following the demise of the Japanese Empire Mao Zedong established 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and unleashed a series of failed economic reforms 
and class struggle. It was only in 1978 when China had another chance to restart its 
national economic and social development thanks to the Reform and Opening Policy of 
late Deng Xiaoping, followed by an unprecedented increase of the country’s power and 
wealth in the last forty years. Thanks to Deng’s reforms China’s economy was growing 
by almost 10 per cent annually on an average between 1978 and 2008, became the largest 
of many markets like cars and internet, one of the top trading nations, and today it has a 
decisive say in global issues like environmental protection, global standards or the future 
of global governance. Even the global financial crisis was not severe enough to stop the 
growth of the Chinese economy, hence, it even accelerated its catch up with the developed 
countries. Consequently, the focal point of global growth and economic power has been 
moving away from the North-Atlantic region towards East Asia and particularly China. 
The country has been accumulating immense amount of wealth, foreign exchange reserves 
and power due to the diligence of its 1.4 billion people and the long-term developmental 
strategy of the government. Today the PRC is once again one of the major powers of the 
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world, the size of its economy is only second to the US in nominal terms, and under the 
rule of its current leader Xi Jinping, the country is regaining the position it believes it 
deserves in the centre of the world stage. 
Meanwhile, the West and first of all the US has been preoccupied by expensive and mostly 
futile wars, accumulated enormous amounts of debt and seems to be losing its political, 
economic and moral influence over the World. China has been eager to have more and 
more say in world affairs, and events like the London Summit of the G-20 in 2008 or the 
COVID-19 pandemic in 2019-2020 may be understood as milestones in history by future 
generations, as it shed light on the new reality where global issues cannot be addressed 
without developing countries, and first of all without China. Some argue that the rise of 
Donald Trump means a new opportunity to Beijing, as growing isolationist and 
protectionist voices in Washington and the gradual demise of American global leadership 
offers an unexpected space to manoeuvre to China. As a latest development, the global 
corona virus pandemic may strengthen the narrative about a dysfunctional American 
power and an efficient China. According to the Chinese point of view, global order is in a 
crisis, and as the Chinese saying goes crisis means threat and opportunity at the same time. 
Xi Jinping’s illiberal China is not afraid to grab that opportunity, what might pose the 
greatest challenge to the liberal international order led by the West since the end of World 
War 2. 
The Central and Eastern European (CEE) region has obviously never played an important 
role in the foreign policy of China. The total population of CEE countries equals to one 
of the bigger provinces of the PRC, and their cumulative economic production is a 
fragment of the Chinese GDP. Due to their EU membership and perceived economic 
opportunities of CEE countries, however, Beijing has turned to the region in the last 
decade. Following their successful integration into the Euro-Atlantic alliance system, 
most of the CEE countries have also rediscovered the enormous Chinese market as a 
potential economic and business opportunity, while the global financial crisis and the 
difficulties of the European Union offered another strong impetus to strengthen the 
political and economic relationship with Beijing. Most CEE countries share the same 
problems and challenges when it comes to their China policy: growing trade imbalances, 
intra-CEE competition for the attention of Beijing, the concerns of the EU, rising Chinese 
15 
influence in the region and first of all the lack of tangible results after a decade of 
cooperation.  
After ages of mutual lack of interest, China and the Central and Eastern European 
countries started their rapprochement in the mid 2000’s. Hungary was one of the first to 
re-evaluate its China policies, and then Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy visited China a 
few months after he signed the EU accession treaty of the country in May 2003. Others 
have followed the Hungarian example, and China expressed its interest towards the region 
as well. The global and European financial and economic crisis triggered an enhanced 
interest on both sides, as CEE countries had to find new source of investment and trade 
opportunities amidst the meltdown of the EU markets, while China saw a window of 
opportunity to enter European markets through the region. Consequently, the Chinese 
government decided to establish the so-called 16+1 (as Greece joined the cooperation in 
2019 it is called 17+1 today, but the present theses focuses on the original 16 members 
only), a cooperation mechanism between China and sixteen countries of the CEE region 
(Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, [North]Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia).  
The Hungarian government hosted the first „China-Central and Eastern European 
Countries Economic and Trade Forum” in Budapest in 2011 and based on its success the 
Chinese side decided to officially establish the 16+1 in Warsaw where the first „Meeting 
of Prime Ministers Poland – Central Europe – China” event was held in 2012. Besides 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk another fifteen 
Central and Eastern European countries were represented by their (deputy) heads of 
government. As individual countries in the CEE region were too small and economically 
irrelevant from the Chinese perspective, it was a logical move to Beijing to create a 
regional level cooperation. The cumulative size of the sixteen countries (more than one 
hundred million inhabitants, and 1.4 trillion-dollar nominal GDP as of 2012) represent a 
scale of magnitude attractive even to China. From this point of view, the 16+1 cooperation 
can be understood as a way to reduce transaction costs to the Chinese side, as the Premier 
was able to meet sixteen national leaders at once, and thus cooperation and coordination 
was easier through the mechanism. The political benefits were clear to the CEE side too, 
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since without the initiative, most prime ministers of the region would have seen their 
Chinese counterpart once in a decade or maybe never. 
Ever since the inception of the cooperation, the 16+1 has been a target of tremendous 
criticism. The EU and certain Western member states have been concerned of the 
increased level of Chinese activity in the Eastern part of the integration and afraid that 
Beijing might try to divide and rule the EU through the 16+1. Furthermore, EU-China 
relations have been deteriorating in general recently, as Europe is more and more 
frustrated by the rise of China, and Beijing is getting more and more disappointed by the 
slow progress of the EU while its own self-confidence is on the rise. The European arms 
embargo, human rights or the market economy status of China all mean thorny issues on 
the agenda, and the European perceptions of the 16+1 add further tensions to the 
relationship. Certain major European countries like France or Germany are concerned of 
the Chinese activities in the CEE region, as they see China as a competitor on a market 
they have always considered as their home turf. In 2012, I was attending an interesting 
closed-door roundtable on EU-China relations in Brussels, where a diplomat from one of 
the Western European countries set forth his remarkable assessment of the 16+1 initiative 
as he said: “China and Central Europe were building a new Berlin Wall across the EU”. 
I had the chance to attend a similar event in Brussels in December 2017, and that time 
I was told by the representative of another major Western country that China simply 
“bought off” Central and Eastern European countries and Eastern member states were 
”puppets on the hands of Beijing“. An article published by the Handelsblatt in April 2018 
on a report prepared by EU ambassadors that sharply criticised China’s BRI (Belt and 
Road Initiative) project stated that only the Hungarian ambassador refused to sign the 
paper, because ”countries such as Hungary and Greece, which both rely on Chinese 
investment, have in the past shown they are susceptible to pressure from China”. (Heide, 
et al., 2018) In sum, CEE governments have been accused in the recent years by their 
Western counterparts and by EU institutions that Eastern member states were trading the 
political cohesion of Europe for economic benefits from China, that is economic 
dependency had political consequences. 
Indeed, the cooperation between China and the CEE region has been attracting significant 
attention in Brussels and other major EU capitals in recent years. As it will be presented 
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in the following chapters many argue that the lack of transparency and the semi-
institutional form of the project serve Chinese interests, and that the 16+1 cooperation 
itself is a malign Chinese attempt to divide and rule Europe, where cash-strapped CEE 
countries simply open the doors of the EU to Chinese influence in exchange for economic 
gains. At first glance, the economic prospects of cooperation were bright: CEE countries 
were in need of liquidity and investment during the years of the global and Eurozone 
financial crisis, China was in need of new investment opportunities and new markets, and 
of course, both sides were eager to boost their trade relations. However, success appears 
less obvious if one takes a closer look.  
In the following, I would like to challenge this oversimplified discourse and to point out 
that Chinese influence in the region is very limited if not marginal, and its source is not 
the economy, as despite all previous expectations Chinese economic presence is still 
insignificant in CEE countries, and what China has been offering is not an attractive 
economic alternative to the EU members of the region. I believe it is of utmost importance 
to understand the real causes of the pro-China movement of certain CEE countries, since 
a misguided and oversimplified discourse, focusing on Chinese economic offers does not 
catch the reality, and measured responses cannot be placed on misbeliefs. 
First, CEE member states of the EU have been economically outperforming the rest of the 
Union: annual GDP growth averaged 2.5 percent in the region between 2012 and 2017, 
compared to the 1.4 percent average of the whole EU. The macroeconomic stability of the 
region is based on strong net exports, relatively low inflation and unemployment, and the 
high inflow of foreign direct investment (2 percent of their GDP annually on an average) 
plus the approximately EUR 150 billion in EU structural funds that CEE member states 
received between 2012 and 2016. 
CEE countries have been enjoying a high total trade surplus in recent years, and indeed, 
exports to China have been growing significantly, 9 percent annually on an average since 
the establishment of the 16+1 cooperation. Still, the share of exports to China was as low 
as 1.2 percent of the total exports of CEE countries. The stock of Chinese investment still 
represents a very low share of the total stock of FDI in the region. Meanwhile the total 
stock and share of Chinese capital in the five biggest economies (Germany, the UK, 
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France, Italy and Spain) of the EU is significantly higher both in terms of total amount 
and in terms of relative share. Actually, the export dependence of Germany, the UK and 
of France on China is higher than any of the CEE countries. None of the countries of the 
region are cash-strapped or dependent on exports to or investment from China in any 
respect. 
It is also noteworthy that public support among the population of CEE member states does 
not back the enthusiastic pro-China policies of some of their governments. According to 
the survey of Eurobarometer, only 40 percent of Hungarian and 25 percent of Czech 
respondents have a positive perception of China, while the EU average is 32 percent. The 
same applies to public discourse. In the framework of project ChinfluenCE almost 10,000 
articles published on China has been analysed in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia in the period from 2010 to 2017. According to the results, negative opinions 
outweighed positive ones by a wide margin, while the vast majority of articles were 
neutral towards China. Though the Czech leadership has made a political turnaround and 
became a supporter of Beijing in the recent years, the public discourse is still highly 
critical of China, and topics like human rights and other values are high on the agenda. 
Despite all the above-mentioned facts and figures, it would be hard to argue that China 
has not gained any political influence in certain CEE member states, as it certainly has. 
One of the most explicit examples is Hungary, as the current government offered its 
blatant support to Beijing in several cases. Budapest watered down the common statement 
of the EU on human rights, attended the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, signed 
memorandums of understanding with China against the will of the EU and even bolstered 
the Chinese discourse on the South China Sea issue following the ruling of the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in the Hague. 
Therefore, based on the assumptions above, Hungary must have gained tremendous trade 
and investment opportunities in China in exchange of its political support. It has not. The 
amount of new Chinese direct investment that flowed in the country between 2012 and 
2017 was insignificant, as low as USD 20 million, while the growth of exports to China 
was half of the regional average, and it is highly dominated by multinational companies. 
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So, what drives the pro-China development of some of the CEE countries if not lucrative 
economic exchanges with Beijing? One potential explanation is the personal political 
motivations of certain political leaders in the region. Most Czech experts regard President 
Miloš Zeman as the main initiator of the new China policy of the country, as he was the 
only EU head of state who attended a military parade in Beijing marking the end of World 
War 2. In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán seems to believe that close relations to 
China may serve as a bargaining chip in his struggle with Brussels, and cooperation with 
other illiberal states, first of all with China, may help his political endeavour. Ever since 
Victor Ponta stepped down in Romania, the country has been barely visible on the map of 
the 16+1 activities, and since the Polish leadership became disappointed in 2017, Beijing-
Warsaw relations have also taken a less amicable turn, what reinforces the assumption 
that political leaders and their interests have been playing an important role in forging the 
China-CEE cooperation. 
If the EU is to strengthen its common China policy, Brussels and major Western member 
states should stop blaming CEE countries for pursuing better economic relations with 
China, as such arguments could be easily labelled as unfair double standards. Western 
companies and politicians have been eager to cooperate with China for many decades, and 
CEE countries should get their small slice of the pie, though not very successfully yet. 
The fact that the economic outcomes of China-CEE relations are considered disappointing 
by many, and that some leaders of the region still see Beijing as a potential ally, leads us 
back to the assumption that the 16+1 is a political and not economic initiative in nature. 
Europe must find the proper answers to address this issue, while the discourse on “cash-
strapped CEE countries bought off by China” leads nowhere, or even worse, it may prove 
to be counterproductive. The present dissertation is based on my research of the past 
decade and intends to offer new results to address the above-mentioned issues and to find 





1.1. Aim of the research 
 
The aim of this work is to contribute to the literature on the link between dependence in 
forms of international trade and investments and the political consequences of such 
dependencies through an assessment of the state of bilateral relations between the PRC 
and Central and Eastern European Countries and its impact on the EU. That is, in the 
analytical section of the dissertation I focus on the effects of the 16+1 on EU-China 
relations, and not on the structure or nature of the initiative itself. 
I have had the opportunity to observe the development of the 16+1 cooperation from the 
very beginning. In the past nine years, I have witnessed the many forms of criticism and 
even accusations put forward by EU institutions and Western member states, thus the aim 
of my research was to analyse the basis of such criticisms and the soundness of these 
accusations. As I have mentioned in the introduction the main factors to be taken into 
account are the political and economic exchanges between China and the CEE region. Of 
course, the assessment of China-CEE relations would not make too much sense without 
its context, EU-China relations at large. China-CEE cooperation has to be seen in the light 
of the relations between the EU as a whole and China. Thus, in the followings I analyse 
the quality, quantity and development of political and economic exchanges between China 
and its seventeen Central and Eastern European partners, with a special emphasis on the 
EU members of the region (CEE-11). Furthermore, I compare all results to the exchanges 
between China and some major Western member states to offer an interdisciplinary 
analysis of the 16+1 cooperation and to prove or to reject claims and accusations of the 
critics. 
Based on extensive empirical analysis, the present thesis argues that, after years of 
intensive cooperation between China and the CEE region, available data do not support 
the idea of extensive, Chinese leverage based on investment or trade in CEE capital cities. 
When it comes to trade relations, the correlation is very weak, even negative, between the 
strength of political relations and trade volume. Even though previous research papers, 
discussed in the review of the literature, found strong links between these two factors (for 
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example, the Dalai Lama effect)1, it seems that Central and Eastern Europe is  less affected 
by that kind of Chinese economic influence, and thus most CEE governments have no 
reason to fear any alleged Chinese political pressure. 
However, when it comes to investment relations, the picture is different. Data suggest a 
strong and positive correlation between the quality of bilateral political relations and 
Chinese investment activity in CEE countries. Even though private enterprises have 
invested 60 per cent of all the Chinese capital in the region, it cannot be ruled out that 
CEE politicians would try to attract more Chinese investment into their home countries 
even at the price of political requests from Beijing. 
1.2. Research questions 
Based on the above-mentioned developments the questions are clear: do CEE-11 
governments really favour economic relations with China over the political unity of the 
EU, or is economic dependence translated to political consequences? On the other hand, 
have CEE-11 governments offered political favours to Beijing in exchange of economic 
benefits? Could China threaten CEE countries with the deterioration of economic relations 
in case of undesired political actions? Are CEE countries economically dependent on 
China to an extent that may influence their political actions on the EU level? Alternatively, 
in a more general way: Has the 16+1 cooperation really divided the EU? 
Questions like these are crucial, as the proper EU level reactions to the increased Chinese 
activity should be based on the proper understanding of the situation. The present paper 
aims to reveal the impact of the 16+1 on the policies of the CEE-11 countries in the EU, 
and on their attitude towards China based on three fundamental research questions: 
- How important are the absolute and relative trade and investment relations or 
dependencies between China and the CEE-11 countries? 
- Are there any correlations between the volume and dynamics of bilateral trade or 
investment relations and the quality of bilateral political relations with China? 
 
1 According to the research of Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann countries officially receiving the 
Dalai Lama at the highest political level are punished by Beijing through a reduction of their exports to 
China. (Fuchs & Klann, 2010) 
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- Has there been any significant changes in the EU level China policy of CEE-11 




According to the concerns of the European External Action Service and major Western 
EU members China might play CEE member states against the unity of the EU by offering 
economic benefits. The present work attempts to verify the validity of the two following 
assumptions: first, China may obtain political favours from CEE EU member states in 
exchange for export benefits; and second, China may obtain political favours from major 
CEE EU member states in exchange for higher levels of foreign direct investment thus 
disrupting the unity of the EU. To evaluate such an alleged threat to the cohesion of EU 
external relations and internal cohesion, the context and extent of Chinese activity in the 
CEE region must be understood, through the following hypotheses: 
H1: If China would have been buying political support in exchange of economic 
advantages, its proportional economic presence had been more significant in the 
CEE-11 countries than in Western EU member states. 
H2: If China had gained political influence in the CEE-11 countries, there would be 
a correlation between the quality of political relations and the quantity of economic 
relations with CEE-11 countries. 
H3: If China had had the political influence in CEE-11 countries to divide EU level 
China policies, the voting habits of CEE-11 countries on the level of EU or global 
issues would have changed as a sign of political compliance. 
 
1.4. Reasoning of the hypotheses 
H1: As I have mentioned before (and will give examples below) institutions of the 
European Union and certain Western member states have been accusing the CEE-11 
countries of exchanging the political unity of the EU for economic (trade and investment) 
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advantages from China. If this was true, it is reasonable to argue that Chinese economic 
presence, the stock or inflow of investment to and level of trade with CEE-11 countries 
would be proportionally higher than in other member states not affected by the Chinese 
attempt to ‘buy them on the cheap’. To put it simple, if China were successful in ‘buying-
off’ CEE-11 countries, the ‘price’ would be detectable in form of Chinese investment or 
trade opportunities favourable to CEE-11 nations after a decade of cooperation, compared 
other member states. 
H2: In close logical relation with H1, I argue that if one assumes CEE-11 countries have 
been selling political favours to China in exchange of political benefits, the countries with 
the best political relations with a grateful Beijing should have the most lucrative economic 
exchanges with China. Alternatively, it is unlikely that Beijing would willingly push its 
companies to invest heavily in and trade with countries having ill political relations with 
China. When it comes to the question how to quantify the quality of China-CEE-11 
political relations, the author is in the convenient situation to rely on the analysis of the 
China-CEE Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the main scientific 
advisory institution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC on 16+1 related issues. 
H3: Anti-dumping procedures are launched by the European Commission under the Anti-
Dumping Regulations (ADR) in order to protect the market of the EU from third countries’ 
products sold at a dumping price. The procedure requires the EC to consult the Anti-
Dumping Advisory Committee. This latter one consists of representatives of each member 
state, and though the committee’s advice does not bind the commission, its votes are 
important, as the European Council has the final say on the issue. Anti-dumping 
proceedings have been a thorny issue between the EU and the PRC, as 77 per cent of the 
procedures was initiated against Chinese products between 1995 and 2011. (Dunoff & 
Moore, 2014). The importance of the issue is well explained by the work of Scott and 
Jiang. According to their estimates granting market economy status and renouncing anti-
dumping measures as a protective tool would endanger millions of jobs and reduce the 
economic output of the EU by EUR 228 billion per year. (Scott & Jiang, 2015) Others 
question the accuracy of these estimates, and point to the fact that only 2 per cent of total 
import from China were affected by anti-dumping duties in 2014, what amounts to EUR 
6.5 billion only. (Sandkamp & Yalcin, 2016)  No matter how wide the range of estimates 
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is, it is obvious that anti-dumping procedures have a significant effect on EU-China trade 
and hurt Chinese economic interests. I consider anti-dumping votes as a great litmus paper 
to prove or reject H3, as trade policy and anti-dumping proceedings are one of the most 
neuralgic points of EU-China relations, and the ‘one country, one vote’ system gives a 
significant voting power (40per cent) to the CEE-11 nations, what is disproportional to 
their economic or demographic size in the EU. That is, anti-dumping votes are the only 
regular bureaucratic procedures where the decision of individual member states may have 
a decisive impact on issues important to Beijing. Having said that, I presume that any 
successful Chinese attempt to influence CEE nations through the 16+1 mechanism to 
disrupt EU unity would have had an impact on the voting pattern of CEE-11 countries in 
the period in question. 
Besides anti-dumping votes, another possible way to grasp the extent the pro-Chinese 
attitudes of certain CEE-11 countries is to analyse their voting habits on a global level that 
is in the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN GA). In line with relevant literature 
[e.g. (Armstrong, 1981)] the records of the UN GA offer a great opportunity to monitor 
the behaviour of CEE-11 countries on a global level, since many of the votes are 
considered to be important to the EU, China or the US. Consequently, it seems to be 
worthwhile to check how CEE-11 countries have voted in the past decade, whether they 
got more aligned to Chinese interests or their allegiance is still with the West.  
Of course, anti-dumping procedures and UN votes are not only way for CEE-11 countries 
to express their solidarity with the rest of the EU. There have been multitudes of China-
related votes on ad hoc issues in the past decade, therefore it is necessary to offer a 
thorough picture of such issues and to analyse the behaviour of CEE governments on a 
qualitative basis. 
2. Theoretical background and ontological assumptions 
 
The search for an adequate theoretical framework is an ever-recurring issue when it comes 
to the analysis of the Chinese foreign policy. Many scholars argue [e.g. (Acharya & 
Buzan, 2010) that explaining the actions of Beijing through Western political theories and 
concepts is problematic, since Asia and China is so different and unique that it cannot be 
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properly described or understood through the international relations theories (IRT) of the 
West. Consequently, it can be argued that employing Western (that is, global) theoretical 
concepts to analyse Chinese foreign policy may lead to false and invalid conclusions. 
The contradiction may be solved using the tools and frameworks of indigenous Chinese 
IRT, but that would be another rocky pathway. The study of modern foreign affairs is a 
relatively new area of research in China, thus less developed then its Western counterpart, 
and there are only a handful of indigenous Chinese concepts of IRT. Most experts agree 
that traditional Chinese culture and its system of values may mean a significant 
contribution to the Chinese version of IRT, but the study and understanding of 
contemporary Western theoretical approaches is a priority to most Chinese scholars. 
Nevertheless, it needs to be understood that from the Chinese point of view, Western IRT 
is of foreign origin, and thus a special emphasis must be placed on the consistence of 
Western concepts and Chinese traditions. (Geeraerts & Jing, 2001) This present 
dissertation, however, may allow itself the convenience to rely on the well-known Western 
schools of international relations theory, since it does not attempt to explain the actions or 
behaviour of China, but of the CEE-11 countries. 
There are several theoretical options to describe the motives and behaviour of CEE 
countries in their cooperation with China. One may argue that 16+1 should be analysed 
through the lens of liberal institutionalism. The central insight is that co-operation may be 
a rational, self-interested strategy for countries. Institutions promote interstate cooperation 
by enhancing legal liability, reducing transaction costs, increasing exchange of 
information, enhancing interaction, raising the reputation cost for reneging on agreements 
and mitigate credible commitment problems. (Keohane, 1984) Institutionalists share many 
of the realists’ assumptions about the international system: it is anarchic; that states are 
self-interested; rational actors seek to survive while increasing their material conditions; 
and that uncertainty pervades relations between countries. Still, they believe that 
cooperation between nations is possible and cooperation may be rational strategy. 
Institutionalists argue that institutions (defined as a set of rules, norms, practices and 
decision-making procedures that shape expectations) are able to overcome the uncertainty 
that undermines co-operation. Based on the brief description of liberal institutionalism it 
seems like a perfect choice to describe the 16+1 cooperation in the context of EU-China 
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relations. Many experts argue that the 16+1 initiative is a de facto institution, one of the 
fundamental and well-known reasons of its foundation was to reduce transaction costs 
through the meeting of seventeen leaders at once, it increases exchanges between the 
sides, disseminates information among the involved parties etc. (Song, 2018) I believe, 
however, that institutionalism is not the right school of thought for this present 
dissertation. 
First, the 16+1 is not a real institution. The Chinese side has always officially denied it, 
and even though it has a permanent secretariat, it is physically located in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the PRC, staffed only by Chinese diplomats, what does not meet the 
requirements and standards of an international institution. Second, as I have stated above, 
the aim of the dissertation is not to merely analyse the 16+1 itself, but to present its impact 
on and conflict with EU-China relations. That is, in the analytical section of the 
dissertation I focus on the effects of the 16+1 on the EU level policies of the CEE-11 
countries in the context of EU-China relations, and not on the structure or nature of the 
initiative itself. 
2.1. Why neorealism? 
Based on the above-mentioned considerations the present work offers a three-level 
theoretical framework to reach its research goals. First, the reasoning for the use of the 
school of neorealism follows below, as it serves as the foundation of the theoretical 
background. The foreign policy of small states according to the neorealist way of thinking 
serves as the second layer of the theoretical framework, while the last element focuses on 
the theories of economic dependence and political compliance. I believe that this three-
layered pyramid of intertwined theories offers an optimal and solid framework for the 
analytical sections of the dissertation. 
I argue it is better to describe the issues surrounding the 16+1 initiative through the lenses 
of one of the branches of realism. Neorealism or structural realism was first described by 
Kenneth Waltz in his fundamental book, the Theory of International Politics in which he 
argues that international politics is about a struggle for power, where the main actors are 
the sovereign states. Structural realists or neorealists claim that the struggle for power 
comes from the anarchic nature of the international system. Of course, anarchy does not 
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mean chaos, but that there is no higher authority that can limit the actions of states. That 
is, nothing stops states from attacking one another, consequently, it is important for a state 
to maximise its power to successfully defend itself in case of an attack. (Waltz, 1979). 
Structural realists have five assumptions when it comes to the power struggle among 
states. First, states are the primary actors of international politics and the international 
system is inherently anarchical by nature, as there is no supreme power states may turn to 
in case of threat or attack by another state, and they operate in a world in which they can 
only rely upon themselves. Second, states have the tools and the means to launch offensive 
military strikes against other states, consequently the national interest is the maximization 
of power in order to ensure the state’s survival and the distribution of economic and 
military capabilities are the most important explanatory variables. Third, states can never 
be certain about the intentions of other states. According to the neorealist school, there are 
two kinds of states: revisionist states and status quo states. Revisionist states aim at 
changing the existing balance of power, while status quo states prefer the existing system. 
A state can never be sure which category the other states belong to. Fourth, the primary 
goal of all states is survival. Fifth, all states are rational, that is, they are capable of 
successfully maximising their chances for survival. In sum, in this environment states have 
little trust in each another, and they are constantly preoccupied by accumulating as much 
power as possible in order to ensure their own survival. Even alliances formed by states 
are only temporary, as states always put their own interests ahead of that of other states, 
therefore these temporary alliances do not change the true nature of the international 
system. Furthermore, it is important to note that structural realists do not take into account 
cultural and historical differences, as they claim that the system itself makes all states to 
act in the same way. (Dunne, et al., 2013) 
Of course, the grand theory of neorealism is too broad to explain the details of CEE-11 
countries behaviour and interactions with China. First, the 16+1 cooperation does not 
cover security issues and the primary goal of the CEE-11 countries to engage in such a 
cooperation with China was economic by nature and not geopolitical. Of course, one may 
argue that the global financial crisis and the Eurozone crises around the turn of the last 
decade posed serious economic threat to the region, and economic survival was at stake, 
while trust in the EU, other member states and the international environment in general 
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diminished, thus CEE-11 countries rationally sought for new ways to maximize their 
economic security on their own. Furthermore, the crisis created an environment where 
states dominated the international stage as primary actors (even in the framework of the 
EU, where states like Germany were at odds with other states like Greece). The desire for 
more even distribution or revival of economic power may also explain the decision of 
CEE-11 countries to turn to Beijing for help, as it will be explained later. Structural realism 
may also explain how CEE-11 countries formed a temporary cooperation with China in 
which all states have been pursuing their own interests ever since, while cultural and 
historical differences did not play a role at the formation of the 16+1. 
The other reason I believe neorealism is the adequate framework for the present thesis is 
that the European Union itself views the 16+1 initiative and Chinese activities in Europe 
at large through the lens of neorealism, as a zero sum game, where more China in the CEE 
region means less Europe, where China tries to ‘divide and rule’ the EU and Beijing poses 
a threat to the security of Europe at least according to the perceptions of Brussels and other 
Western capitals.  As I have mentioned before, European experts, diplomats and 
politicians have been criticising the 16+1 cooperation, based on the assumption that China 
employs a ‘divide and rule’ strategy vis-à-vis the EU through its influence in the CEE-11 
countries. This is clearly a realist approach, where states play the main role in their fight 
to maximise their power at the expense of other states. 
 
It is obvious, that 16+1 could be analysed through other schools of thoughts, such as (neo) 
liberalism in case one would prefer to focus on the forms and means of cooperation, 
interdependences or values. Still, as any choice of theory must reflect the nature of the 
object of the analysis, I believe neorealism offers the proper framework to analyse the 
research questions of the present thesis, the conflict between 16+1 and wider EU-China 
relations and the assumed use of economic hard power by Beijing to bend the political 
will of CEE governments. 
 
2.2. Small states with neorealist characteristics 
Having established the basis of the neorealist theoretical framework of the present 
dissertation now, it is time to dig deeper and to present how small states (like the CEE-11 
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countries) adjust their foreign policy according to the neorealist school. There is, however, 
a fundamental problem at the very beginning: are CEE-11 countries small states? One of 
the interesting aspects of the study of small states that experts have never agreed on what 
makes a state small, or where the threshold is between small and big states. (Szalai, 2014) 
Still, CEE-11 countries easily fit into the category of small states both in quantitative and 
qualitative terms according to several pieces of the relevant literature. (Maurice , 1973) 
(Vanderbosch, 1964) 
What are the foreign policy motivations and considerations of small states? According to 
Szalai the neorealist school emphasises the importance of the international system as one 
of the most important influencing factors of the foreign policy of small states. The role of 
external forces is more important for small states than for big states. Likewise, the 
geographical location and their position in the international system have a major impact 
on their decisions as well. 
As Wivel and his co-authors write the security dilemma must be understood in a broad 
way when it comes to small states. These countries are more vulnerable not only to 
geopolitical or military threats but to economic threats (crises) as well, as small states tend 
to be more dependent on the global economy and trade. (Wivel, et al., 2014) 
Randall L. Schweller described four different foreign policy attitudes of states in the 
‘jungle’ of the anarchic international system: lions (the leaders of the system), lambs 
(weak states that prefer the status quo and survival), jackals (smaller states that make 
alliances with big states to maximize their profits) and the wolves (strong states that are 
unsatisfied with the status quo). Small states may choose between the role of the lamb or 
the jackals in this model, that is, they may stick to their limited foreign policy capacities 
or seek for alliances with a big state to enjoy its strength for the sake of their own interests. 
(Schweller, 1994) As Szalai writes most neorealist experts label small states as jackals, as 
these states cannot maintain their own security therefore they inevitably seek for alliances 
with strong states. (Szalai, 2014) 
As a next step, Wiberg identified five strategies small states may choose from: forging 
bilateral relations with a major power; creating alliances between two or more small states; 
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to join an alliance system of a major power; to maintain non-alignment and neutrality; to 
maintain non-alignment without declaration of neutrality. (Wiber, 1987) 
Finally, besides quantitative attributes of a state, its level of development may also play a 
role in its foreign policy. As McGowan and Gottwald writes the level of development 
(modern or less modern) and the size of a country (small or big) both influence its 
international behaviour. As modern, developed major countries have the capacity to bend 
the international system according to their self-interest, they are more capable to pursue 
an intransigent foreign policy. Meanwhile, small states, both developed and less 
developed ones, tend to be more acquiescent in their foreign policy. (McGowan & 
Gottwald, 1975) 
When it comes to the CEE-11 countries we may conclude that the region is made up of 
small and modern states, as their size falls into the proper category (especially compared 
to China or to the EU) and they are members of the EU (and of the OECD in most cases). 
CEE-11 countries have followed one of the above described small state strategies in their 
past, as they have pursued to form bilateral and multilateral security alliances (e.g. the 
special US-Poland relationship, NATO membership, EU integration), and their behavior 
also fits into the category of jackals (make alliances with big states like Western Europe 
or the US to maximize their profits). 
But how does the 16+1 and cooperation with China fit into this theoretical framework? 
One may assume that CEE-11 countries as developed small states should have preferred 
the status quo (strong pro-EU and transatlantic commitment), instead of pursuing an 
activist foreing policy and a turn toward China. I believe that the economic crisis and the 
underlying changes in global power offer the solution to this ostensible contradiction, as 
the small states of the CEE-11 had to find answers to the economic existential threat and 
to the tectonical changes of international power relations. That is, they did not abandon 
the status quo, on the contrary the status quo abandoned them. 
Sidenote Nr.1.: Why do illiberal states join international cooperation? 
Although the neorealist approach of the present work should omit factors like the 
internal political system of states. In the particular case of our topic, however, the 
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behaviour of illiberal states like China and some of its partners in Central and Eastern 
Europe is an interesting question, as many would expect these countries to ostensible 
from international cooperation and institutions based on liberal economic and political 
consideration. But states, liberal and illiberal alike, may choose to participate in a 
multilateral cooperation if doing so is considered better serving their interests in terms 
of power. 
Illiberal states understand the logic of power politics that shapes the institutional 
framework for international cooperation, thus they join multilateral organizations to 
minimize the cost incurred by not complying with the dominant system and to achieve 
their own goals with greater efficiency. Furthermore, multilateral arrangements are 
attractive to illiberal states because they provide an opportunity to spread alternative 
ideas about global governance. As Chansoo Cho states illiberal states want to be 
recognized as they are, and they join multilateral institutions largely because they do 
not have enough power yet to revise the international order as a whole. (Cho, 2012) 
For China, and some illiberal members of the 16+1 cooperation recognition is indeed 
important, while such a multilateral cooperation may help them reach their national 
goals. China can spread its own narrative about the Beijing consensus, while CEE 
countries hoped to make economic profit and to gain political influence or at least space 




2.3. Economic dependence and political compliance 
The final layer of the theoretical framework of the present dissertation focuses on the 
relationships between economic dependence and political compliance in international 
relations. It is necessary and inevitable to dig deep in this school of thought, as according 
to accusations the ‘original sin’ of the CEE-11 countries was their political courtship with 
China in hope of economic advantages. Therefore, the following section offers an insigth 
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into the theoretical works focusing on the nexus between economic and political relations 
of states.  
One of the fundamental works in this field is the paper of Adrienne Armstrong. She argues 
that nations with limited economic resources are more vulnerable to pressure from other 
nations and more likely to comply under stress, and her analysis should be viewed as a 
study of power relations. This means a clear link to neorealism and small states’ theories 
discussed above. Armstrong’s work focuses on the dynamics between economic 
dependence and political compliance as a consequence of dependence. Dependence are 
based on the following three conditions: high magnitude of a nation’s investment 
controlled by another nation; the inability to find easy substitutes for a commodity or a 
trading partner; the intense demand for a commodity.  
The first condition is not merely about FDI flows and stocks of a nation, but its trade 
relations also belong to this question. Its foreign trade and other international transactions 
relative to its GNP is a source of economic vulnerability and the greater the nation’s 
volume of trade with another, the greater the loss if that market is no longer available. 
The second condition is about the availability of substitutes (markets or dependence) and 
the cost of switching from one trade relationship to another one. A nation that concentrates 
its trade on a few commodities or markets may experience the most severe adjustment 
should trade cease. Trade dependence can be easily diminished by distributing trade 
among a wide range of partners and commodities. Armstrong also argues that export 
relations are most important from the perspective of dependence than import ties, as it is 
generally easier to find import substitutes than new export markets. 
The third condition involves the intensity of the demand for certain commodities (or other 
resources, such as financial resources). A nation which exports essential commodities (e.g. 
crude oil) has the upper hand at the negotiating table over those nations who require that 
particular commodity. The more nations which demand the commodity and the fewer the 
nations which export it, the greater the leverage on the exporter’s side. (Armstrong, 1981) 
Besides regular trade Armstrong identified international aid as a source of asymmetrical, 
nonreciprocal from of exchange, another source of dependence and leverage. The donor 
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is in a dominant position, as it can terminate such aid programmes without serious 
consequences, while the recipient would lose an important source of wealth. Furthermore, 
the demand for aid is always greater than the number of nations willing to offer it, what 
puts the donor in a great bargaining position. From the current dissertation’s point of view 
this is an important element of her theory, as CEE-11 countries were all hoping for 
Chinese financial support at the beginning of the 16+1 cooperation. Of course, it would 
not have been aid but financial investment, in the middle of the double crisis, it was vital 
for the region to find new sources of financial liquidity.  
Dependence is the basis of power, where country A wields power over country B as a 
result of B’s reliance on A. It is important to note that dependence must be one-sided, 
asymmetrical instead of an interdependent relationship. But this power is not necessarily 
translated into real action, it only means potential till country A uses it to force country B 
to do something it would not do otherwise. Armstrong cites the work of Knorr who has 
identified four possible scenarios based on the importance of certain issues:  
1. The particular issue is not important to neither the dominant nation nor the 
dependent nation 
2. The issue is not important to the dominant country, but important to the dependent 
one. 
3. The issue is important to the dominant country, but not important to the dependent 
one. 
4. The issue is of high importance for both parties. 
Table 1: The matrix of issue importance and compliance 







Implicit use of power by 
nation A. 
 




Low compliance cost for 
B, compliance is an option 
if it is in the interest of B. 
B follows its own policy 
without regard to its 
dependence on A. 
High 
Implicit, possibly explicit 
use of power by nation A. 
 
Low compliance cost for 
B, high probability of 
compliance 
Explicit use of power by nation 
A. 
 
B resists A's pressure if the 
economic burden falls short of 
the costs of compliance. 
Source: Author’s edition based on (Armstrong, 1981) and (Knorr, 1975) 
Another approach to analyse relations between dominant and dependent states was 
described by Moses K. Tesi. The so-called ‘bargaining model’ explains the implications 
of economic dependence for a dependent country's behavior in foreign affairs is a power 
model built around the notion of bargaining. Although the work of Tesi revolves around 
the relationship between developed countries and least developed countries, its 
conclusions are still valid and relevant to the issue of China-CEE relations. (We should 
not forget that President Xi Jinping of China once labelled the 16+1 as an example of 
South-South relations, that is, CEE countries were not considered as developed nations by 
Beijing (Szczudlik, 2019)) Bargaining is practically a method to settle conflict through 
the process of give and take or negotiation between two parties. Both sides try to make 
the other side give in and adopt its position and eventually each side usually gets 
something, although neither may get everything it wanted. The developed country (or the 
dominant one according to Armstrong’s terms) bring their economic resources - large and 
differentiated markets, technology, capital, expertise, etc. The less developed countries 
(or dependent) however, do not have these resources and they need access to them to 
achieve their development projects. The success of the dominant power in extracting 
compliant behavior from the dependent nation is also influenced by how vital the values 
at stake are to each party in each situation as Tesi writes in unison with the arguments of 
Armstrong and Knorr presented in Table 1. (Tesi, 1990)  
In the case of China-CEE relations it is easy to admit that under the special circumstances 
of the global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis, China had the upper hand as it was 
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offering trade and investment opportunities, while CEE economies were in desperate 
needs of these alternative resources as a substitute of business cooperation with collapsing 
Western economies.  
As Neil L. Richardson writes in his book the support of the dependent countries to the 
dominant country “may be grudging, but it may be necessary (...) the foreign policy 
behavior is viewed as partial payment in exchange for the maintenance of benefits they 
derive from their economic ties to the dominant country.” (Richardson, 1978) 
 The asymmetrical relationship means that power plays an important role in such a 
situation. The dominant state exploits its economic advantage in the process to pressure 
the subordinate partner into yielding. From the point of view of the present dissertation 
the following arguments of Tesi based on Keohane’s work are crucial: 
The dominant state can promise greater economic benefits to the dependent country as a 
reward and as a result get the latter to comply with its wishes or demands. Or the 
dependent state's compliant behavior may be based upon the anticipation that compliance 
would induce the dominant state to increase the economic benefits it provides. For 
instance, the dominant country may identify some of its own corporations and encourage 
them to invest in the dependent country. This may be further enhanced by tied loans or 
aid.On the other hand, the dominant state may employ punishments as well, as the 
dependent state's decision to comply with the wishes or demands of the dominant state 
can result from threats of punishment. Or compliance can be manifested as a precautionary 
measure in situations wherein threats for punishment have not been directly or explicitly 
made by the dominant state. The dominant state may suspend aid to the dependent country 
or impose trade and investment sanctions. (Tesi, 1990) (Keohane, 1967) 
As Tesi summarises the policy compliance is seen to be the price paid by a less developed 
country for its economic dependence on its more developed and economically powerful 
partner. When it comes to the sources of economic dependence early research focused on 
aid transfers to developing countries in the Cold War era. Later the focus of analysis 
moved to trade and foreign investments as the main economic factors. 
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Of course, the bargaining model has its shortcomings as well. It assumes that the needs of 
dependent countries are issues relating only to economic development and social well-
being, consequently their behavior toward the dominant economic partner revolves around 
calculations of how much trade, aid, investment, etc. will be added or cut-off as a result 
of this or that action. Meanwhile, the model fails to take into account other factors such 
as national security, prestige, ideology, etc. and leaves the impression that dependent 
countries would give up everything in exchange for economic development and social 
welfare. This argument is strongly challenged by real life experiences, but still, it serves 
well to describe the initial years of the 16+1 cooperation, while other factors mentioned 
above have started to play their role at a later stage of the initiative. 
Finally, Keohane and Nye argue in their book that besides asymmetry and power, the 
relationship of the dominant and dependent states consists two more important factors: 
sensitivity and vulnerability. The first means the cost that the dependent state could suffer 
at the dominant state’s hands before making compensatory adjustment. The latter refers 
to the longer run costs that the dependent country would experience even after it had 
adjusted its policies to the changes wrought by the dominant state. Vulnerability is more 
important as it denotes more enduring and cumulatively greater costs. They argue that the 
dominant country has to establish and maintain linkages between the domains of its 
superior power and the area of policy it wishes to influence in the inferior country. 
(Keohane & Nye, 2012) As Richardson adds in his paper, a dominant country is more 
interested in receiving foreign leaders' support on some issues than on others, and it would 
more forcefully seek the accord of its dependent partners on issues that it regards as 
important. When foreign policy behavior is, like foreign trade, understood as a mode of 
exchange, it suggests that the greatest compliance should be expected of those nations that 
are most trade dependent. Consequently, a positive linear relationship is expected between 
dependence and compliance. (Richardson & Kegley Jr., 1980) 
2.4. Summary of theoretical assumptions 
Based on the three-leveled pyramid of theories described above, the following conclusions 
may be drawn. The present dissertation employs neorealism as the foundation of its 
theoretical framework. Therefore, the research predominantly focuses on power relations 
between sovereign states as primary actors of international relations (China and the CEE 
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countries), although the EU cannot be left out of the analysis, however it will be 
understood as a state. The states in question aim to maximising their power to defend 
themselfes, but in our case this struggle is limited to the economic space. Under the 
circumstances of the global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis trust in international 
cooperation declined and economic survival was the primary goal of CEE countries, 
therefore they made rational choices to maximise their chances in form of temporary 
international alliances. Critics of the 16+1 cooperation also seem to employ a realist 
attitude when they express their concerns about the perceived intentions of Beijing to 
divide and rule the EU through the 16+1. 
The second level of the theoretical framework focuses on the behaviour of small states. 
External factors and geographical location play a crucial role in the foreign policy of small 
states, and they are more vulnerable not only to geopolitical but to economic threats as 
well. Consequently, most small states behave like ‘jackals’ (smaller states that make 
alliances with big states to maximize their profits) or lambs (weak states that prefer the 
status quo and survival). I argue that the double crises of the turn of the last decade pushed 
most of the CEE states towards the category of jackals as they sought to find economic 
redemption from China. Finally, small states, both developed and less developed ones, 
tend to be more acquiescent in their foreign policy. 
The third level of the framework introduced theoretical considerations to understand the 
links between economic dependence and international political compliance. This is a 
particularly important element as the fundamental problem the present dissertation 
attempts to find answer for, is the accusation that CEE-11 countries have sold out EU 
unity to China (political compliance) in exchange of trade and investment opportunities 
(economic dependence). This school of theory agrees with the works focusing on small 
states that nations with limited economic resources are more vulnerable to pressure from 
other nations and more likely to comply. Dependence is based on investment and trade 
relations, and such international transactions relative to its GNP are a source of economic 
vulnerability. Country A wields power over country B as a result of B’s reliance on A, but 
this power is not necessarily translated into real action or coercion if the issue in not 
important to the dominant state. On the other hand, even less important issues to the 
dominant states can influence the dependent state if that particular issue in not important 
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to the dependent either. Anyway, foreign policy behavior is viewed as partial payment in 
exchange for economic benefits. Finally, sensitivity and vulnerability also have to be taken 
account and a positive linear relationship is expected between dependence and 
compliance. 
Based on the above mentioned considerations, the following details are to be checked in 
the analytical part of the present dissertation to validate the assumptions of neorealism, 
small state theories and depedence&compliance: 
- CEE-11 countries acted as rational and sovereign states during the establishement 
of the 16+1 
- Trust in the international system and the EU declined in the early 2010s 
- Economic survival and power was at stake for CEE-11 countries 
- 16+1 meant to be a temporary alliance without changing the international system 
CEE-11 countries lived in 
- Cultural and historical differences were not taken into account 
- CEE-11 countries behaved like small modern states (jackals) 
- Trade and investment dependence forced CEE-11 countries to comply with 
Chinese interests 
- CEE-11 countries complied with Chinese interests when the particular issue in 
question was important to China and/or not important to CEE-11 countries 
- China employed rewards and punishments to make CEE-11 countries comply with 
its interests 
- Greatest compliance is expected of those nations that are most trade dependent, 
sensitive and vulnarable vis-á-vis China. 
 
Sidenote Nr.2.: Does neorealism explain the international behaviour of China? 
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As one of the most well-known foreign policy experts of China, Wang Jisi describes in 
his article in Foreign Affairs, the history of foreign invasions of China matters a lot to 
the leaders of the country. He also adds that the international strategy of the PRC was 
dominated by political and military security interest during the rule of Mao Zedong. In 
the era of Deng Xiaoping China embraced a non-confrontational foreign policy to 
enhance its position in the World and to consolidate the CPC’s power at home, while 
traditional security concerns remained important. The principle of state sovereignty has 
played (and still plays) an important role in Beijing’s foreign policy and it has never 
given up the option of using military force to reunite with Taiwan. Under the presidency 
of Hu Jintao, it was announced that China’s diplomacy must safeguard the interests of 
sovereignty, security and development. Furthermore, as Wang describes, there were 
competing schools of thought on the ideal foreign policy of China. Some said the 
country should focus on the US as a threat to China based on the conviction that 
Washington and other Western powers and Japan are hostile nations, and the country 
should abandon its low-profile strategy. Others insisted that the country should stick to 
the strategy of Deng Xiaoping to keep a low profile in the international arena. (Wang, 
2011) 
Dai Bingguo, then state councillor for external relations elaborated on the core interests 
of China in his article published in December 2010. According to his words, the primary 
goals of Beijing were to maintain the leadership of the CPC and socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity and national unity of 
the country, and to sustain the economic and social development of China. (Dai, 2010) 
 
International observers have been arguing that ever since President Xi Jinping came to 
power in 2012 China has been more assertive in its foreign relations. For the first time 
in its history, the Chinese leadership finally publicly articulated a coherent vision of its 
grand strategy when Xi made his speech at the 19th Party Congress in December 2017. 
According to Chen Dingding, the speech of President Xi was a clear sign that Beijing 
abandoned the strategy of Deng Xiaoping and he announced a ‘new era’. Furthermore, 
the vision of Xi presents long-term goals, a new grand strategy to guide Chine through 
2050 and to turn the country into a leading world power by the centenary of the PRC. 
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Chen believes that as China continues to grow and become more powerful, it will be 
more confident and its cultural and ideological power will increase as well to an extent 
where Beijing may offer solutions to other countries based on the ‘Chinese model’. 
(Chen, 2017) Following the meeting of the National People’s Congress a few months 
later, Zhong Feiteng of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences analysed the results in 
March 2018. According to his understanding, the ultimate goal of Xi’s strategy is to 
develop China into a state with substantial global influence. (Zhong , 2018) 
President Xi Jinping delivered a remarkable speech at the 19th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China on 18 October 2017. I believe his words represent the dawn 
of a new era, where the competition between the US and China gets to a new level and 
goes beyond economic or strategic competition. As Mr. Xi said: 
“It means that the path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics have kept developing, blazing a new trail for other developing countries 
to achieve modernisation. It offers a new option for other countries and nations who 
want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers 
Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.” (Xi, 
2017) 
In the same speech the President also said that in the ’new era’ China will move closer 
to the centre of the World’s stage and make greater contributions to mankind, and that 
the dream of the Chinese people is connected with the dreams of the people of other 
countries, and that China’s international influence, ability to inspire and power to shape 
had risen further. Based on such statements it seems clear that China wants to play a 
major power’s role in World affairs. In his three-hours-long speech, Xi listed the 
priorities of China for the upcoming years in December 2017. Many of these points 
offer an insight into the new foreign policy approach of the country one may expect in 
the upcoming years. First of all, the leading role of the party is a primary goal of the 
CPC. Furthermore, Xi called for a comprehensive understanding of national security. 
Besides the traditional core interests of the country (sovereignty, Tibet, Taiwan) Beijing 
intends to incorporate the South China Sea into sphere of influence and to pursue a more 
proactive foreign policy, in sharp contrast with Deng’s strategy. (CPC, 2017)  
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In summary, the most important priorities of China in the last decades have always been 
issues such as the survival of the party (that is, the survival of the communist state, the 
PRC); national sovereignty; nationalism (Maoism was an atypical form of communism, 
nationalistic in nature, in sharp contrast with the internationalism of the Soviet style 
communism); the predominance of the state and pragmatism. This latter one, 
pragmatism is probably the best way to describe Chinese policies, especially since the 
era of Deng Xiaoping, as practical results have been more important than ideological 




3. Methodology and Epistemic Assumptions 
 
Research methods employed by the present work are in accordance with the standards of 
the multidisciplinary doctoral school of the Corvinus University of Budapest, aimed at 
finding scientifically verified answers to the research questions and hypothesis of the 
thesis. The backbone of the research is based on quantitative research based on publicly 
available national and international statistical databases, scientific publications, and 
especially on the exclusive statistical analysis of publicly not available documents of the 
European Union. Besides the aforementioned sources, other primary and secondary 
sources have been used during my research, such as news releases, governmental 
communiques and documents, publications, interviews and background information based 
on my own research in the last nine years. Besides quantitative tools, qualitative methods 
will be employed as well to statistically analyse the strength and sophistication of 
economic and political relations between China and its CEE partners. 
In order to evaluate such an alleged threat to the cohesion of EU external relations, the 
context and extent of Chinese activity in the CEE region are to be understood. The analysis 
of trade and investment relations starts in 2009, the first year of the global economic crisis 
when CEE countries experienced the first shockwaves and turned their attention toward 
China, and it continues to 2019. The analytical section of the paper compares Chinese 
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trade and investment in Central Europe to EU trade and investment in the region. In a 
further step, the paper analyses the development of trade dependency of individual CEE 
economies in contrast to their political relations with China. 
The aim of the research in the case of H1 is to present the importance of the volume and 
dynamics of trade and investment relations with China to CEE countries in comparison to 
the same activities with other EU members. Trade dependence and trade magnitude will 
be considered of the CEE-11 countries compared to the similar data of France, Germany 
and the UK. In case of H2 the analysis will shed light on any potential (negative or 
positive) correlation between the quantities (and development) of trade and investment 
relations with China and the quality of bilateral political relations. In both cases, the 
statistical database of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development offers 
all necessary data on trade to conduct a statistical analysis of bilateral relations between 
China and its eleven partners in the CEE region. The statistical analysis will shed light on 
the correlations between the quality of political relation and level of economic 
cooperation, including trade and investment dependence on China. As for investment 
relations, the paper analyses the flow of Chinese investment into CEE economies 
compared to the quality of their political relations with Beijing, and it also compares the 
relative importance of Chinese financial capital in the CEE region and in other parts of 
the EU. Since investor ownership structure also plays a significant role, the paper offers, 
lastly, a review of the background of Chinese companies with a presence in the region. 
Export dependence is calculated as: 
EXD: Xij/Xi 
Where Xij= country i’s merchandise exports to China 
 Xi= country i’s total exports 
Trade Magnitude is calculated as: 
𝑻M=𝑿𝒊𝒀𝒊𝒋, 




Where: TM stand for Trade Magnitude 
𝐴𝑖: The value of total exports and imports of nation i (CEE-11) 
𝐺𝑁𝑃𝑖: The Gross National Product of nation i (CEE-11) 
𝑋𝑖: (Trade Importance) The percentage of exports and imports as a part of economic 
production of nation i (CEE-11) 
𝑌𝑖𝑗: (Trade Dependence) -Amount of trade conducted with the dominant nation (China) 
𝐴𝑖: The value of total exports and imports of nation i (CEE-11) 
𝐴𝑖𝑗: The value of exports and imports of nation j (CEE-11) to nation i. (China) 
 
FDI dependence represents the share of the Chinese investment to CEE-11 countries in 
the GDP of CEE-11 nations and is measured as a percentage of GDP. 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑝= 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑗/𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖∗100 
 
In order to prove the last hypothesis (H3), I have requested the Council of the European 
Union to disclose the documentation of all China related anti-dumping votes for the period 
between January 2004 and April 2015. I have received and coded almost 200 documents 
featuring the 3000 votes of individual member states in the previously mentioned period. 
Based on statistical analysis I will either confirm or reject the hypothesis that pro-China 
votes of the CEE-11 countries must have been significantly growing in the post-16+1 
period, if Beijing was indeed able to influence them through the promises of economic 
benefits. Since the EU’s anti-dumping decisions are important to China, and CEE member 
states represent almost 40 per cent of voting power, any pressure from Beijing should have 
had an impact on voting patterns. 
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When it comes to the analysis of UN GA, the present work utilises UN General Assembly 
voting as a proxy for political influence and foreign policy using a panel of 11 EU 
members of the 16+1 cooperation. As international criticism and thus the research 
questions presume that CEE-11 countries have sold out EU unity in exchange of economic 
gains, the analysis focuses on issues important to the West in general. The US State 
Department annually publishes the voting patterns of UN member states about selected 
votes important to the US. Based on these sources it is possible to construct an index of 
voting alignment with China or the US and the EU, to see if CEE-11 countries deviated 
from EU positions or not. To create an index of voting alignment the present thesis follows 
the methodology proposed by Kilby which codes votes in which the country voted in 
agreement with China as 1, unmatched votes as 0 and abstentions as 0.5. The calculations 
treat abstention as a vote, since it can be taken to reflect a political statement. Meanwhile, 
absents are not included, as absenteeism can be due to a number of other factors but 
influence. (Kilby, 2009) 
 
As to the sources of the thesis, the present work relies both on primary sources such as 
databases, EU Commission documents, official communiques and political speeches and 
on secondary sources such as scientific papers, policy papers and books that have been 
published by experts and researchers of the matter. Furthermore, given my own decade-
long research on the issue, I will also rely on some of my previous works published in 
peer-reviewed journals or other publications. 
 
3.1.  Definition of the CEE region and the geographical limits of the research 
When I started to work on China-CEE relations in 2009, one of the main methodological 
problem was how to define the concept of “Central and Eastern Europe” from a historical, 
geographical or political point of view. Terms like “Central Europe”, “Eastern Europe” or 
“Central and Eastern Europe” are widely used in public discourse, but their real meaning 
is too ambiguous or vague to rely on in a scientific work. The exact definition of the region 
depends on the topic or field of science in question, and unable to embrace the complexity 
of the cultural, ethnic, language and historical diversity of the region. That is, the concept 
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of “Central Europe” has been dynamically changing through the ages (Johnson, 1996), 
and the following definitions are the most relevant ones in contemporary political 
discourse. 
According to Ronald Tiersky the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia and their 
Visegrad 4 cooperation (V4) represents the core or the engine of the region (Tiersky, 
2004). Others believe that “Central Europe” means a certain level in the process of 
Europeanisation, proven by the similar way of development in V4 countries. From a 
German point of view, the main theme of the Central European identity is the division line 
between the Western and Eastern (orthodox) Christianity. (Katzenstein, 1997) 
The definitions used by major international organisations rarely focus on the historical or 
cultural background of the region. According to the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) the CEE region comprises Albania, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three 
Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. (OECD, 2014) 
The definition or concept of Central (and Eastern) Europe itself represents an independent 
and widely researched topic, with an extensive list of publications. When it comes to the 
scope of the present thesis, however, the complexity of the question was highly reduced 
by the simple fact that the PRC has issued a list of countries it cooperates with in the CEE 
region. Thus, I am in the convenient situation to rely on the Chinese understanding of the 
region, comprising the following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
(North)Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. (PRC MFA, 
2012) I can speculate only how China selected these countries, while it omitted some 
others in the region. Kosovo seems to be the most obvious case as Beijing does not 
recognise the sovereignty of Pristina. The picture gets a bit murkier to the East, as 
Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus are not a member of the cooperation either, what might be 
explained by Russia’s strong influence and interests in these countries. Towards the West, 
the picture is less foggy, China has seemingly selected all countries East of the former 
iron curtain (except former East Germany of course). 
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Although China has signed a formal cooperation agreement with 16 CEE countries, only 
11 of these were EU member states at the same time. Since I would like to analyse the 
impact of the 16+1 cooperation on the level of the European Union, I will focus on these 
eleven EU member states, with a special emphasis on the key countries of the region, such 
as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, the five countries 
representing almost 82 per cent of the GDP of CEE member states and 89 per cent of the 
region’s $97 billion bilateral trade with China. (UNCTAD, 2020) Furthermore, as I have 
mentioned before, the present thesis excludes the analysis of Greek-Chinese relations, 
because Athens has joined only a year ago and from a political, economic or historical 
point of view, Greece is not considered part of the CEE region. 
3.2. The timeframe of the research 
Since the present work focuses predominantly on the 16+1 cooperation, the general 
timeframe of the research starts in 2011 (the year of the first China-CEE meeting) and 
lasts until 2020. Of course, to offer a historical background to the description of political 
and economic relations, a brief section gives an overview of bilateral relations between 
China and specific CEE countries, while in case of the third hypothesis the analysis covers 
a pre- and post-16+1 periods as well. 
3.3. The use of Chinese names and expressions 
In accordance with international standards, the present dissertation employs the official 
Chinese pinyin system to romaine Standard Chinese names and expressions. 
 
3.4. Structure of the thesis 
Following the introduction and the sections on theoretical considerations and 
methodology, the thesis follows a top-down approach, that is it presents EU-China 
relations as the macro level environment of the 16+1 in Chapter 4, than it narrows down 
its scope to the brief history and the general introduction of the 16+1 itself and bilateral 
relations between China and selected CEE countries in chapters 5 and 6 respectively. 
Chapter 7 introduces the social and political perceptions of China in CEE countries, while 
chapter 8 presents the means and fields of the 16+1 cooperation through the guidelines 
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published after each summit. Chapter 9 offers an insight to the literature on the 
connections between Chinese investments and political strings, while chapter 10 sheds 
light on the European concerns about the 16+1. In chapter 11, the thesis presents the 
empirical quantitative analysis based on statistical databases and the political ranking 
system. Chapter 12 takes political actions if CEE-11 countries into consideration what 
may seemingly contradict the findings of the databased empirical analysis.  The lucky 
thirteenth chapter concludes the thesis and articulates recommendations to policy makers 
to the future development of EU-China and 16+1 relations, while chapter 14 admits certain 
limitations of the thesis and offers further research opportunities.  
4. EU-China relations and the European context 
 
The following chapter introduces the history and structure of EU-China relations as the 
wider context of the 16+1. Of course, I cannot offer a full picture of the long history and 
extremely complicated mechanism of EU-China relations as a whole, still it is important 
to shed light on the mutual interests and tensions in this relationship. Given the extent and 
depth of political and economic cooperation between the EU and China, it is 
understandable that EU institutions and some member states developed concerns 
regarding the 16+1, what many perceived as a challenge to the existing cooperation 
mechanism between Brussels and Beijing. 
Individual member states of the European Union have had various relations with China 
over the past decades. Members of the former Eastern Bloc recognised the PRC and 
established official diplomatic relations with Beijing a few days after the proclamation of 
its establishment in early October 1949. Meanwhile, Western European states followed 
different paths in their relations with China. The United Kingdom was among the first to 
recognise the PRC in 1950 due to the special situation of Hong Kong. France made official 
contact with Beijing in 1966 in the framework of the independent policies of President 
Charles de Gaulle. Most of the Western countries, however, established diplomatic ties 
later in the 1970s, following the US-Chinese rapprochement. Beijing’s accession to the 
United Nations (UN) triggered a response from the European Economic Community 
(EEC) since the enormous potential of the Chinese domestic market offered attractive 
trade and investment opportunities to the companies of the European integration. The two 
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sides reached an agreement to establish diplomatic ties in 1975, followed by the inflow of 
European capital into China, especially after the implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s 
Reform and Opening up policy in the late 1970s. Due to the nature and competencies of 
the EEC trade issues stood in the focal point of bilateral relations in the next decade, until 
the Tiananmen shock in 1989 when the Europeans and the US introduced economic, 
political and military sanctions against the Chinese regime. Economic interests, however, 
proved to be stronger than political and value-based considerations and economic and 
trade sanctions were lifted by the mid-1990s. The arms embargo is still in power as of 
today but has a minor impact on bilateral economic relations. Following decades of rapid 
development EU-China trade has become one of the biggest trade relations in the world 
as its total value surpassed EUR 600 billion in 2019. (EU, 2019) Meanwhile EU members 
are among the most significant investors in China with a total stock of FDI over EUR 175 
billion and the EU is the most important source of high technology for China. After 
decades of development EU-China relations have started to develop symptoms of 
deterioration in the recent decade as mutual disappointments and rising tensions poisoned 
economic and political relations as well. The EU shares the China related concerns of the 
Trump administration, though it does not share the means and methods of Washington in 
dealing with such issues. Trade deficit and market access is a major headache for most 
EU members, as it shows how easily the Chinese goods and investments penetrate the 
open European markets, while China still protects its own markets in various ways. The 




4.1.  EU-China political relations 
EU-China diplomatic relations celebrate their 45th anniversary in 2020, and bilateral ties 
have experienced both setbacks, such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, and high 
points such as the 2003 strategic partnership in the past forty-five years. Formal relations 
between the European Union and China started in 1975 yet took on more importance only 
from the 1990s onwards with China's Reform and Opening up policy. The two sides 
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signed a strategic partnership in 2003 and fifteen years after this affirmation, EU–China 
relations are without doubt one of the most significant relations in international relations, 
given that the two parties represent around 30 per cent of world trade, and 25 per cent of 
humanity. Besides, despite significant differences in their political systems and values, 
China and the EU have built up an exceptionally complex collaboration at several levels, 
including political, strategic and economic or people-to-people dialogues.  The agreement 
to upgrade the existing partnership between the two sides in 2003 to a strategic partnership 
was motivated by a “similar understanding of the post-Cold War international system and 
of both partners’ place within it”. (Casarini, 2012) The EU and China had similar views 
about the forces of globalisation, the fallout of 9/11, the growing economic 
interdependence between the two sides and the desire by both of them to play a more 
active role in global affairs. Since the first EU–China summit took place in 1998 EU–
China relations have become well institutionalised as dozens of official meetings take 
place every year. European and Chinese statements now and again refer to their interests 
in each other and their common views on certain global issues, such as climate change or 
trade. The EU and China has expressed their mutual will for cooperation and joint action 
as well.  For decades, there has been a mutual agreement between the two sides on 
partnership in sharp contrast of the more confrontational US-China relationship. 
(Christiansen, et al., 2019)  
 
Meanwhile, there are major differences and clashes as well in EU-China relations, as both 
sides have their own historical experience and perspective. The EU and China have gone 
through different ways of political and economic development while their geopolitical 
interests are also highly different. Their political nature shows major differences as well. 
The EU has a legal personality and international powers, still it is not a state and therefore 
its behaviour on the international stage is very different from classical actors. EU level 
institutions have a significant level of independent power to influence the international 
actions of the integration, but in reality, the EU is not a ‘superstate’. Its member states 
have their own political and economic interest and maintain their own foreign policy and 
bilateral relations to China. As Christiansen and Kirchner write in their book this unique, 
hybrid nature of the EU makes it sometimes difficult to articulate common policies vis-á-
vis other countries and traditional states like China. (Christiansen, et al., 2019) 
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China is also a unique country. It was invaded, massacred, colonised and war torn for a 
century before the communist takeover led to even more human and economic losses in 
the 1960s and ‘70s.  Throughout its history, China preferred to think of itself as the centre 
of civilisation, with all outward entities considered barbaric and therefore necessarily in-
ferior to the Middle Kingdom. All under heaven (tian xia) in traditional Chinese thinking 
means not only the physical world; it is a cultural concept that also incorporates morality 
and the workings of the universe. The classical Chinese international system, called the 
tributary system is essentially based on inequality, as it meant that the beings in the world, 
including countries, are unequal: China is at the centre point, surrounded by all else ar-
ranged in concentric circles.   All under heaven form part of a great hierarchy, which, per 
definitionem, is without any conflict and comprises every country dominated by China. 
Traditional Chinese thinking distinguished no individual sovereign states but considered 
all under heaven to be part of a single whole, which is why it lacks the concept of inter-
national relations in the classical sense. (Matura, 2020) 
Of course, China had to learn the realities of the Western international system through 
suffering in the 19th and 20th century, but thousands of years of tradition did not disappear 
entirely, and under Mao Zedong China tried to re-establish itself as a major power. Later, 
in the era of Deng Xiaoping Beijing realised the need of economic development as a 
prerequisite of its re-emergence to international dominance and given its spectacular 
growth and development Beijing has started to assert itself as a major power in the recent 
years. Since the EU is located far away from China, geopolitical and strategic 
considerations do not influence their bilateral relationship, as it is mostly focused on 
economic issues. Still, European countries are often remembered as colonial powers and 
the main actors in the so-called century of humiliation, and these historical memories have 
an impact on bilateral political relations even today. As Kirchner and Christiansen writes, 
when the EU talks about human rights, open markets and liberal  democracy, or about its 
expectations of China being a responsible stakeholder  in the international community, 
then the underlying assumption is  that relations with Beijing would be easier for the EU 
if China were to become  more ‘like us’. Consequently, much of the China policy of the 
EU and its biggest member states was patronizing China to a certain extent and was 
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focusing on what the West wanted China to be, rather than what China itself was aspiring 
to. (Christiansen, et al., 2019) 
For many years, the EU embraced a liberal-institutional approach in its dealing with 
China. EU level China policy was focusing on the mutual benefits of economic 
cooperation and common interest such as global stability, predictability and the deepening 
of globalisation. In the recent years, however, a more realist perspective has emerged in 
the EU and its member states. From a European perspective, the rise of China and its 
increasingly assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping means a major disappointment, as 
the EU believed that decades of economic and political engagement with China would 
ultimately lead to convergence between the two sides that is China would become more 
like the West. The current European discourse about China is in a sharp contrast with its 
former cooperative attitude, as the EU and its major members have become suspicious 
about the intentions of Beijing, and started to think about the national interests and power 
of themselves. As Fox and Godement wrote it back in 2009, the EU’s China strategy was 
based on the belief that China, under the influence of Europe would liberalise its economy, 
improve the rule of law and democratize its politics. This strategy produced a plethora of 
bilateral agreement, memorandums of understanding, summits and other high-level visits, 
yet as their report showed, China’s foreign policy evolved in an independent way and 
resisted European influence. (Godement & Fox, 2009) Fox and Godement were very 
pessimistic about the intentions of China and EU-China relations in 2009, and when they 
revisited the question a decade later, they found that the EU had started to act in a more 
realist way vis-á-vis China, and requirements for reciprocal opening entered EU policy 
statements on China. (Godement & Vasselier, 2017)  
In the past decade it has also become clear that China is more important for the EU and 
its member states than the EU is for China. It is partially a consequence of the EU’s search 
for partners for the sake of multilateralism, as the EU needs to initiate partnerships while 
the independent foreign policy of China does not see such structures crucial. (Wissenbach, 
2007) The asymmetry of the relationship was somewhat mitigated by China’s intentions 
to find alliances in Europe to counter the policies of Donald Trump. The Covid-19 crisis 
and China’s dominance in supplying medical equipment, however, reinforced the 
asymmetry once again. 
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As the EU has not been able to formulate a strong unified China policy, Beijing attaches 
higher importance to some of its member states than to Brussels itself. This is especially 
true when China sees opportunities to gain the upper hand as member states compete with 
each other for lucrative business opportunities with the Chinese side. That is, common 
objectives do not necessarily coincide with common commitments. For instance, relations 
between the EU and China have often encountered clashes over human rights, religious 
freedom, security or environmental protection, the proper application of international law, 
territorial integrity and non-interference in domestic affairs. One of the principle reasons 
for these differences is that the EU has an inherently more flexible understanding of 
sovereignty and is widely seen as a normative or ‘civilian’ power, while China regards 
sovereignty and national interest as absolute priorities of its foreign policy. (Christiansen, 
et al., 2019) 
Despite the long relationship between China and the EU, the fundamental problem of the 
EU is still unresolved. As it has been mentioned above, member states have their own 
political and economic interests and pursue their own foreign policy and bilateral relations 
to China. The lack of a unified and solid China policy undermines the leverage of the EU, 
as China can actively exploit differences between member states by individual 
partnerships with EU countries. Consequently, some observers see the EU as “suffering 
from internal divisions, being less in political terms than the sum of its parts and lacking 
strategic vision.” (Christiansen, et al., 2019) 
The most recent development of bilateral ties was coined by the EU’s latest assessment of 
relations, titled EU-China – A strategic outlook. To the surprise of many observers, the 
EU used unprecedently strong words to describe its relationship to Beijing: 
“China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with 
whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom 
the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the 
pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative 
models of governance. This requires a flexible and pragmatic whole-of-EU 
approach enabling a principled defence of interests and values. The tools and 
modalities of EU engagement with China should also be differentiated 
depending on the issues and policies at stake. The EU should use linkages across 
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different policy areas and sectors in order to exert more leverage in pursuit of 
its objectives.” (European Commission, 2019) 
These words signal the changing attitude of the EU towards China, as it acknowledges a 
shift in the balance of challenges and opportunities in bilateral relations and take a more 
assertive approach. On May 6, 2020 EU ambassadors to Beijing published an op-ed in 
two major Chinese newspapers the China Daily and the People’s Daily, titled Marking 45 
years of EU-China diplomatic relations in a time of global crisis. The authors were 
praising cooperation in many areas such as political, economic, financial, scientific, 
educational and cultural spheres and shared interests in the peaceful resolution of global 
conflicts, climate change mitigation, sustainable development, food and energy security, 
nuclear non-proliferation and social justice. However, the EU Delegation in Beijing was 
informed by the two media outlets that that the publication of the Op-Ed “would only be 
allowed by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the condition that a part of a 
sentence related to the origins and spread of the coronavirus was removed” what marked 
a new milestone in the deterioration of bilateral relations. (Delegation of the EU to China, 
2020) European criticism of the 16+1 cooperation feeds into this emerging anti-Beijing 
discourse, as it sees Chinese activities in the CEE countries as a zero-sum game, where 
China – now claimed to be not only a partner but an economic competitor and systemic 
rival as well – gains more power and the EU loses its influence. 
 
4.2. EU-China trade relations 
The economic relationship between China and the EU is extensive. While the EU is 
China’s largest trading partner, China is the EU’s second largest, and it may catch up with 
the US soon.  
 
According to the statement of the EU Delegation in Beijing, the EU seeks to promote 
reciprocal economic and financial exchanges between the EU and China. For the sake of 
proper communication, the following dialogue mechanisms have been established 
between the two sides:  
- the High-level Economic and Trade Dialogue, chaired by a Vice President on the 
EU side and a Vice-Premier on the Chinese side 
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- the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank, on one side, and the Chinese Ministry of Finance, the 
People's Bank of China and the Chinese financial market regulators, on the other 
- the Macroeconomic Dialogue between the European Commission and the National 
Development and Reform Commission of China 
 
The EU and China are the two of the biggest traders of the World thus their bilateral 
exchange of goods and services is of considerable size. China is the biggest source of 
imports to the EU, while most of the advanced technology arrives to China from the EU. 
As the volume of bilateral trade keeps increasing, the two actors are on due course to 
become each other’s most important trade partner in the upcoming years. The EU is 
committed to open trading relations with China, and wants to ensure that China trades 
fairly, respects intellectual property rights and meets its obligations as a member of the 
World Trade Organisation. (Delegation of the European Union to China, 2016) 
Since China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation in 2001, the EU’s goods exports 
to China have grown on average more than 10 percent a year and service exports by over 
15 percent a year. This has resulted in ample benefits for businesses and consumers of the 
EU but at the same time, it has also caused some disruption in European labour and 














Figure 1: EU-China Trade (2009-2019) 
 
 
Source: (Directorate-General for Trade, 2020) 
 
The trade relationship between China and the EU should be understood in a general 
equilibrium context, rather than from a bilateral perspective. Even if China does not buy 
as much from the EU as it sells to the EU, the EU has an overall trade surplus, and this is 
made possible to some extent by the EU’s exports to third parties, which have, in turn, 
seen their exports to China surge. (Dadush, et al., 2019) 
Trade and investment related issues are discussed at the annual EU-China Summit and at 
the following main annual dialogues: 
- the High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue (HED), chaired by a Vice President 
on the EU side and a Vice-Premier on the Chinese side 
- the Joint Committee (JC) at Commissioner/Minister level 
- the Trade and Investment Policy Dialogue (TIPD) and the Economic Trade 
Working Group (ETWG) at Technical level 
 
The structure of trade between the EU and China is well developed and balanced. Based 
on the high added value of exchanged commodities, the relationship can be described as 
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trade between two developed countries, and not as trade between a developed region (the 
EU) and a developing country (China) 
 
Table 2: Structure of EU trade with China 
  
Source: (Directorate-General for Trade, 2020) 
 
4.3. EU-China investment relations 
The composition of Chinese foreign exchange reserves and the geographical distribution 
of the investments are confidential data. (Neely, 2017) Consequently, there are only esti-
mates regarding the countries in which China has investments and the government secu-
rities of which it purchases. The situation is illustrated by the fact that even Chinese re-
searchers and reports mainly rely on western estimates concerning their own foreign ex-
change reserves. 
The lack of information constitutes a serious problem for both researchers and decision 
makers. This deficiency derives not only from fast changes and the Chinese companies’ 
unprecedented demand for stake in European business but also from the fact that members 
of the EU does not provide general information about the details of investment, thus it 
prevents the creation of an official and frequently updated databank about it. It is difficult 
to identify the geographical targets of Chinese financial capital what makes the situation 
even more complicated. Almost 60 per cent of Chinese Outward Direct Investment (ODI) 
has been directed to tax havens and investment centres such as the Cayman Islands, the 
British Virgin Islands and Hong Kong, therefore, the route of this amount of money is 
problematic to track. (Huang & Xia, 2018) Nevertheless, a considerable part of this capital 
most probably returns to China after a “round-tripping” due to taxation matters. The ex-
ploration of this field is further complicated by the fact that China tends to use western 
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monetary infrastructure to conduct its fiscal transactions; it is therefore probable that an 
offer from London originates from a Chinese buyer. 
 
The going global strategy (Zǒuchūqū Zhànlüè) was introduced by the Chinese government 
in 1999. The first years of this new approach were less successful, with some significant 
failures. The second half of the 2000’s witnessed a tremendous increase in Chinese ODI 
outflows, shaken only temporarily by the global financial crisis. Over the past decades, 
the Chinese economy has been relying mostly on growing volumes of exports and major 
infrastructure investments, until the outbreak of the global crisis. The structural changes 
of the world economy raised the awareness of the government in Beijing that relying upon 
the export of low value-added manufactured goods or building more infrastructure cannot 
ensure the sustainable growth of the Chinese economy anymore. Instead, Chinese firms 
must move up on the value chain of the global manufacturing sector, and to generate more 
and more wealth domestically.  
The economic model of China in the previous decades resulted in huge foreign exchange 
reserves, and the financial crisis in Europe offered a unique opportunity to utilise that 
capital to acquire financially distressed European firms, which were equipped with the 
industrial and commercial technology and know-how. Through ‘Going Global’ compa-
nies will exposure to mature markets, and it will force them to learn management skills 
and further intangible assets abundant in developed countries but scarce in China. Another 
reason behind the strategy was to mitigate political pressure on Renminbi exchange rates 
with the world, while it was indeed a better investment strategy than buying governmental 
bonds. The latter option was too risky during the years of the Euro zone crisis, while the 
opportunity to acquire European companies at low market capitalisation was tempting. 
(Jie, 2012) 
 
China’s investments in Europe have made front-page news on several occasions in recent 
years, especially in those cases when one well-established European company or another 
has become its target for acquisition. The fact that MG Rover, Saab and finally Volvo 
passed completely or partially into Chinese ownership, has aroused the interest of the 
press, and indeed, frequently the sources regarded as authoritative also warned of Europe’s 
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acquisition by China. Naturally, all of these fears are exaggerated; at the same time, it is 
quite true that the weakness of the European economy and listed companies first during 
the Eurozone crises and now due to the economic downturn induced by the COVID-19 
pandemic has created an excellent opportunity for Chinese companies to buy up their 
European competitors for various reasons. 
Although Europe in general is a proponent of an open and investor-friendly business 
environment, concerns often arise regarding the motivation behind the Chinese purchases 
and their consequences. In my opinion, a lack of reliable and comprehensive information 
and data makes discernment difficult; knowledge of them would promote understanding 
of the rapidly changing situation. In addition, there also exists a serious dearth of up-to-
date specialist literature, which stems on the one hand from the lack of appropriate 
databases, and on the other from the novelty of the Chinese economic presence. That the 
situation changes so rapidly that even the existing data and statistics soon become 
obsolete, and no pan-European data are available, represents a further obstacle.  
It should be noted at the same time that even with data in the appropriate quantity and of 
appropriate quantity, it would be difficult to state the genuine sources of the capital flow, 
since in 2010 more than three quarters of Chinese operating capital exports left the 
People’s Republic of China through Hong Kong, Luxemburg, Singapore or the British 
Virgin Islands and other tax havens (often only for a brief time, because the 
“globetrotting” of Chinese capital for reasons of taxation is a common phenomenon). 
Hong Kong itself received 55 percent of the flow of Chinese ODI (Outward Direct 
Investment). 
The situation is often similarly uncertain regarding foreign trade with China. Frequently 
quite serious deviations can be encountered among the data published by the individual 
(Central) European countries, Chinese sources and international organisations. 
Because China’s presence and investment activity in the East Central European region is 
a relatively new phenomenon, the number of reliable and comprehensive sources is quite 
low. In the area of general EU–China relations, Françoise Nicolas in her 2009 study 
pointed out that although China’s investments in Europe are growing continuously, their 
percentage is infinitesimal within total operating capital in Europe. (Nicolas, 2009) 
According to official Chinese numbers in 2010 Chinese capital invested in the EU was 
USD 12.5 billion, while according to the study by Thilo Hanemann and Daniel H. Rosen, 
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entitled “China Invests in Europe: Patterns, Impacts and Policy Implications,” in 2011 it 
was USD 20.9 billion, and according to the Heritage Foundation’s China Global 
Investment Tracker it was USD 60.3 billion (including already signed but not yet actually 
implemented contracts). (MOFCOM, 2011) (Hanemann & Rosen, 2012) In other words, 
even in the latter case Chinese investments represented a mere 0.82 percent of all foreign 
operating capital invested in the European Union. In Nicolas’ opinion – and in this area 
the specialist literature is unanimous – the primary motivations for Chinese investments 
in Europe were new markets, strategic investments and technology transfer. Obtaining 
through acquisitions and mergers prestigious brands, as well as the know-how and 
logistical systems connected with them, had similar significance for them. According to 
Nicolas, up until then the performance and profitability of Chinese companies present in 
Europe had been disappointing. (At the same time, I believe that in certain cases this may 
also derive from the fact that Chinese companies, to gain new markets, deliberately 
allowed for initial losses. The trouble was caused by the prolonged European crisis, which 
was swelling these losses to a much larger size than planned.) 
 
The situation, however, has significantly changed in the subsequent years, as Chinese 
investment skyrocketed in the EU in the 2010s. Analysts of the European Council on 
Foreign Relations have summarised their opinion in the first sentence of their study: 
“China is Buying up Europe”. (Godement, et al., 2011) Chinese investments in Europe 
quadrupled between 2007 and 2010 indeed and this process has even accelerated further 
in the recent years. The total value of Chinese investments reached 12 billion dollars by 
2010 and increased astonishingly to over EUR 100 billion by 2016 and to EUR 160 billion 












Figure 2: Chinese FDI in the EU (2000-2019) 
 
 
Source: (Kratz, et al., 2020) 
 
Of course, China could not increase its investment indefinitely, and numbers have started 
to decrease significantly in since 2018. Beijing may have carried out cost–benefit analyses 
to measure up the amount that is worth investing into European economy, saving sufficient 
capital to be injected into the Chinese financial system even in the case of a collapse of 
the market in Europe and a subsequent recession of the world economy In case of a 
potential global depression, Beijing will be preoccupied with its own problems. Moreover, 
the current deflating of the real estate bubble as well as the astonishingly high degree of 
public of provinces and other local authorities may even lead to a domestic crisis, but also 
affecting the world economy. 
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A further significant point at issue is that aiding the previous colonial powers, the “spoilt 
and rich” western societies are vexing to Chinese public opinion as poverty is still a serious 
problem in their own country. Even though China is not a democracy, decision-making in 
Beijing is highly influenced by public sentiment. “Some members of the EU do not make 
sufficient efforts in order to resolve the crisis” – not only is this the public opinion, but 
also conviction (based upon personal experience) of experts of international relations, 
influential people in the area of foreign policy.  
 
Figure 3: Stock of Chinese investment by member states (2019) 
 
Source: (Kratz, et al., 2020) 
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Prior to the financial and economic crisis, the EU was on the way towards establishing a 
substantial and strong relationship with China on a community level. This intention, how-
ever, was shaken by individual national interests that increasingly intensified in the course 
of the recession. The attitude of member states towards the East Asian country has polar-
ised the EU and member states struggling with financial difficulties have been competing 
for Chinese connections considerably weakening each other in the process. The conse-
quent situation could be described as “divide and rule”, even though China does not aim 
at dividing members of the EU – they divide themselves. 
 
Figure 4: Member state attitudes to China before the crisis 
 
Source: (Godement, et al., 2011) 
63 
Figure 5: Member state attitudes to China after the crisis 
 
Source: (Godement, et al., 2011) 
The two diagrams above, taken from a study widely cited both in the West and China, 
demonstrate that differences between the member states’ political and economic points of 
view considering China did exist even before the crisis. Following the recession, however, 
a clear polarisation can be observed: member states in trouble saw China as their saviour, 
while the economic and commercial leaders of the EU were frightened of increasing 
Chinese influence and competition. Each member that could not be classified as falling 
into either of the (slightly constrained) categories adopted a favourable attitude towards 
Beijing as well. 
Undoubtedly, China’s economic opportunities seemed to be excellent compared to those 
of western societies. In addition, its ODI was growing at a high pace, and suggested that 
all the economic problems of Central and Eastern European countries could be solved by 
bilateral commercial and investment relations. However, it was an exaggeration, as it will 
be explained below. 
 
Data of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development clearly show that 
China’s share of global ODI was hardly 1.54 per cent in the stock variable, but 5.14 per 
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cent in the flow variable in 2010. (For comparison: the share of the USA was 
approximately 23.5 per cent, while the EU owned 42 per cent.) (UNCTAD, 2020) 
Moreover, only five percent of this Chinese investment’s gross value was directed to 
Europe, though the share of the EU in the Chinese flow variable, due to cheaper European 
enterprises after the breakout of the crisis, was ten percent in 2010. Aggregate trade data 
of Central European members of the Union show that China’s share is merely two percent, 
while its investments’ value constitutes only 0.3per cent of gross FDI transferred to the 
region. 
Though a significant growth was experienced in both cases in recent years, partly because 
of the weak base, China’s presence in the Central European economy is still 
inconsequential – not surprisingly, considering the enormous geographical distance and 
the orientation of the CEE countries towards the Union. Statistics show that some 60–90 
percent of the foreign trade of the Central European countries is directed to other, mostly 
western members of the EU. Russia, particularly due to the energy import, is also 
significant. As ninety percent of the world trade is seaborne, the Central European region 
is not expected to gain considerable importance in economic relations between the EU 
and China or play a prominent role in related logistics either, unless the highly debated 
Belt and Road Initiative and its Central European sections, such as the contested 
reconstruction of the railway line between Budapest and Belgrade proves to be successful 
eventually. The majority of Chinese merchandise is still going to arrive to Rotterdam, 
Hamburg, and other great Western European ports. The development of the Trans-
Siberian Railway would certainly be constructive and probably even advantageous to 
Hungary, its channel capacity, however, is limited compared to maritime trade. In 
addition, it is also questionable whether the turnover connected to it could be directed 
towards our country. 
It is clear, however, that Beijing demands huge rewards for any financial and economic 
aid provided for members of the EU. Chinese corporations earned a powerful interest in 
the operation of seaports and in ship production in Greece. At the same time, political 
compensation occurred for example when the Spanish EU presidency suggested lifting 




5. The origins and structural problems of the 16+1 cooperation 
 
When it comes to China, history always matters, therefore some important notes must be 
made on the background of China – Central and Eastern Europe relations. Before 
analysing patterns of interaction, a brief discussion on the background of China – CEE 
relations is in order. First, the fact that CEE countries were not part of the colonial 
incursion into China in the nineteenth and twentieth century means that political relations 
are free of historical tensions. Second, CEE countries were the first to establish diplomatic 
relations with the People’s Republic of China, as early as October 1949. Later, relations 
were heavily influenced by the tensions between Moscow and Beijing during the Cold 
War. After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, countries of the region put all their efforts 
into joining NATO and the EU, and China did not become a priority until the beginning 
of the twenty-first century. Hungary was one of the first CEE countries to ‘rediscover’ 
China right after Budapest successfully concluded its EU accession in 2003, since the 
socialist government of the time was more eager to re-establish good relations compared 
to its right-wing predecessors. All Hungarian prime ministers have visited Beijing over 
the course of the past decade and a half, most of them more than once. (PRC MFA, 2018) 
Other CEE countries such as Poland have attempted to foster better economic relations 
with China as well, sometimes even in spite of political tensions. (Palonka, 2010) The 
European financial crisis, however, set the tone for a new approach. 
The economic downturn gave a new impetus to China–CEE relations when traditional 
foreign direct investment and financial sources dried up in Europe. Weaker EU member 
states – in Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe – had to find new economic 
opportunities.  
 
Figure 6: Aggregate exports of CEE-11 countries to the EU and to the World 
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Source: Author’s own calculations based on (UNCTAD, 2020) 
 
As Figure 6. presents, the global financial crisis meant a severe hit to the export industry 
of CEE-11 countries with a 23 per cent decline on average. Although the volume of 
exports returned to pre-2009 levels by 2011, a second wave of downturn trends returned 
in 2012 due to the Eurozone crisis. Since CEE-11 countries have developed a heavy 
dependence (see Figure 7.) on EU markets since the 1990s, the collapse of demand in 
Europe made CEE-11 countries realise their vulnerability and called for action to diversify 
their trade partners. As it has been stated in the theoretical framework, the security 
dilemma must be understood in a broad way when it comes to small states. These countries 
are more vulnerable not only to geopolitical or military threats but to economic threats 
(crises) as well, as small states tend to be more dependent on the global economy and 
trade. (Wivel, et al., 2014) 
Figure 7: Share of the EU in the exports of CEE-11 countries 
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Source: Author’s own calculations based on (UNCTAD, 2020) 
 
 
The impact of the financial and Eurozone crisis becomes even more obvious when 
investment relations are considered as well. Figure 8. offers an insight into the dynamics 
of FDI flows to the CEE-11 countries between 2005 and 2012. The sudden and severe 
drop (63 per cent on average) of investment inflow into the investment dependent 
economies of the CEE-11 countries contributed to the deep economic contraction in the 
region. While the average GDP growth (Figure 9.) of the region reached 7 per cent in 2006 
and 2007 the pace of growth dropped to -7 per cent by 2009 and economic development 
remained week and fragile for the following years. 
 
 
Figure 8: Aggregate inflow of FDI to CEE-11 countries 
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Source: Author’s own calculations based on (UNCTAD, 2020) 
 
Figure 9: Average annual GDP growth rate of CEE-11- countries 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on (UNCTAD, 2020) 
 
 
At the same time, China had an abundance of cheap capital and industrial overcapacity. 
(McNally, 2013) Therefore, to find new economic opportunities in the European markets 
seemed like a logical step forward. As part of an effort to revitalise relations, the 
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Hungarian government was pleased to host the first meeting of the Central and Eastern 
European countries and China in 2011. (Kong, 2015) The next meeting in Warsaw, the 
first real summit for the 16+1 prime ministers was a clear sign that Beijing considered the 
previous meeting in Budapest a success and thus decided to establish a regular mechanism 
of summits. The founding of the Secretariat for China–CEE Cooperation was the next 
milestone of the development of cooperation in September 2012, while the third meeting 
in Bucharest (2013) and the fourth in Belgrade (2014) and all subsequent summits (2015-
Suzhou, 2016-Riga, 2017-Budapest, 2018-Sofia and 2019-Dubrovnik) have proven the 
commitment on both sides to carry the project forward.  
The 16+1 cooperation initiative is an intergovernmental mechanism (but not institution) 
whose main aim is to reduce the transaction costs of interactions between China and the 
CEE region. In concrete terms, it is a forum where 16 CEE countries – including 11 EU 
members – have the opportunity to meet the Chinese premier on a regular basis. Without 
this mechanism, the chance for minor regional players to have bilateral talks with the 
Chinese PM would be minimal. At a time when German, French and British leaders visit 
Beijing on a regular basis to sign huge deals, such opportunities were clearly important to 
CEE leaders. (Godement & Fox, 2009) For Beijing, it was also more attractive to have 
access to the leaders of nations of 120 million people and a total nominal GDP of USD 
1442 billion as of 2012 (UNCTAD, 2018) at once, instead of pursuing bilateral talks. 
Others perceive the mechanism to serve the purpose of socializing others to China’s norms 
and practices, or as a process of ‘laying foundations for a parallel international order and 
as a space where China can project its norms and ideas by embedding them in institutional 
arrangements, guiding documents, policies and ‘shared practices’. (Song & Pavlićević, 
2019) Kowalski argues that China strategically places these initiatives within the premises 
of South–South solidarity and corresponding policies while pursuing more prosaic 
economic and political goals. (Kowalski, 2016) 
The original and dominant purpose of ‘16+1 cooperation’ was economic as it was 
explained above. Although there have been political concerns in Prague and Warsaw with 
regard to the status of human rights and democracy issues in China, as the economic 
influence of Beijing grew stronger, these reservations mostly faded away for several years, 
just as they have in other European capital cities. For most governments on the member 
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states’ level it seems to be more convenient to leave these thorny issues to the European 
Parliament. (Rühlig, et al., 2018)  
As Iulia Monica Oehler-Șincai has identified, the CEE countries joined 16+1 initiative 
because they are interested in the diversification of their export markets and 
investment/financing sources; most of them need a better infrastructure; they perceive the 
cooperation with a strong country outside the EU as a supplementary negotiation power 
inside the EU (in the process of their EU accession); some of them intend to diminish their 
dependency on Russian energy; some CEE countries wish to balance between Russia and 
Germany and increase their regional role”. (Oehler-Sincai, 2018) 
 
Based on the above-mentioned economic circumstances it is clear that Central and Eastern 
European countries were all interested in the cooperation with China in order to: 
- increase their export volume to extra-EU destinations, first of all to China; 
- attract investment (including infrastructure development) from non-EU sources, 
since FDI was an important source of economic growth in the region 
- catch-up with Western EU members both in terms of general economic 
development and in terms of strong relations to China; 
- carve out more political space to manoeuvre and leverage in EU and global affairs. 
 
The first two bullet points may be easily derived from the public communication of CEE 
governments and from the so-called guidelines published after every single 16+1 summit 
(see below). As Robert Fico, then Prime Minister of Slovakia said in 2014 his part, said 
his country was “ready to work with China to transfer the sound development of bilateral 
ties into substantial cooperation, to make good use of the China-CEE Investment 
Cooperation Fund, while he also pledged to provide convenience for Chinese companies 
to increase investment and for Chinese financial institutions to set up offices in Slovakia. 
(Xinhua, 2014) A year before he talked about the “enormous importance of China as a 
trade partner” and he mentioned the benefits of the special loans for the region worth $10 
billion. (Slovak Spectator, 2013) 
The Czech government was sending similar signals to Beijing at the beginning of the 16+1 
cooperation. It stopped criticising Beijing’s human rights record and its occupation of 
Tibet to increase trade with China, and to attract investors into Czechia. As then Prime 
71 
Minister Bohuslav Sobotka put it in 2014: “If we want to get our relations with China on 
the same level as other EU member states, we want to follow the principles of the EU’s 
joint policy towards China. That includes, among other things, the One-China policy, the 
inseparability of Tibet, and the principle of non-intervention in China’s domestic affairs.” 
(Richter, 2014) 
 
President Miloš Zeman has been playing a pivotal but controversial role in forging better 
political and economic relations between Prague and Beijing. On the occasion of the 
historic visit of President Xi Jinping to Prague in 2016 Zeman said that he expected 
Chinese investment to reach 95 billion korunas in that year, and that Czech car 
manufacturer Skoda Auto would invest 60 billion korunas in China in the upcoming five 
years, while other deals on industrial zones, scientific and technological cooperation, 
health care and civil aviation were as well. (South China Morning Post, 2016) 
The Polish leadership expressed similar thoughts in 2012. As then Prime Minister Donald 
Tusk said: “It is our task in the coming hours to bring Polish-Chinese relations to a level 
that would make Poland a prime partner for China in this part of the world.” The Polish 
government said it hoped the country would become a hub for Chinese investment in the 
region, while trade relations would also develop further. (Scislowska, 2012) 
Viktor Orbán of Hungary has also mentioned the importance of economic cooperation 
with China on multiple occasions, though he seems to follow a slightly different approach. 
Besides economic opportunities, Mr. Orbán always mentions political cooperation and 
presents China as a role model for labour-based economies in contrast with Western 
economies based on “speculation”. As he said in one of his speeches in 2016:  
“(…) we Hungarians are not enthusiastic about the export of various political and 
economic systems. We hold that each house has its own customs. We believe that each 
nation has its own character, and that this is embodied in specific and unique political 
systems. And this is something which should be respected. Therefore we, for our part, also 
look upon the Chinese political system in this spirit. The Chinese political system is a 
matter for the Chinese people, just as the Hungarian political system is a matter for the 
Hungarian people. No one has the right to interfere with this by adopting the role of a 
kind of self-appointed judge.” (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister, 2016) 
72 
Besides economic considerations, there might have been another motive for CEE 
leaders the engage with China: their personal political interests. The 16+1 cooperation 
offers a unique opportunity to the political leaders of the small Central and Eastern 
European countries to meet with one of the most important and busiest politicians of an 
upcoming superpower (and to present pictures of such meetings to their home 
constituencies), and to attend or to organise high-profile summits. Without the 16+1 
mechanism, prime ministers of the CEE region may have the chance to meet their Chinese 
counterpart once in a decade or two. When it comes to China–CEE relations, Richard 
Turcsanyi gives an excellent overview of the political background to the 16+1 
cooperation. His policy paper reflects on the suspicions of Western EU members that 
China and its 16 CEE partners are trying to divide the EU. Turcsanyi argues that China is 
interested in investing in the CEE region due to favourable business opportunities, its 
proximity to Western Europe, and its relatively rapid economic development. The EU is 
a huge and attractive market; therefore, it makes sense for the Chinese side to build 
production sites in the relatively low-cost Eastern members of the EU. (Turcsányi, 2014) 
Based on my informal discussions with Chinese experts in recent years, it is clear 
that Beijing wants to build stable relations with countries that are strong and influential 
members of the EU and not with troublemakers. It is also important to note by Fürst and 
Pleschová that all participant countries emphasise that ‘16+1 cooperation’ is in line with 
EU rules and conducted under the EU–China framework.2 The 16 countries do not form 
a homogeneous bloc; rather, they see each other as competitors in attracting Chinese 
attention and, consequently, trade and investment opportunities. (Fürst & Pleschová, 
2010) 
 
What really matters today, at least according to many politicians, are trade and investment 
relations. (Godement & Vasselier, 2017) The total bilateral trade volume between China 
and the 16 CEE countries was around $74.8 billion in 2014, or 11.8 per cent of total EU–
China trade. (UNCTAD, 2020) Given that the trade dependence of CEE countries on EU 
markets was 60–90 per cent, it was a natural reaction to seek alternate trade routes in the 
thick of the European financial crisis. Although most CEE countries have a major trade 
 
2 See the chapter above about the Sofia Guidelines, Budapest Guidelines, Riga Guidelines etc. 
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imbalance with China, the deficit itself is not a real problem for countries such as the 
Czech Republic, Hungary of Slovakia, since the majority of imports from the PRC are 
spare parts, accessories and other inputs for CEE industrial production. Thus, the majority 
of imported Chinese products are re-exported to Western EU members as high-tech 
product parts manufactured in CEE. (Szunomár & Biedermann, 2014) Meanwhile, other 
countries like Poland or Serbia suffer due to the extreme level of trade deficit to China. 
(UNCTAD, 2020) However, when it comes to exports to China, the picture is less 
promising, since indigenous CEE products are rarely exported to China, mostly due to the 
lack of quantity or the proper financial sources of CEE companies to set up a business in 
China. Hungary or Slovakia are major exporters to China, but 93–99 per cent of their 
exported goods are produced by multinational companies and thus their respective 
governments have a minimal influence on the structure and volume of trade with China. 
(Matura, 2013) 
 
 It is difficult to grasp a clear picture of investment relations, as official statistical 
data are inaccurate. In the case of Hungary, for instance, Chinese FDI is around USD 600 
million according to the European and Chinese statistical bureaus, while according to 
estimates the real number is closer to USD 2 billion (Hanemann & Huotari, 2018) or even 
as high as USD 3.8 billion (Scissors, 2018) as most Chinese investment flows through 
third countries, mostly tax havens, thus those numbers are not counted as Chinese 
investment. (Seaman, et al., 2017) The fundamental problem lies in the divergent 
economic interests of China and the CEE countries. The region would like to attract 
greenfield foreign direct investment to create jobs and boost production and tax incomes. 
(Kaczmarski & Jakóbowski, 2015) At the same time, the Chinese have mostly been 
interested in mergers and acquisitions, and public procurement tender opportunities for 
infrastructure construction. (Seaman, et al., 2017) Even though Beijing is willing to 
provide financial solutions for infrastructure development in the region, these would be 
loans (such as the case of the Budapest-Belgrade railway line), not non-refundable 
structural and other funds as provided by the EU. Meanwhile it sparks criticism from 
Brussels or Berlin if CEE governments decided to finance Chinese construction 
companies from European funds. Further details of trade of investment relations are to be 
discussed in the empirical section of the dissertation. 
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6. Bilateral relations of China and the five most important members of the CEE-11 
countries 
The following chapter offers an introduction to the development of political relations 
between China and Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, as these five 
countries have an overwhelming weight in Central and Eastern Europe, representing 70 
per cent of the population, 77 per cent of the GDP and over 80 per cent of the trade and 
investment volumes with China in the region. Furthermore, as it was mentioned above 
and will be further explained below, the 16+1 cooperation is not an international 
institution but rather a bunch of bilateral relations. As Jakóbowski writes Chinese-led 
regional cooperation can be considered as nominally multilateral, as they provide venues 
for intergovernmental talks and policy coordination but mainly used by China to develop 
and manage bilateral relations with particular member countries. Relations between China 
and the countries of the region are managed in a bidirectional, rather than multidirectional 
way. (Jakóbowski, 2018) Justyna Szczudlik presents a similar approach in her paper, as 
she describes the 16+1 a platform or umbrella for 16 bilateral dialogues with China. She 
argues that the CEE countries have never set up their own secretariate for the cooperation 
or any other kind of joint steering committee. Thus, there is a lack of coordination between 
the countries of the region to bolster their cooperation with China, what would be a 
prerequisite of institutionalisation. (Szczudlik, 2019) Martin Hala follows the same 
pathway as he writes: “16+1 is not a regional bloc through which the CEE countries can 
coordinate their policies toward China. Rather, it is a platform for sixteen bilateral 
relationships with Beijing, with China afforded an overwhelming advantage in each.” 
(Hala, 2018) Turcsanyi takes a further step and argues that CEE countries actively 
approach the platform as a channel for their bilateral relations with China and that the 16 
countries do not form a bloc, on the contrary, they perceive each other as rivals in 
attracting China’s attention. (Turcsányi, 2014)  
In sum, even though the 16+1 cooperation disguises itself as an international multilateral 
platform, in reality it is much more like a loose network where 1+1 bilateral relations are 
multiplied by 16 times. Consequently, it is important to shed some light on the 
development of bilateral relations between China and the most significant countries of the 
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region, as these short case studies may reveal common patterns in their cooperation with 
Beijing.  
 
6.1. Czechia-China relations 
 
As Rudolf Fürst of the Institute of International Relations in Prague writes in his report on 
bilateral relations, the Czech Republic (or officially Czechia since 2016) generally follows 
the European mainstream, economy-focused approach towards China, though high-level 
political exchanges between the two sides were relatively rare until 2012-2013. Based on 
the principles and heritage of late President Vaclav Havel, the Czech Republic followed a 
charismatic human rights-oriented policy vis-à-vis Beijing following the breakup of the 
communist regime in 1989. The Dalai Lama has visited the country for eleven times before 
2015, what also contributed to the rather frosty bilateral relationship between the early 
1990s and the early 2010s. The Czech side usually presented the visits of the Dalai to 
Prague as private appointments or religious meetings and focused on themes of human 
rights and inter-cultural dialogue. (Fürst, 2015)  
Following the first meeting between President Havel and the Dalai Lama in 1990, 
subsequent meetings with Havel (or with members of the Czech parliament and other 
politicians) were handled in a less official manner due to the strong protests from the 
Chinese Embassy in Prague. Prague faced the strongest Chinese criticism ever in 2009, 
when then Prime Minister Jan Fischer welcomed the Dalai Lama in his official 
government residence, followed by a decrease of high-level political exchanges, and even 
by the cancellation of the Czech PMs visit to the Shanghai Expo in 2012. As Fürst writes, 
the power of the ‘Tibet lobby’ became apparent when the Czech ambassador in London 
met the Dalai Lama in July 2012, just before the Beijing Olympic Games and, right after 
the launch of the 16+1 cooperation in Warsaw. In the same year, the leader of the Tibetan 
government in exile attended the Forum 2000 conference and he returned in 2014 again. 
(Fürst, 2015)  
The analysis of Alice Rezkova agrees with the findings of Rudolf Fürst. As she writes, the 
Czech foreign policy has undergone years the most substantial change in its position 
towards China among all European countries in the last thirty years. First, it was a strong 
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defender of principles and an assertive industrialist, later it turned into a pleasing 
apologiser and an accommodating follower in the 2010s. Though initially the relationship 
with China was not at the centre stage of the Czech political attention, later Prague (given 
the small size and openness of its economy driven by exports) had to pay attention to the 
growing imbalance in trade with China and untapped opportunities on the Chinese market. 
Czech politicians, however, had to realise soon that a high number of visits to China could 
not secure an exclusive access to the Chinese market. Slow progress has always been 
blamed on the special treatment that the Dalai Lama and other anti-mainland and anti-
socialist political activists received in the Czech Republic. Even though many Czech 
business interest groups pushed for a more forthcoming approach towards China, the 
political elite held a different opinion. As Rezkova states, foreign policy in the Czech 
Republic is often created by strong personalities and not exactly by strategies and 
roadmaps, therefore, the policy towards China has always been whisked away to one or 
the other direction depending on the actual political set up. (Rezkova, 2020) 
Turcsányi and Bajerová offer a similar view on Czech-Chinese relations adding some 
interesting details about the feelings of the Czech people. Since Czechs are experienced 
in the struggle against communism, they are able, or even morally obliged to contribute 
to freedom in the world. Others say according to their paper that Czech inclination towards 
human rights protection in Tibet is partially based on feeling of guilt among Czech people, 
as they did not struggle against their own authoritarian regime by themselves. Therefore, 
they are emotionally more inclined to stand up to other authoritarian regimes, first of all 
China. (Bajerová & Turcsányi, 2019) 
Czech-Chinese political relations have taken a new turn in the recent months, as bilateral 
ties entered another phase of deterioration. The CEFC scandal or the cancellation of the 
sister-city agreement and direct flights between Prague and Beijing are all clear signs of 
fundamental problems in the relationship. When late Mr. Kubera, the speaker of the Czech 
senate planned to visit Taiwan in early 2020 the Chinese embassy in Prague wrote a letter 
in which it threatened repercussions for Czech companies including Škoda, Home Credit 
Group and piano manufacturer Klavíry Petrof. When the new speaker of the senate Mr. 
Miloš Vystrčil eventually visited Taipei, he upped the game to even higher levels as he 
said “I am a Taiwanese” in his address to the Taiwanese national assembly. The PRC of 
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course reacted in a very harsh manner and threatened Mr. Vystrčil personally. (Davidson, 
2020) 
However, China does not have a significant stake in the Czech economy, even President 
Zeman has complained about the lack of Chinese investment in the country, thus its power 
to punish the Czech side is rather limited. China must be careful with Skoda, as it is part 
of the German sphere of interest. Another Czech company, Home Credit may be more 
vulnerable, but it is not a strategic issue from the point of view of the Czech economy. Of 
course, general Czech exports to China may experience some trouble, but only 1.4 % of 
the Czech export goes to China. Limiting the number of Chinese tourists might be a 
dimension where China could hurt Czech interests, but numbers are in a free fall anyway 
due to COVID19. High-level visits by Chinese officials will be cancelled and political 
relations will freeze for sure, but as I mentioned at the beginning, that would not mean a 
major shock to Prague.  
 
Chinese influence in Czechia is another interesting element of bilateral relations. As 
Sebok and Karaskova write in their recent report, China-Czech relations at the level of 
governments have been characterized by periods of ups and downs in the past 15 years, 
with times of mutual affection alternating with periods of cool political relations. China’s 
approach has been mostly reactive, responding to the changes in the struggle between 
Czech political factions focusing on human rights and economic pragmatism. As a 
coincidence China’s newfound interest towards CEE countries came at a time when the 
Czech government itself was reconsidering its approach towards Beijing. Czech Prime 
Minister Petr Nečas came up with the term “Dalai-Lamaism” to describe the Czech 
foreign policy towards China in September 2012, suggesting that the human rights-based 
policy followed by Czechia in the previous 20 years was a mistake. As a reaction to the 
changing attitude of Prague China resumed bilateral contacts, and the warming of relations 
culminated in the visit by President Xi Jinping in 2016. Initially the new China policy of 
the Czech government brought benefits for some Czech companies on the Chinese market. 
The period of warm bilateral ties, however, has faded quickly as the political partnership 
failed to deliver economic results expected by many in Czechia. Like in some other CEE 
countries, most of the public expectations about Chinese investment were not created by 
Beijing but by Czech actors following their own domestic interests. China has lost its 
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political support in Prague following the establishment of the new Czech government in 
2017 and thus issues of human rights, Taiwan and Tibet gained public and political 
attention once again. The Chinese reaction was harsh to these undesirable changes. The 
Chinese ambassador started to criticize Czech politicians and media in an unprecedented 
manner of assertiveness for their comments on Taiwan, Hong Kong, Chinese 
telecommunication companies etc. China has even taken concrete actions to punish the 
‘misbehaving’ Czech politicians and other entities. For instance, Beijing revoked its sister-
city agreement with Prague in 2019, as a reaction to the pro-Taiwan actions of the new 
mayor of the Czech capital city. Despite the strong social and political backlash in 
Czechia, Beijing increased its use of threat further when the late President of the Czech 
Senate was planning to visit Taiwan in 2019. It is noteworthy that threats were not 
communicated publicly by the Chinese side, but by the President Miloš Zeman, who 
warned that the visit would damage Czech economic interests. In sum, China has been 
employing both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ in its relationship with Czechia, what is in sharp 
contrast with its relations with Hungary. (Šebok, et al., 2020) 
 
Though the changes in the Czech China policy were mostly based on domestic 
development, the US-China rivalry have had an impact on bilateral relations as well. 
Disappointing trade and investment record opened the way for a more cautious perception 
of China, while the security focused agenda and cybersecurity issues started to dominate 
the domestic political and media debates and brought Czechia closer to the US. Czechia 
regards the US as the historically-proved long-time strategic safeguard against Russian 
and Chinese influence. The Czech National Cyber Security Agency (NÚKIB) issued a 
document warning of a security threat related to Huawei and ZTE in November 2018. The 
following day Prime Minister Babiš issued a ban on Huawei technologies. Furthermore, 
Prague made efforts to follow the EU’s common stance on China in investment screening 
cooperation and joint cybersecurity measures. In sum, the more assertive narratives about 
China in Brussels, and in Washington, resonate in Czechia in both the government 




6.2. Hungary-China relations 
 
Bilateral relations between Hungary and China belong to the most intriguing ones among 
the CEE-11 countries, as the Hungarian government has been the most persistent 
supporter of Beijing in the region. Given the speciality of the relationship, its analysis 
deserves a longer chapter. 
 
By the beginning of the 21st century Hungary was one of the first post-socialist Central 
and Eastern European countries to rediscover China after spending more than a decade 
occupied with its EU and NATO accession processes. All of the four Hungarian prime 
ministers have visited Beijing during the last decade in an effort to revitalize relations. 
The Hungarian government was pleased to host the first meeting of the Central and 
Eastern European Countries and China in 2011. 
Factors, like the size of the Chinese diaspora, the early positive political signals of 
Budapest or even the legend of Sino-Hungarian brotherhood might have played an 
important role in raising attention in Beijing.  Indeed, Hungary is by far the largest receiver 
of Chinese foreign direct investment in the CEE-11 region, while the strategic location of 
the country may provide further economic opportunities. When it comes to trade relations, 
Hungary is the third most important partner of China in Central and Eastern Europe, 
although it has to be noted that international trade is dominated by trans-national 
companies to a high extent.  
 
Like most other CEE countries, Hungary officially recognized the People’s Republic of 
China in early October 1949. Subsequently, relations deteriorated during the Sino-Soviet 
split and China’s Cultural Revolution. In the late 1980’s the Hungarian government 
provided visa free entry for Chinese citizens for a few years, which had contributed to the 
rapid increase of the number of the Chinese diaspora in the country. Probably the relatively 
high number of Chinese people in Hungary (approx. 40.000 in the late 1990’s) attracted 
the Bank of China to Budapest in 2002 and called for the opening of the Sino-Hungarian 
Bilingual Primary School (now secondary school as well) in 2004. The democratic 
transition of Hungary in 1989 affected the bilateral relation negatively once again. The 
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reorientation of Hungarian foreign policy, and the new ideological differences resulted in 
low profile contacts for more than a decade. 
 
The 21st century has brought a new dawn to Sino-Hungarian relations, when the Hungarian 
government of the time realized that following the successful EU and NATO accession 
process of the country more priority had to be given to emerging powers as potential 
partners as well. Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy of the Hungarian Socialist Party visited 
Beijing in 2003 and Budapest created a new special envoy position for the development 
of Hungarian-Chinese relations and for the coordination of the China-related work of 
governmental institutions and the public administration. The opening to China bore its 
first fruit in 2004, when President Hu Jintao paid a return courtesy visit to Hungary, its 
most important economic partner in the CEE region at that time.  
The second, third and fourth (2010-2022) Orbán governments have paid a special attention 
to China, due to the economic crisis in Europe. Hungary started to search for new 
opportunities in its recovery from recession. The so-called Eastern Opening Strategy was 
implemented from 2010-11 as a reaction to the crisis. Mr. Orbán established official party-
to-party relations with the CPC even before the elections in 2009, and he visited China 
already as a prime minister at the end of 2010. This meeting was returned by Premier Wen 
Jiabao’s visit in Budapest in May 2011, which also meant the first step to create the annual 
China-CEE summit. Orbán’s new, pragmatist attitude towards China was kind of a 
surprise to most observers, since during his first term he nurtured strong anti-communist 
sentiments, and even met the Dalai Lama in his office in 2000.  
 
Although the Hungarian political arena is rather divided, Sino-Hungarian relations enjoy 
a privileged position on all major parties’ agenda. The Orbán administrations have not 
only continued the effort of their predecessors but also even increased it in order to forge 
excellent political relations with Beijing. No matter how fierce the domestic political 
debates are, none of the major parties questions the importance of China. 
The main goal of Hungarian governmental policies towards China has always been 
economic in nature since 2003 to boost and possibly to restructure bilateral trade, to reduce 
the trade deficit and to increase the inflow of Chinese FDI in order to create jobs. 
However, during the clashes of the Orbán cabinet with the EU a political factor emerged 
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since the mid-2010s, since the potential Chinese support might have provided political 
capital to the Hungarian government within the EU, or at least, Mr. Orbán hoped so. 
In their public communications Hungarian politicians have been overestimating the 
significance of the Chinese economic involvement in the country and generated 
exaggerated hopes and expectations in the society as well, what serves as an indirect 
source of Chinese influence in the country.   
 
Economically speaking China appreciates Hungary as a part of the EU and the CEE-11 
region, but does not attach special economic plans or interest exclusively to Hungary, 
thought the ongoing reconstruction of the railway line between Budapest and Belgrade 
lends a special significance to the country. Through this railway project Budapest could 
become an important section of the Belt and Road Initiative project, but not as an 
individual country. It is obvious that the main business interest of China is to get a piece 
out of the regional infrastructure public procurement pie, and Hungary is sitting in the 
middle of the region. 
Table 3: List of important visits, events and investments 
DATE EVENT 
6 October, 1949 The P.R. of Hungary recognized the P.R.C. 
1984 Establishment of the Hungarian-Chinese Economic, Trade, 
Technology and Scientific Cooperation Committee. 
 
1988 Opening of the Hungarian consulate general in Shanghai 
1991 Agreement on investment protection and avoidance of double 
taxation 
1992 Agreement on visa waiver for diplomatic and service passport 
holders 
1995 Pres. Jiang Zemin’s visit to Budapest 
Agreement on customs cooperation 
Agreement on mutual civil and trade legal assistance 




Closure of the Hungarian consulate general in Shanghai 
Bilateral agreement on cooperation and mutual understanding of 
the political and social differences of the two countries 
2002 Opening of the first CEE branch of the Bank of China in 
Budapest 
2003 PM Medgyessy’s visit to Beijing 
Agreement on Hungary’s Approved Destination Status (ADS) 
2004 Pres. Hu Jintao’s visit to Budapest 
Re-opening of the Hungarian consulate general in Shanghai 
Establishment of the Budapest-Beijing direct flight connection 
Opening of the Sino-Hungarian Bilingual Primary School in 
Budapest 
2005 PM Gyurcsány’s visit to Beijing 
Huawei established its regional centre in Hungary 
2006 Hisense established its TV factory in Hungary 
2007-2008 Hungarian Cultural Year in China 
2009 VP Xi Jinping’s visit to Budapest 
Inter-Party visit of Mr. Orbán to the CPC 
Closure of the Hungarian consulate general in Hong Kong 
2010 PM Orbán’s visit to Shanghai 
Opening of the Hungarian consulate general in Chongqing 
ZTE established its centre in Hungary 
Wanhua Yantai took over BorsodChem 
2011 Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Budapest to open the first 
China - Central and Eastern European Economic Forum 
2012 Vice-premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Budapest 
2014-2020 PM Orbán’s several visits to Beijing 
Re-opening of the Hungarian consulate general in Hong Kong 





When it comes to the results of economic cooperation, the picture is less rosy, however. 
The Orbán government has elevated political relations with Beijing to new heights, signed 
a strategic partnership agreement with China in May 2017 and the ‘Opening to the East’ 
policy of Hungary has aimed at forging better trade and investment relations with China. 
The large Chinese community, the region’s only Chinese-Hungarian bilingual elementary 
school, the CEE headquarters of the Bank of China, among other factors point to Hungary 
as a primary destination of Chinese investment, at least in theory. Despite all the efforts, 
however, expectations regarding the potential tsunami of Chinese investment have not 
been met, and the country has not received any new, major Chinese investors in the past 
few years. Still, the government regards China as an important partner, but political 
calculations may play a more significant role than economic interests may. (Matura, 2015) 
Still, when it comes to the stock of Chinese direct investment, Hungary enjoys a pivotal 
position in the CEE region, as by the end of 2019 cumulated Chinese investment in 
Hungary reached USD 2.5 billion, according to scientific sources, while according to 
government announcements it might be as high as USD 4.5 billion. (Kratz, et al., 2020)  
(MFA of Hungary, 2019) Whatever the actual number is, the inflow of Chinese FDI is 
highly concentrated – around 75 percent of the total amount is linked to a few major 
transactions. Besides Wanhua, major investors are Huawei, ZTE, Lenovo, Orient Solar, 
Sevenstar Electronics Co., BYD Electronics, Xanga, Canyi and Comlink. Unfortunately, 
major industrial greenfield investments are still lagging in Hungary so far. 
A remarkable set of agreements were signed during the visit of Premier Wen Jiabao in 
Budapest back in 2011 and of then-Vice-Premier Li Keqiang in 2012, when he visited 
Hungary to witness the signing ceremony of seven bilateral agreements (e.g. a Chinese-
built train connection between downtown Budapest and the airport; an agreement on a 
EUR 1 billion credit line between the China Development Bank and the Hungarian 
Ministry of National Economy; an agreement on SME cooperation, etc.). Yet, most of 
these were merely confirmed agreements of the previous year, and most of them have 
never been realized. None of the planned infrastructure development and joint venture 
investments have been realized since. In the framework of China–CEE cooperation, new 
84 
Chinese financial sources were opened for Hungary in 2013, and the Hungarian Exim 
Bank and its Chinese counterpart concluded an agreement on a EUR 100 million credit 
line for export financing. A USD 500 million “Chinese Central Eastern European 
Investment Fund” was also established, with a USD 30 million contribution from the 
Hungarian side. 
A milestone was reached when China, Hungary and Serbia agreed to modernize the 
railway line between Budapest and Belgrade. According to the original plans, the first 
train should have rolled through Hungary by 2017, but construction on the Hungarian side 
has not even begun. The main obstacle was the infringement process, allegedly started by 
the European Commission concerning financial agreements between the Hungarian and 
Chinese sides. No surprise, the lack of transparency was one of the main concerns of the 
European Union. Based on what has already been announced, the Chinese investment 
model for the Budapest-Belgrade rail project is similar to the general pattern of One Belt, 
One Road (OBOR or BRI) investments: Beijing offers financial backing through a loan 
from its Exim Bank and hopes that Chinese companies will have the chance to modernize 
the railroad, establishing a transportation corridor between Piraeus in Greece and Western 
Europe via Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary. So far, it has not been clarified what the 
benefit for Hungary would be, while it seems that the Chinese side does not have to bear 
too high of risks: the loan and the interest rate (approx. 2.5 percent annually, according to 
the announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary) will be guaranteed by 
the Hungarian state, the construction will be carried out by a Chinese enterprise, and the 
railroad itself will be mostly used by Chinese cargo companies, all while failing to connect 
any major cities within Hungary. (Matura, 2017) 
 


























Automotive greenfield 2004 25 success 
Hisense  electronics 
(joint venture 
with Flextronics) 
joint venture 2004 3 success but 
closed in 2010 
Huawei ITC greenfield 2005 300 success 
ZTE ITC greenfield 2005 15 success 
Lenovo-
Flextronics 
ITC greenfield 2009 NA success 
Sevenstar solar panels 
(EnergoSolar 
Ltd.) 
acquisition 2009 NA success 
Wanhua Group chemicals 
(Borsodchem) 
acquisition 2010 1600 success 
Comlink ITC greenfield 2012 NA success 






acquisition 2017 200 success 














aviation industry joint venture 2016 30 still in 
progress 
RZBC Citric acid factory greenfield 2014 100? likely failed 













Cargo Airport greenfield 2009 NA failed 
Orient Solar solar panels greenfield 2011 NA failed 
Canyi Lighting 
technology 
















2013 NA failed 
Source: compilation by the author based on media releases 
Given the low number of successful projects, any clear strategic-level motivations on the 
Chinese side remain undiscernible. As the table above suggests, Chinese businesspeople 
arrived in Hungary almost a decade before Budapest introduced its ‘Opening to the East’ 
policy. When it comes to the corporate level, the excellent geographic location, access to 
EU markets, and the favourable political and investment environment are the most 
frequently mentioned reasons for Chinese investment in Hungary. It is indeed true that the 
16+1 cooperation and the role of Hungary in it has drawn further attention to the country 
in China, but the increased inflow of Chinese political and business delegations has not 
boiled down to tangible results so far. (Matura, 2017) 
With regard to trade relations, the imbalance and structure of imports and exports will 
remain a challenging factor. Even though we know that a significant amount of Hungarian 
imports from China means an important input for the domestic industry, it would be 
desirable to provide better opportunities to Hungarian owned companies. It seems to be 
clear that in the fields of merchandise trade, it is impossible to achieve a balance, however, 
service sector, especially tourism may contribute to a better balance. Given the fact that 
after the 3rd China-CEE summit in Bucharest in 2013 Hungary became responsible for 
tourism relations between China and the region, it is utmost important to Budapest to 
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utilize this opportunity, though the current COVID-19 pandemic means an obvious and 
serious challenge to the further growth of the number of Chinese tourists in Hungary. 
 
Unlike in some Western European countries or the US, increased Chinese activity has not 
triggered any alarm in Hungarian political circles or among the wider public. To the 
contrary, there seems to be a cross-party agreement on the importance of relations with 
China, and none of the major political players opposes the opening towards Beijing. This 
is partly due to the relatively positive image that many Hungarians hold of the Chinese 
people, thus making it hard for any party to gain domestic political support through China 
bashing. Hence, Prime Minister Orbán has mentioned China several times as a good 
example of a successful ‘labour based society’, and as an alternative to Western economies 
‘based on speculation’.  Meanwhile, the lack of major Chinese investment in recent years 
obviously decreased public attention on the matter, and therefore security or political 
concerns have never been raised. (Matura, 2018) 
Budapest was so eager to cosy up to Beijing in the recent years that the government offered 
important political favours to China, even against the will of the European Union. This 
caught the attention of many international observers when the Hungarian MFA repeated 
Chinese statements on the South China Sea issue in 2016, or when the prime minister 
signed the joint communique on the “Belt and Road Initiative” in May 2017, despite the 
objection of the EU and its major member states. No wonder more and more experts raise 
the question: will the significant amount of Hungarian international political capital 
invested in China ever pay-off for the economy, or does the government regard China 
primarily as a political ally rather than an economic one? Political opponents of the ruling 
party argue that government efforts to get closer to Beijing (and Moscow) are part of a 
game against Brussels, and economic interests play only a minor role in this story. 
(Matura, 2018) No matter what the intentions of the Hungarian side are, the example has 
been set, and countries across Central and Eastern Europe, including the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovakia, were all looking to forge closer ties with Beijing, although the tide 
has already started to turn in Prague, Warsaw and other regional capital cities in recent 
years. 
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When it comes to the question of Chinese influence in the region, Hungary offers 
particularly concerning examples. It is beyond question that the governments of Hungary 
and the PRC are undergoing a honeymoon in their relations. This may be surprising, as 
the two sides could be considered as unlikely bedfellows: a formerly moderate national 
liberal anti-communist crusader, now right-wing Christian-democratic Prime Minister of 
a small Central and Eastern European country and the President of the largest, communist-
ruled state. Still, the PRC-friendly political decisions of Budapest are significant. Not only 
does the Orbán government not stand up to Beijing’s human rights violations and 
persecution of ethnic and religious minorities in China, it also actively blocks multilateral 
mechanisms that would do so. (Marques, 2019) Hungary also defends other questionable 
international PRC policies. At least four times, Mr Orbán’s government vetoed or 
threatened to veto EU decisions aimed against controversial PRC measures between. 
(Gotev, 2016) As mentioned, a NATO-ally, and an EU member state’s minister of foreign 
affairs regularly calls out partner governments over real as well as assumed hypocrisy over 
their policy stances towards PRC; and he carefully yet enthusiastically conforms to 
Beijing policies. (Irish, 2019) In return, the ‘long stick’, that is punitive measures of the 
PRC is absolutely absent in Hungary. In sum, government-to-government relations are 
driven by two main forces: the promise of economic and business cooperation with China 
and Viktor Orbán’s and other leaders’ seemingly genuine admiration of the Chinese 
model. It is important to emphasize that there is no need for proactive Chinese measures 
to influence the China policy of Budapest, as the government of Hungary has been very 
supportive of Beijing. According to some unofficial diplomatic sources, the eagerness of 
Hungary has made China feel uncomfortable in certain cases, as the low reputation of 
Hungary in the EU may harm China-EU relations as well. (Matura, 2020) 
Even though the Orbán government prefers to present itself the best friend of China in the 
region, it could not avoid to react to the rising tensions between Washington and Beijing, 
but it is not afraid to navigate the stormy waters between the US and China. Budapest has 
been cosying up to Beijing for years and is now trying to tame US requests to distance 
itself from China by making business deals to please President Trump. Meanwhile the 
government does not want to give up its close relationship with China either, despite the 
lack of tangible economic results. Mr. Orbán compared his foreign policy to a ‘peacock’s 
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dance’ in 2012, a strategy designed to appease critics in the short term while consistently 
pursuing his interests in the long term, what one may call a balancing game. However, 
with the (geo)political return of the US to Central Europe, Washington is attempting to 
push Hungary back into the Western sphere of interest and to prevent it from nurturing 
close relations with Russia and China. The US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, visited 
Budapest in February 2019, and he made some important remarks on the dangers of 
Chinese influence in the Central European region, including the issue of Huawei. Despite 
all US diplomatic efforts, the Hungarian government does not see any national security 
threat associated with Huawei or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and official warnings 
about Chinese (or US) tech risks have never been issued by its national security agencies, 
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs announced in November 2019 that Huawei would 
develop the 5G system in Hungary. Based on the Hungarian government’s actions and 
policies, as described above, it is clear that Mr. Orbán focuses on opportunities and 
political manoeuvres rather than on threats and risks associated with the friction between 
Washington and Beijing. His strategy of having his cake and eating it at the same time 
seems to be working for the time being, although it is uncertain how the country would 
react to a potential future inflexion point in US-Chinese rivalry if a choice must be made. 
(Matura, 2020) 
 
6.3. Poland-China relations 
 
Like other CEE-11 countries, Poland was preoccupied with its Euro-Atlantic reintegration 
process in the decades following the change of its regime, thus China was not high on the 
agenda of the Polish foreign policy in the 1990s and the 2010’s. China was either ignored 
or perceived as an authoritarian regime, while Poland perceived itself as a pioneer of 
democratization. Following the end of the communist regime Polish government 
representatives met the Dalai Lama many times, the support for the Tibet among the 
general public was high, and institutions like the Parliamentary Group for Tibet or the 
Polish-Taiwanese Parliamentary Team were established. Poland’s support of both the 
Tibetan and Taiwanese case met with Chinese criticism of course. (Bachulska, 2020) The 
global financial crises, however, has changed Poland’s attitudes, Polish representatives 
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stopped the criticism of China’s domestic behaviour in 2008 and bilateral ties were 
upgraded to a ‘strategic partnership in 2011 at Polish President B. Komorowski’s 
landmark visit to China. The relationship grew stronger during Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit 
to Poland in April 2012, when the 16+1 cooperation was launched in the presence of the 
prime ministers of sixteen Central and Eastern European countries. As Justyna Szczudlik 
writes in her report local cooperation between provinces, cities, counties, and towns has 
gained importance in Poland’s China policy. While the central government was signalling 
to the Chinese side that Poland was a country worth cooperating with, the real cooperation 
took place on the local level as regions knew better the needs of their area and could 
identify potential areas of cooperation. (Szczudik, 2015) 
Government-to-government cooperation intensified further following the election victory 
of the conservative Law and Justice Party in 2015. A year later, President Xi Jinping 
visited Poland and elevated bilateral ties to a strategic comprehensive partnership. The 
two sides signed and extensive list of cooperation agreements during Xi’s visit what was 
a symbolic gain and helped to inflate the image of win-win cooperation promoted by 
Beijing. (Bachulska, 2020) 
The main goals of the Polish government were articulated in speeches of government 
officials. China was identified as important in terms of developing relations with Asia in 
a speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Radosław Sikorski in March 2012, while the 
importance of China was also highlighted in two statements by Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Grzegorz Schetyna in 2014 and in 2015, in which he noted that the Polish economy was 
highly focused on Europe and was therefore vulnerable to European economic cycles. 
Consequently, as Schetyna explained, Poland had to seek new markets and capital 
resources to maintain economic growth. To facilitate economic cooperation new 
institutions and mechanisms were set up including the ‘Go China’ program; the Center for 
Polish-Chinese Economic Cooperation within the Polish Information and Investments 
Agency; a new post in the Polish Embassy in Beijing; the Inter-Ministerial Committee for 
Coordination of the Polish-Chinese Strategic Partnership Development; the Working 
Group on Poland-China Local Cooperation within the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Development, etc. According to Szczudlik the political and economic goals were the two 
main priorities in Poland’s China policy: political goals were to maintain political dialogue 
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with China, which was considered as a prerequisite (or tool) for enhancing the primary 
objective economic cooperation. Economic goals included the expansion of Polish exports 
to China (e.g. agricultural products, food, luxury items such as jewellery etc.) to narrow 
the enormous trade deficit and to attract Chinese (preferably greenfield and brownfield) 
investment to Poland and to increase Polish investment and business activities in China. 
Finally, Poland (like many other CEE-11 countries) aspired to become a hub or centre of 
China’s economic presence in Europe and an important link in the chain of the Belt and 
Road Initiative connecting Asia with the EU. (Szczudik, 2015) 
From a global political point of view, Warsaw tried to forge better relations with Beijing 
because it was afraid that not having intensive relations with the PRC might marginalise 
Poland in the EU and globally given the spectacular rise of China in global affairs. 
(Szczudlik, 2020) 
Like in most other CEE-11 countries, Chinese plans for investment in Poland have never 
been materialised in their full extent. Significant infrastructure projects were still missing 
from the agenda in 2017 as the government in Warsaw insisted to keep infrastructure 
investments under Polish control, while economic partners like China were expected to 
be interested in the success of such projects. Furthermore, the infamous Covec issue3 in 
2012 made the Polish side even more cautious about infrastructure cooperation with 
Chinese companies. Meanwhile, the Chinese side was more interested in offering credit 
lines combined with construction services as it can be observed in the case of the 
reconstruction of the Budapest-Belgrade railway line. Furthermore, Warsaw was looking 
for Chinese partners that might offer comparative advantages such and know-how and 
high technology, not simply for cash-rich investors. Even though the volume of Chinese 
investment has been rising in Poland, its total value (despite the high level of uncertainty 
of data sources) is still negligible. One of the reasons for the lack of Chinese investment 
in Poland is that Warsaw encourages Chinese greenfield and brownfield investment, but 
not necessarily mergers and acquisitions. (Szczudlik, 2017) 
 
3 China’s Covec construction firm won the bid to build two sections of Poland’s main east-west highway in 
2009 as its bid was extremely low less than 50 percent of what the government had budgeted. However, the 
company stopped the construction in a matter of weeks following the start of the construction in 2012 due 
to cash flow problems and the Polish road building agency cancelled the contract leading to a major scandal 
in Poland. 
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The bilateral relationship, however, had to face a set of difficulties as well. Asymmetry in 
market access, barriers for agricultural and agrifood products for Polish products in China, 
the lack of Polish access to Chinese public procurement tenders all represent significant 
problems in the economic relationship between the two country. From an organisational 
point of view, another problem was the one-way nature of relations, that is Chinese 
initiatives and offers were based purely on Chinese interests with a lack of reciprocity. 
It seems that despite all the political hype economic cooperation between Poland and 
China is unsuccessful, as the Polish trade deficit keeps expanding and the Chinese 
investment offer is not attractive. Meanwhile, the growing assertiveness of China, such as 
take-overs of high-tech companies and loan-based investments have made Poland rethink 
its China policy. Since 2017, Warsaw voices its discontent about trade deficit, scarce 16+1 
results, China–Russia cooperation, and that the strategic partnership has not met its 
expectations. (Szczudlik, 2020) 
Since Warsaw stopped criticizing China’s human rights record or any kind of issues that 
Beijing could perceive as threatening no ‘sticks’ were used by China to punish Poland. 
However, Beijing has started to criticize Warsaw’s foreign policy and its close relations 
with the US. Consequently, Poland has found itself torn apart between Washington and 
Beijing, as some China-related were perceived as potentially deteriorative for its ties with 
the US. The prime example of such dilemmas is connected to the case of Huawei’s 
presence in Poland. The Chinese tech giant has gained a foothold in Poland in recent years, 
but at the same time, it has also become the target of international criticism due its alleged 
links to the CPC and the Chinese military. The arrest of an alleged Chinese spy in January 
2019, who worked for Huawei’s office in Warsaw and the signing of the Polish-US Joint 
Declaration on 5G in September 2019, was perceived as a sign of Poland siding with the 
US in its battle with China over technological supremacy. (Bachulska, 2020) 
Although China has employed mostly ‘carrots’ in its relations with Poland, Warsaw seems 
to be disappointed by the scarce results of the 16+1 cooperation. Furthermore, as it was 
presented in the theoretical background, small states tend to seek for security cooperation 
with major countries, and also tend to comply with interests the major state considers 
important. Thus, it seems to be a natural development that following its short-lived affair 
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with China Warsaw has eventually turned back to Washington given its own security 
considerations (e.g. Russia) and the fact how important the 5G question is for the US. Of 
course, the Polish government is aware that it needs to find a delicate balance between its 
own interests and that of Washington and Beijing, especially since Poland needs to 
develop a 5G network as soon as possible.  
As Polish Prime Minister Morawiecki said Poland is “a very pro-European nation…and 
at the very same time very much pro-American,” therefore Warsaw can help bridge 
divides by “translating European fears and expectations and observations into American 
language and vice versa. We are explaining American fears and observations to our 
partners in the European Council.” (Wemer, 2020) 
In sum, Poland is manoeuvring between the US and EU, while keeping the door open to 
cooperation with China as Justyna Szczudlik writes in her report. The US is the most 
important ally and security guarantor of Poland. Meanwhile Poland still sees China as a 
partner though Warsaw’s approach has become more cautious. It tries to stick to the 
mainstream of the EU when it comes to its China policy and attempts to play a role as a 
bridge between the US and China. As a sign of political compliance with the US, the 
Polish MFA published on its twitter account a statement in December 2018 about 
commercial cyber-espionage, including that attributed to China. Furthermore, two Huawei 
employees from the Warsaw office were arrested on spying allegations in January 2019, 
what was seen by many as Polish support for Washington’s China policy. (Szczudlik, 
2020) 
6.4. Slovakia-China relations 
Slovakia did not pay too much attention to China in the 1990s and 2000s, as political 
differences and the great geographical distance hindered closer relations. Still, Slovak 
politicians had rather frequent meetings with their Chinese counterparts. Between 1993 
and 2008, there were eight official visits to China from Slovakia, with the former Prime 
Minister Robert Fico visiting three times. Slovak officials usually avoided mentioning 
controversial issues given the lack of historical support for human rights issues in the 
Slovak society, what was in sharp contrast with the foreign policy of Czechia. 
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Furthermore, the cautious approach towards sensitive issues was one of the tools aimed at 
improving economic relations with China. (Šimalčík & Kelemen, 2020) 
Slovakia has launched a new phase of its relations with China when then Prime Minister 
Robert Fico visited China in 2007. The two countries have signed several international 
agreements of economic cooperation, while Slovakia participates in the BRI and the 16+1 
format as well. According to the researchers of the Central European Institute of Asian 
Studies Bratislava’s approach towards China is a combination of fascination with the great 
power and exotic nature of China and the relative lack of interest due to Slovakia’s 
strategic focus on geographically closer areas. (Kelemen, et al., 2020) 
Like in the case of Czechia, Slovakia’s foreign policy towards China also focussed on 
frequent meetings with Chinese counterparts. Slovak initiatives wished to improve 
economic relations with China through two specific features: the award of honours to 
Chinese ambassadors in Bratislava, and a cautious approach towards issues that are 
sensitive for China. Following its separation from Czechia in 1993, Slovakia maintained 
intensive political contact with China. Besides frequent high-level visits to China, high 
state honours have been awarded to Chinese ambassadors in Slovakia, the same honour 
what ambassadors of the USA, Russia or other European countries received. Furthermore, 
successive Slovak governments always avoided provoking China with political issues. 
Thus, Slovak officials abstained from criticising China for human rights violations or 
when the Dalai Lama visited Slovakia in 2000, none of the four highest Slovak 
government representatives was willing to meet with him. (Fürst & Pleschová, 2010) (It 
is worth remembering that Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán did meet the Dalai 
Lama in his office in Budapest in 2000, while he refused to meet his holiness ten years 
later in 2010)  
Despite all political efforts, the Slovak strategy resulted neither in increased Slovak 
exports to China nor in a boost of Slovak investment in China. The underwhelming 
performance of Slovak businesses in China have been caused mainly by the large 
protective barriers around the Chinese market, such as protectionist policies, bureaucracy, 
violations of property rights, lack of connections, unclear legislation and a lack of 
transparency in taxation regulations . (Fürst & Pleschová, 2010) The results are 
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underwhelming given that the Slovak government’s strategy towards China for 2017-2020 
and an accompanying action plan on the development of economic relations between 
China and Slovakia focuses on economic considerations as the main goal of bilateral 
relations rather than on political or security issues. (Šimalčík & Kelemen, 2020) 
Chinese companies had invested less than EUR 50 million in Slovakia by 2017, and the 
level of FDI from China has not reached EUR 100 million in 2019 either. Greenfield 
investments are rare, and as the drivers of Chinese investors are market access, reducing 
production costs, and technology transfer. Bratislava has tried to attract more Chinese 
investment to the country but without much success, as Chinese investment in Slovakia, 
both relative to overall FDI in Slovakia and to Chinese investment in Europe is still very 
low. Furthermore, Slovak media has also raised concerns that certain potential Chinese 
investors have tried to gain privileges through access to governing party members. The 
government of Robert Fico identified several potential projects but none of them has 
materialized due to the lacking interest on the Chinese side.  (Pleschová, 2017) 
China has mostly been using carrots to please the Slovak government, but Beijing has 
employed some sticks as well to influence local politics in the country. When Slovak 
President Andrej Kiska met the Dalai Lama in 2016 China’s Foreign Ministry threatened 
retaliation against Slovakia as the meeting was breaking ‘‘the political basis of China-
Slovak relations” according to their understanding. A yearlong diplomatic stalemate 
followed in Slovak-Chinese relations as consequence of the meeting. The relationship 
normalised finally at the end of 2017 following the 6th summit of the 16+1 when China 
started to show interest to the cooperation in railway-cargo transport and customs. It is 
noteworthy that Slovakia did not experience any negative impact on its economy, on the 
contrary, the bilateral economic exchange slightly increased during this diplomatic freeze 
off. Though Slovak officials became cautious to mention sensitive issues again following 
the freezing and tried to reopen communication channels, the new President of the country 
has turned the table once again. President Zuzana Čaputová did not shy away from 
mentioning the importance of human rights to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi at their 
meeting in Bratislava in 2019, though her remarks simply reinstated the position of the 
EU on the issue, thus the Chinese side did not bother itself too much. (Šimalčík & 
Kelemen, 2020) A year later, however, the Slovak president voiced her support to the 
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Czech Republic in the face of Chinese threats to Czech Senate President following his 
visit to Taiwan. (TASR, 2020) 
The rather weak positions of China in Slovakia are well presented by its reluctance to side 
with Beijing in its struggle with the US. As Turcsányi and Pleschová argue, China-related 
developments are not a priority to Bratislava since the role of China is limited in the 
country. Therefore, political will is missing to enhance relations with China, though at the 
same time the Slovak government does not want to antagonise China and thus it avoids 
publicly taking sides. Still, bilateral US-Slovak relations experienced a boom in 2019. 
Slovak PM Pellegrini met Donald Trump in the White House, Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo visited Bratislava to convince the country to abandon Huawei as a potential 
developer of its 5G network. Meanwhile, Slovakia shows an increasing courage to speak 
out on China’s human rights issues. President Andrej Kiska dined with the Dalai Lama in 
Bratislava in 2016, while President, Zuzana Čaputová, as it has been mentioned before, 
expressed her ‘concerns and worries from worsening human rights situation in China, the 
detention of lawyers and human rights activists as well as position of ethnical and religious 
minorities’ when she was meeting China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi in June 2019.  
In sum, Slovakia is interested in strengthening its relations with China, but it perceives 
itself firstly as an EU member and as an ally of the US. The Slovak MFA prefers to follow 
joint European policies towards China, as the support for a common EU policy fits well 
into the pragmatic approach of a small country using its EU membership and alliance with 
the US as a shield against possible intervention by China. (Pleschová & Turcsányi, 2020) 
 
6.5. Romania-China relations 
 
Like in the case of other CEE-11 countries Romanian priorities in the 1990s were focusing 
on the development of a functional democratic regime and a market economy that would 
facilitate its accession to NATO and the EU, thus mutual interests between Romania and 
China were marginal, despite the close relationship between the two countries during the 
Cold War. It was not until the mid- and late-2000s, when the successive Romanian 
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governments re-evaluated their relationship with China due to its growing role in the 
international political and economic systems. As a sign of partisan divisions of the 
Romanian political landscape, the liberal-democrat governments of the 1990s and the mid- 
and late-2000s were the ones to focus on the promotion of economic relations with the 
West, while social-democrat governments pushed for better relations with China. Thus, 
under the social-democrat government in early-2000s that Romania signed the Economic 
Cooperation Agreements with China and later the Enhanced Cooperation Partnership (in 
2013) to expand trade and cooperation with the Middle Kingdom in order to decrease 
Romania’s large trade deficit. According to Simona R. Soare the Romanian MFA 
identified to major goals in its engagement with China: strategic interests and economic 
goals. The Romanian government regarded the Hu and Xi administrations’ opening to the 
West policy and the 16+1 format and the Belt and Road Initiative as important strategic 
and economic opportunities for Romania through which the country could have become a 
regional hub connecting the Chinese ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ with the EU’s Danube 
Strategy. When it comes to the economy, Bucharest identified several opportunities in its 
cooperation with China. Following the economic crises around the turn of the last decade 
Romania was seeking to diversify its economic partners, products, and sources of FDI 
through developing its relations with China. The two governments have agreed to jointly 
build the new reactors of the Cernavodă nuclear power plant, with an overall investment 
of USD 6 billion over the next 10 years and other energy related project were considered 
as well. The development of the Port of Constanta was a priority to both sides as it could 
have served as an important part of the BRI. The communication sector was another major 
element of bilateral talks, including the role of Huawei and Lenovo in the development of 
Romania’s IT sector. (Soare, 2015) 
Sino-Romanian relations were revitalised by Prime Minister Victor Ponta’s government. 
Mr. Ponta made his first visit to China as head of the government in 2013, a few months 
later Romania hosted the 16+1 Summit in November 2013. According to Popescu and 
Brînză the summit meant the apex of Sino-Romanian political relations and succeeded in 
re-positioning Romania on the list of China’s closest friends in the region. The two prime 
ministers witnessed the signing of more than 10 memoranda of understanding on projects 
valued at EUR 8.5 billion at the summit. However, more than four years after the summit, 
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none of the investment projects was implemented and some of them were still under 
negotiation. (Popescu & Brînză, 2018) 
Consequently, despite all the great plans, the share of Chinese direct investment 
represented only a tiny share (0.3–1.3 percent) of the total FDI stock in Romania by 2017. 
Though several major investment projects proposed by the Romanian side have been taken 
into consideration by the Chinese side in the past decade, but most negotiations have been 
eventually cancelled or moved forward very slowly as Oehler-Sincai writes in her report 
titled “Chinese Investment in Romania: More Lost Opportunities than Implemented 
Projects”. (Oehler-Sincai, 2017) No surprise that the current Romanian government has 
greatly reduced the significance of China in its policy. The Governmental Program for the 
period between 2018 and 2020 dedicates only a few sentences to China in its chapter on 
Foreign Policy. As Popescu and Brînză concludes previously proposed Chinese 
investments in Romania are on the brink of failure, and thus Romanian intentions to 
cooperate with China seem to decrease year by year. (Popescu & Brînză, 2018) 
 
The above-mentioned factors have had an obvious impact on the development of 
Romanian foreign policy amidst the rise of US-China rivalry in recent years. Romania is 
strongly attached to Western political values and more inclined to support the security and 
economic interests of its most important non-European strategic partner, the US. 
Furthermore, the change of government in Romania may alter the country’s attitude 
towards China, since the Liberal Party is more cautious about China than its Social-
Democratic predecessor, who had been the main supporters of a strong relationship with 
China. (Oehler-Sincai, 2020) As a clear sign of the changing tone, Romania’s economy 
ministry announced on May 28, 2020 that it had asked state-owned power producer 
Nuclearelectrica to end negotiations with the Chinese side about the construction of two 
reactors following six years of fruitless talks. (Reuters, 2020) 
 
In sum, Romania intends to strengthen its cooperation with China but only if it does not 
generate tensions with the US or with the EU. Bucharest has intensified cooperation in the 
fields of education, culture and tourism, which do not pose any risks to its relations with 
its Western allies. Therefore, Romania tends to respond positively to US requests. The 
‘Joint Statement from President of the United States Donald J. Trump and President of 
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Romania Klaus Iohannis’ adopted in Washington DC on 20 August 2019 underscores 
Romania’s support against both Russia and China. As it states: ‘We also seek to avoid the 
security risks that accompany Chinese investment in 5G telecommunication networks’. 
Thus, even if Romania does not declare itself to be on the US side, it seems to support the 




6.6. Summary of bilateral relations between China and five most important 
members of the CEE-11 countries 
 
Based on the above presented five cases there are some conclusions to be drawn regarding 
the pattern of bilateral relations between China and Czechia, Hungary, Romania, and 
Slovakia. According to the literature the primary goals of all analysed countries within the 
16+1 framework were to increase their export volume to China; to attract investment 
(including infrastructure development) from China, to catch-up with Western EU 
members both in terms of general economic development and in terms of strong relations 
to China, and finally to carve out more political space to manoeuvre and leverage in EU 
and global affairs. It means that they were open to economic cooperation with China and 
were ready to use political tools to enhance their chances of attracting Chinese investment 
and opening trade opportunities as well, as it was expected based on the theory of small 
states’ foreign policy by Schweller, Wiberg, McGowan and Gottwald in chapter 2.2. 
However, the lack of tangible and substantive results in the fields of economic cooperation 
with China and rising tensions between the US and China have induced the analysed 
countries (and arguable all CEE-11 governments) to revise their relationship with Beijing 
and to realign their foreign policies in accordance with the needs of their traditional allies, 
the European Union and the United States. Having spent a decade with mostly fruitless 
negotiations with China, disappointment with the 16+1 has been spreading across the 
region in recent years, and most CEE-11 countries have started to turn towards a less 
enthusiastic and more cautious China policy. There is only one noticeable exception, 
Hungary, as Budapest still insists on maintaining strong relations with Beijing and pushing 
ahead with its balancing policy. 
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7. Social and political perceptions of China in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
The following chapter attempts to shed some light on how certain CEE societies perceive 
the role China plays in the world and in the region. Based on the many years of cooperation 
in the 17+1 framework, one might assume that the people of Central and Eastern Europe 
have developed positive attitudes toward China. In the followings, I will cover media per-
ceptions and political opinions about China. 
 
7.1. How the media depicts China in Central Europe 
 
I have had the pleasure to be the researcher responsible for Hungary in Project Chinflu-
enCE in the past three years. The first programme of the project aimed to chart media 
coverage on China in Central Europe. The aim of the research was to assess the image of 
China and to understand how the wider public and the political elite perceive topics related 
to China. In the first phase of the project, we have collected, coded and analysed all printed 
and electronic media coverage on Chinese politics and economics in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary Slovakia and Poland for the period between 2010 and Q2 2017. As a result, we 
have created an enormous dataset based on almost 10.000 articles published in four coun-
tries. Based on our research we have found major differences between media sentiments 
towards China in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. The discourse in 
the Czech Republic and Hungary is heavily politicized and stereotyped. As the graph be-
low shows, Czech media sources have taken a critical perspective of China with a special 
focus on values such as human rights, Chinese influence, communism, censorship, Tibet 
and other issues in the forefront of China related coverage. Meanwhile the Hungarian 
media has been focusing mostly on economic issues and the development of bilateral re-
lations, while value-based issues (human rights etc.) have almost entirely missing from 
the discourse. This is partially due to the strong influence of the Hungarian News Agency, 
as it publishes many economic data about China and other media outlets simply republish 
such news and articles. Furthermore, the assessment of Hungarian-Chinese relations in 
the media is strongly influenced by the political attitude of the given media source towards 
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the government. In Slovakia, the media discourse is very neutral, and economic issues are 
the most widely covered topics. (Karaskova, et al., 2018) Meanwhile, Polish media dis-
course on China was exceptionally positive. Of course, foreign media sources have a ma-
jor impact on media coverage in CEE countries, that is, information on China is mostly 
imported from foreign news agencies or English-speaking media sources. (Ostrowska, 
2019) 
 
Figure 10: The most important topics about China in V4 media (2010-2017) 
(Larger fonts mean larger number of articles about the given topic) 
 
 
Sources: (Karaskova, et al., 2018) & (Ostrowska, 2019) 
 
Another important and interesting element of media coverage on China in V4 countries is 
the attitude of articles and news. Researchers of ChinfluenCE coded and categorised every 
single article positive, negative or neutral according to the emotional impression the text 
made on the reader. Articles with emotionally loaded wording were categorised either 
positive or negative, while objective, non-emotional texts were put into the neutral cate-
gory, regardless of the actual content of the news itself. The results show that China was 
not depicted in a positive way in any of the V4 countries in the analysed period (and the 
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situations must have gotten worse ever since due to the COVID-19 pandemic). The Czech 
media seems to be the most negative about China, what is in accordance with the general 
anti-authoritarian mood in Czechia. Over 41 per cent of the coverage shared negative feel-
ings about China, while only 14 per cent were positive. The situation is similar in Slovakia, 
where the relative share of negative news (26%) over positive ones (6%) is even worse 
than in Czechia, though their total share is moderate due to the high number of neutral 
coverage (68%). The extremely high share of neutral news (85%) is eye-catching in the 
case of Hungary. As it has been explained above, most media outlets simply republish 
news shared by the Hungarian News Agency (MTI) and MTI focuses on miniscule eco-
nomic data too. Putting MTI news aside, the Hungarian media shows a pattern similar to 
the Czech and Slovak cases with more negative (10%) than positive (5%) news, though 
the overall picture seems less negative than in the other two Central European countries. 
Once again, this is mostly explained by the dominance of ab ovo neutral economy- and 
business-related coverage. (Karaskova, et al., 2018) 
Compared to the three other V4 countries, Poland is an outlier, at least when it comes to 
the share of positive news (39%) over negative news (3%), while the overall picture is 
still mostly neutral (58%) 
 
Figure 11: Attitudes of China related coverage in V4 media (2010-2017) 
 
Sources: (Karaskova, et al., 2018) & (Ostrowska, 2019) 
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7.2. Political discourse on China in Central Europe 
 
In the second phase of the project, we have looked through almost thirty years of steno-
graphic transcripts of the debate on China in the Czech and the Hungarian parliament and 
analysed how the attitudes of different political parties and individual politicians towards 
China have evolved over the past few decades. Like in the case of the media discourse, 
there are major differences between the Czech and Hungarian politicians’ attitudes to-
wards China. The Czech debate have experienced significant ups and downs in the past 
few decades, as it has gone from criticism to a more pro-Chinese period and back to a 
rather critical standpoint. In the Hungarian Parliament the mood has never been pro-Chi-
nese. Right wing parties used to be fierce China bashers in opposition, but they have been 
neutral or even pro-Chinese since their election victory in 2010. Like the media discourse, 
the Hungarian parliamentary debate is ideologically less underpinned, and human rights 
or other values have mostly disappeared from the agenda since 2010. (Karaskova, et al., 
2019) 
 
Figure 12: Representation of Topics Mentioned in Connection to China in the Czech and 
Hungarian Parliaments (1990/1993 – 2019) 
 





Figure 13: Polarity of Debates on China at the Czech and Hungarian Parliaments in 
Election Cycles (%) 
 
Source: (Karaskova, et al., 2019) 
 
As Figure 13 presents, Czech and Hungarian members of parliament have never been 
sympathetic towards China since the democratic transition in these countries (actually, 
since the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, Central and Eastern European allies of the Soviet 
Union were suspicious of or even hostile to China during communist times as well). The 
major difference between the Czech and the Hungarian case is how these attitudes have 
changed over the last decade. While MPs have become increasingly negative about China 
in Prague over time, attitudes of Hungarian MPs took a turn towards more positive atti-
tudes in 2010. It is noteworthy, however, that the main source of anti-Chinese remarks 
before 2010 came from the very same MPs of Fidesz in opposition who started to embrace 
pro-Chinese attitudes in government following their election victory in 2010. (Karaskova, 
et al., 2019) 
 
Another project about political attitudes towards China was based on research interviews 
with foreign policy experts of the major political parties in Visegrad Four countries. The 
results tell an interesting story about the limits of Chinese political influence in the region. 
In Slovakia, despite its cooperative policy and the pragmatist attitude of political parties 
towards China, there is a strong divide between the government and opposition parties. 
The government parties see China in purely economic terms, while most politicians of the 
opposition view China pragmatically and recognize the need to cooperate but they are also 
wary of security implications as well as China’s human rights abuses.  
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Likewise, in Czechia parties define their position as government or opposition parties: the 
government pursued benefits of political and economic cooperation with China, while the 
opposition sought to criticize this endeavour as a mean of discrediting the governing par-
ties. Although, due to the Czech tradition of value-oriented foreign policy and negative 
Czech experiences with engagement with China so far, the approach of Prague towards 
China is likely to remain critical.  
Similar to the Czech and Slovak cases, the main division line in Hungary is not along 
leftism and rightism, but it runs between the governing and opposition parties. Though 
most parties regard China as an important economic partner, opposition parties call for 
more caution and transparency in bilateral relations and are concerned about the domestic 
and international political costs of the cooperation with China.  
In Poland, the government has been balancing between eagerness to attract Chinese in-
vestment and the strategic friendship with the US. Recent developments, like anti-Huawei 
actions of Warsaw, hint that Poland has eventually decided to abandon its temporary pro-
China policies, despite the fact that a significant part of the elite on both left and right 
wanted Poland to become a leader of Chinese-born initiatives previously. (Simalcik, et al., 
2019) 
 
7.3. Public perceptions of China in Central Europe 
 
Based on the long list of promised economic benefits and the pro-China attitudes of their 
governments one may assume that the people of Central European countries have devel-
oped positive feelings about China in the last decade. Data, however, suggest a different 
picture of public perceptions of China in the region. According to a pan-European survey 
by Eurobarometer, public support among the population of CEE member states does not 
back the enthusiastic pro-China policies of some of their governments. Only 40 percent 
of Hungarian and 25 percent of Czech respondents had a positive perception of China, 
while the EU average was 32 percent in 2017.There were only three CEE member states 
of the Union (Romania, Croatia and Latvia) where the absolute majority of the population 
nurtured positive views of China, while Czechs presented the highest share of anti-Chi-




Figure 14: Public views about China in EU member states 
 
Source: (Commission, 2017) 
 
As Figure 14 explains, the public opinion on China was slightly more positive in CEE 
members of the EU (with the obvious exception of Czechia), but the correlation between 
the 16+1 cooperation and attitudes towards China was not significant. First, there were 
many non-CEE countries with relatively positive attitudes (Cyprus, Greece, the UK, Ire-
land, and Portugal). Second, apart from Romania, Croatia and Latvia China was not seen 
overwhelmingly positively in any of the CEE countries, on the contrary, negative attitudes 












Figure 15: Spatial distribution of positive views about China in EU member states 
 
Source: (Commission, 2017) 
  
The situation has deteriorated even further in the past three years as sporadic data by Pew 
Research Center presents below (see Figure 16, 17 and 18). China has never been really 
popular in the CEE countries (except Bulgaria), but it did experience an uptick in the first 
half of the 2010s. In the second half of the last decade, however, its reputation started to 
gradually decline, and the impact of the COVID-19 crises has probably decreased the 
share of positive attitudes further. Meanwhile, both the United States and the European 
Union have been enjoying a remarkably high and stable reputation throughout the region 
(except Czechia) suggesting that the people of Central Europe still see the West more 









Figure 16: Popularity of China in selected CEE countries 
 
Source: The author’s own graph based on: (Pew Research Center, 2020) 
 
Figure 17: Popularity of the US in selected CEE countries 
 






Figure 18: Popularity of the EU in selected CEE countries 
 
Source: The author’s own graph based on: (Pew Research Center, 2020) 
 
7.4. Summary of social and political perceptions of China in CEE countries 
 
Based on the previous chapters we may conclude that Chinese political and social influ-
ence in Central and Eastern Europe has its limits. The media depicts China in a mostly 
negative manner especially in Czechia, but in other countries as well, especially when it 
comes to value-based issues like human rights, political freedom, Tibet, Taiwan or com-
munist oppression by a one-party state. Although the potential of economic and business 
benefits of the cooperation with China used to serve as an important source of Chinese 
soft-power in the region, especially in the first years of the 16+1 cooperation, the lack of 
tangible results (as it will be presented later) have contributed to the decline of positive 
media coverage.  
Furthermore, despite the seemingly pro-China policies of many CEE government (see 
more details below) the actual influence of Beijing over CEE politics is limited by the fact 
that major parties tend to be pragmatic but still cautious if not concerned by or hostile 
towards China. Parties in government naturally support pro-China attitude in hope of eco-
nomic benefits (although their individual politicians may be more cautious in the back-
ground), but opposition parties both on the left and the right side of the aisle have serious 
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reservations about China and they also use anti-Chinese sentiments to bash their govern-
ments. 
Finally, in spite of the long list of promised economic benefits and pro-China communi-
cation of national governments, Central European publics have not developed a truly pos-
itive attitude towards China. The Czech population is the most negative about China in 
the whole EU, and even the most China-friendly nations favour the US and the EU over 
China by a wide margin. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is still to be researched 
as soon as new survey data get available. 
In sum, China has failed to build a stable and reliable reputation that may serve as a source 
of soft power to influence the domestic and EU level politics of CEE countries. 
8. The means and fields of cooperation  
Based on the official ‘guidelines’ published after every summit, the following means and 
ways of cooperation can be observed in the 16+1 framework. It is clear that Beijing has 
expanded the cooperation to various fields from the benefit and has been using regular 
meetings, conferences, forums and semi-institutional bodies to facilitate the cooperation. 
The following chapter offers an overview and analysis of the bureaucratic part of the 16+1 
mechanism. 
 
8.1. Warsaw: China's Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with 
Central and Eastern European Countries – Housekeeping measures (2012) 
 
Following the first China-CEE summit in Warsaw in 2012, the parties published a joint 
document to lay the foundations and design the further steps of the 16+1 cooperation. As 
to the technical management of communication and coordination within the 16+1, the 
parties decided to set up a secretariat in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In order to 
establish the financial background of potential economic cooperation the parties created a 
US$10 billion special credit line with a focus on cooperation projects in infrastructure, 
high and new technologies, and the green economy. Infrastructure was such an important 
topic from the very beginning that an expert advisory committee on the construction of 
transportation network between China and CEE countries was created as well. 
Furthermore, the summit concluded with the setup of an investment cooperation fund 
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between China and CEE countries with the goal of raising US$500 million. The document 
expressed the wish of the parties to boost cooperation between Chinese companies and 
CEE countries to establish one economic and technological zone in each state. Financial 
cooperation such as currency swap, local currency settlement for cross-border trade, and 
establishment of bank branches in each other's countries were also set as goal in the 
document. Tourism was another important topic in the document, thus China proposed the 
establishment of a tourism promotion alliance between the parties. 
Besides economic and financial cooperation, China also proposed to strengthen ties in the 
fields of culture and education. Beijing offered to organise a forum on cultural cooperation 
between China and central and eastern European countries in 2013 and offered 5000 
scholarships to the CEE countries in the following five years. Furthermore, China 
expressed its willingness to increase the number of Confucius Institutes and Confucius 
Classrooms programmes in the sixteen countries and to invite 1000 students to study 
Chinese language in China. Since the Chinese side has always regarded research and 
knowledge important, Beijing generously offered RMB 2 million annually to establish a 
research fund on relations between China and CEE countries. 
While annual summits represent the main platform of political cooperation, China had 
some thoughts about the future as well, therefore it decided to host the first young political 
leaders’ forum of China and CEE countries in 2013 what may be understood as a long 
term investment into personal relations with the next generation of CEE leaders. (MFA of 
PRC, 2012) 
 
8.2. Bucharest Guidelines – The EU factor (2013) 
 
One of the first sentences of the document published after the second summit addressed a 
fundamental issue, the EU. It states that the parties stressed that China-CEEC cooperation 
is in concord with China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership and relevant EU 
legislation and regulations apply to its members, what is an obvious reaction to the 
criticisms of Brussels, as the first document in Warsaw did not make such a statement. In 
exchange, however, elements of typical Chinese communication patterns or slogans have 
emerged in the Bucharest Guidelines for the first time, such as “offering useful experience 
for countries with different civilizations, systems and levels of development” or to “live 
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in harmony with one another and develop hand in hand” and the famous “Win-Win 
Cooperation for Common Development.” 
 
The Bucharest Guidelines was the first document to carve the annual meeting of China-
CEE heads of government into stone. It was also the first time to offer the specific fields 
of cooperation is a systematic way, namely: investment, economic and trade cooperation 
(section III.); financial cooperation (section IV.); Enhance cooperation in connectivity 
(section V.); science, technology, innovation, environmental protection and energy 
(section VI.); people-to-people and cultural exchanges (section VII.) and sub-national 
level cooperation (section VIII.). As it will be presented below, all subsequent guidelines 
have followed a similar structure to describe plans for cooperation. 
 
Investment, economic and trade cooperation 
According to the guidelines the parties intend to promote mutual investment and scale up 
economic cooperation and trade while striving to mitigate its current imbalances (an issue 
endemic to most CEE countries’’ trade relations with China) To boost economic relations 
the document sets forth a plethora of upcoming events and programmes. It designates 
2014 as the China-CEEC Investment and Business Promotion Year, proposes the 
organisation of the China-CEEC ministerial meeting on promotion of economic 
cooperation and trade; an expo of CEEC commodities in China; a symposium on 
macroeconomic policies in China; a symposium on investment promotion in China; an 
investment promotion event at the China International Fair for Investment and Trade; a 
China investment forum in the Czech Republic and the establishment of a China-CEEC 
liaison mechanism for investment promotion agencies. Furthermore, the document 
supports the establishment of a China-CEEC association of chambers of commerce, CEE 
countries' participation in the China International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair and 
the foundation of a China-CEEC association to promote agricultural cooperation. 
 
Financial cooperation 
China its CEE partners pledged to step up coordination and to encourage their financial 
institutions to engage in cooperation and to bring into full play the role of the US$10 
billion special credit line established in the previous year. The document also announced 
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the launch of the China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund and expressed its support to 
financial institutions of China and CEECs in establishing branches and developing 
business in each other's countries. The parties also supported the central bank of the PRC 




The parties discussed the possibility of building an international railway transportation 
corridor connecting China with CEE countries and to strengthen cooperation in 
infrastructure development (construction of roads, railways, ports and airports) Like in the 
case of general economic cooperation, China proposed various events and programmes, 
such as a high-level conference on transport, logistics and trade routes connecting Asia 
with Europe. 
 
Science, technology, innovation, environmental protection and energy 
Event proposals dominate this chapter as well. The parties agreed to organise a regular 
China-CEE symposium to promote innovation, technological cooperation and 
international technology transfer, the first symposium was held in 2014. 
 
People-to-people and cultural exchanges and cooperation 
Even more events and semi-institutional bodies were entitled to boost connections 
between the two sides. China pledged to organise the first China-CEEC high-level 
symposium of think tanks in China in December 2013. 
The Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European 
Countries invited 50 Chinese journalists and 50 CEE journalists to visit each other’s 
countries in 2014. 
China seemed to be pleased with the first China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum 
and the China-CEEC Cultural Cooperation Forum as the parties decided to organise the 
event on a regular basis in every two years. Furthermore, the document supported the 
establishment of a China-CEEC association of tourism promotion agencies and businesses 
and the organisation of the China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue 
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Cooperation at the sub-national level was also encouraged through the establishment of a 
China-CEEC association of provincial governors, joined by Chinese and CEEC provinces, 
states and municipalities on a voluntary basis. To facilitate exchanges another semi-
institutionalised body, the China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting would be held once every 
two years.  (Secretariat for Cooperation between China and CEE Countries, 2013) 
 
 
8.3. Belgrade Guidelines – The Budapest-Belgrade railway (2014) 
 
Since the publication of the Bucharest Guidelines, references to the EU have become a 
standard element of all subsequent guidelines. Therefore the Belgrade Guidelines also 
starts with statements in which participants reiterated “China-CEEC cooperation is in line 
with China-EU relations and reaffirmed their commitment to deepening their partnership 
for peace, growth, reform and civilization based on the principles of equality, respect and 
trust (…) and thus contributing as appropriate to the implementation of the EU-China 
2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation.” 
 
Connectivity 
The participant (taking note of the EU regulations) supported exploring possibilities of 
China-CEEC infrastructure connections and welcomed the signing of agreements on the 
railway connecting Belgrade and Budapest. Furthermore, the guideline sets forth the 
strengthening of cooperation in infrastructure development including roads, railways, 
ports and airports. Semi-institutionalised bodies, like the China-CEEC association on 
transport and infrastructure cooperation in Serbia, or the Riga High Level Conference on 
Transport, Logistics and Trade Routes and the China-CEEC association on logistics 
cooperation were established as well. As a new element, the establishment of direct flights 
between China and CEE capital cities was mentioned in the Belgrade Guideline. 
 
Economic cooperation, trade and investment 
The parties pledged to increase mutual investment and to elevate the scale and level of 
economic cooperation and trade.  
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Further cooperation platforms were established, such as the China-CEEC Business 
Council in Warsaw or the Secretariat of the China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies 
Contact Mechanism in Beijing, China, and Warsaw and the China-CEEC investment and 
trade fair during the China International Consumer Goods Fair in Ningbo, or the China 
International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair. The China-CEEC association on 
promoting agricultural cooperation was held in Bulgaria while the 10th China-CEEC 
Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum was organised in Hungary and the CEEC-
China Forum during European Economic Congress took place in Katowice in 2015. 
 
Financial cooperation 
Regarding financial cooperation the text practically repeats what had already been stated 
in the previous guideline: it encourages Chinese and CEEC financial institutions to 
cooperate in flexible and diverse forms, to improve financing conditions for businesses 
and to bring into full play the role of the US$10 billion special credit line. Furthermore, it 
reiterates the parties support for currency swap agreements and to facilitate local currency 
settlement as one of the effective means to increase trade and investment. Therefore, it 
encourages Chinese and CEEC businesses to use RMB as settlement currency in cross-
border trade and investment 
 
Science, technology, innovation, environmental protection and energy 
The parties agreed to encourage joint research projects between China and CEE countries 
and to deepen people-to-people and cultural exchanges and cooperation at the sub-national 
level. Therefore the guidelines set forth a plethora of events, meeting and forums, such as 
the China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and International 
Technology Transfer in Slovakia, the establishment of the Center for Dialogue and 
Cooperation in energy-related projects in Romania, an expert forum on the protection of 
Chinese and CEEC cultural heritage in Poland, and an expert forum in the field of tangible 
and intangible cultural heritage management and protection in Albania, the China-CEEC 
summer dance camp in China, a Chinese art festival in the three Baltic countries, the 
China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks or the organisation of regular 
mutual visits of 50 Chinese and CEE journalists. The parties also agreed to organise the 
2nd China-CEEC Cultural Cooperation Forum in 2015 and hold a China-CEEC dance 
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evening gala concurrently. Hungary established the China-CEEC Association of Tourism 
Promotion Agencies and Businesses and 2015 was designated as Year of Promotion of 
China-CEEC Tourism Cooperation. In this spirit the, 
 2nd China-CEEC High Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation was organised in 
Slovenia. Sofia University was acting as the first rotating coordination center on the 
European side for China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium. 
 Local governments were encouraged by the guidelines to take an active part in exchanges 
and cooperation in all fields under the China-CEE cooperation framework, and to run the 
China-CEEC Association of Governors of Provinces and Region. Therefore, the 3rd 
China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting was held China, in 2016. Furthermore, the Czech 
Republic organised the 1st China-CEEC health ministers' meeting in 2015 (Secretariat for 
Cooperation between China and CEE Countries, 2014) 
 
8.4. Suzhou Guidelines – The BRI factor (2015) 
 
The Suzhou Guidelines welcomed the agreement between the leaders of China and the 
EU on establishing the China-EU Connectivity Platform, as well as on developing 
synergies between the Belt and Road initiative of China and the Investment Plan for 
Europe, and between 16+1 cooperation and China-EU relations. This was a clear sign of 
the Chinese intention to gradually merge the 16+1 into the BRI. As a new step toward the 
institutionalisation of the 16+1, the participants supported the establishment of quarterly 
meetings between the Secretariat for Cooperation between China and CEE Countries and 
CEEC embassies in Beijing. 
 
Connectivity 
Hungary was the first EU member state to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with 
China to join the BRI. According to the Suzhou Guidelines, other CEE countries 
expressed their intention as well to have similar documents with China. As usual many 
events and forums were slated to boost practical cooperation between the sides: China, 
Hungary, Serbia and Macedonia organized the 2nd working group meeting and workshop 
under the Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Facilitating Customs Clearance in 
Budapest in 2016, Serbia established a China-CEEC association on transport and 
117 
infrastructure cooperation, Latvia founded the China-CEEC secretariat on logistics 
cooperation, and the 1st China-CEEC Transport Ministers' Meeting was held in Riga in 
2016. Furthermore, the Participants welcomed the relaunch of direct flights between 
Beijing and Budapest and the start of direct flights between Beijing and Prague in addition 
to existing Beijing-Warsaw connection. 
 
Economic and Financial Cooperation 
Even though new agreement was not reached in Suzhou, multitudes of events were slated 
by the participants for the upcoming year. The 2nd China-CEEC Ministerial Meeting on 
Promoting Trade and Economic Cooperation and the China-CEEC Investment and Trade 
Expo were agreed to be held in Ningbo in 2016. Furthermore, the 3rd Meeting of the China-
CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism was held in China in 2016, 
while Romania decided to set up a Center for Dialogue in energy-related projects. The 
China Investment Forum was held in the Czech Republic in 2016.  
 
People-to-People Contacts and Cultural Exchanges 
According to the Suzhou Guidelines, the secretariat continued to invite senior CEE 
officials for trips to China in 2016, the 4th China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and 
the 3rd meeting of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium, the China-CEEC 
forum on cooperation in the field of art and the 2nd China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp 
were all organised in China in 2016. 
 
Cooperation on Science, Technology and Health 
The 3rd China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and International 
Technology Transfer was held in China in 2016. Suzhou was the first summit to include 
cooperation in the fields of health and medicine into the 16+1 cooperation, as Central and 
Easter European health professionals were invited to visit China in 2016 to participate in 
seminars on global health diplomacy. 
 
Agricultural and Forestry Cooperation  
The Suzhou Guidelines was also first of its kind as it incorporated agricultural and forestry 
cooperation into the framework. Thus, the China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic 
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Cooperation Forum was held in China in 2016, and the summit supported Slovenia in 
establishing a China-CEE coordination mechanism for forestry cooperation. Furthermore, 
the 1st China-CEEC High-Level Meeting on Cooperation in Forestry was organised in 
Slovenia in May 2016. (Secretariat for Cooperation between China and CEE Countries, 
2015) 
 
8.5. Riga Guidelines – Business as usual (2016) 
 
The Riga summit did not bring any major new elements to the 16+1 framework, it seems 
that the mechanism had reached its full potential by 2016. The guideline does not contain 
too much beyond the sheer list of planned events and forums for the next year. As it can 
be expected, participants reaffirmed their intention to forge an efficient, practical and 
lasting 16+1 cooperation (in line with relevant EU regulations) and to develop synergies 
between 16+1 and the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, including the EU-
China Connectivity Platform. 
 
Trade and investment  
The parties supported progress in the negotiations of the EU-China bilateral investment 
agreement. The China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo was held in China in 2017, 
while the China Investment Forum took place in the Czech Republic. One of the minor 




The Participants acknowledged the importance of the EU-China Connectivity Platform 
and recognised the need to make efforts to develop synergies between the BRI and the 
relevant EU initiatives such as the Trans-European Networks. Latvia established the 
China-CEEC Secretariat on Logistics Cooperation in Riga and the modernization of the 
Bar-Belgrade railway track section was praised. According to the guidelines, the 2nd 
China-CEEC Transport Ministers’ Meeting was held in 2017. 
 
Industry, energy, science and technology  
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The summit welcomed the so called “Port Area Cooperation” between China and CEECs 
bordering the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Sea (also known as the Three Seas Initiative), 
and the establishment of China-CEEC Secretariat for Maritime Issues in Poland. The 
participants supported the establishment of a China-CEEC Center for Dialogue and 
Cooperation on Energy Projects in Romania and the development of China-CEEC 
Technology Transfer Center established in Bratislava, plus the organisation of the 2nd 
China-CEEC Conference on Innovation Cooperation in 2017. 
 
Financial cooperation  
CEE countries’ financial institutions and businesses were invited to contribute to the 
investment fund launched by Sino-CEE Finance Holding Company Ltd. and the 
participants expressed their intention to explore the possibility of establishing a China-
CEEC Inter-Bank Association. 
 
Agricultural and forestry cooperation  
The 12th China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum and the 5th Meeting 
of the Consultative Board of the Association for the Promotion of Agricultural 
Cooperation between China and CEE countries were organised according to the 
guidelines. 
 
People-to-people contacts  
The summit designated 2017 as Year of China-CEEC Media Cooperation in order to 
strengthen media exchanges, hold a forum on media cooperation and to organize mutual 
visits by Chinese and CEE journalists. Just like in previous years, the secretariat invited 
senior CEE officials for a trip to China in 2017. The 5th China-CEEC Education Policy 
Dialogue and the 4th meeting of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium 
both took place in 2017. 
 
Health Cooperation  
The Participants supported the activities of the China-CEEC Association on the Promotion 
of Health Cooperation, but no further details were disclosed by the guidelines. 
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Local Cooperation  
The 3rd working meeting of the China-CEEC Association of Provincial Governors was 
held in Bulgaria in 2017 and the 4th China-CEEC Local Leaders’ Meeting was organised 
by Bulgaria in 2018. (Secretariat for Cooperation between China and CEE Countries, 
2016) 
 
8.6. Budapest Guidelines – The Trump effect? (2017) 
 
On the fifth anniversary of the establishment of 16+1 cooperation, the participants agreed 
the mechanism had grown over the previous five years in the fields of politics, economy 
and trade, transport and logistics, connectivity, people-to-people exchanges as well as 
other areas. 
It was the first time to have a reference to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter 
and multilateralism and openness in global economy in the series of guidelines, stand for 
multilateralism, and strive for openness in global economy. The Chinese side reaffirmed 
the importance of the China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership and its wishes to see 
a united, stable and prosperous Europe. Of course, the introduction of the guidelines 
praised connectivity between Europe and Asia and the Belt and Road Initiative and Belt 
and Road Forum for International Cooperation as well. Such novel elements may be seen 
as a reaction to the uncertainties in the international system following the victory of 
Donald Trump at the US presidential elections. Meanwhile, references to the Belt and 
Road Forum are aimed at the EU, as it was reluctant to send its high-ranking 
representatives to Beijing. (Xinhua News Agency, 2017) 
 
Trade and investment 
First in the history of 16+1 guidelines the parties stressed the importance of multilateral 
trading system embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its values and 
principles. Once again, it seems probable that China brought the issue of the WTO to the 
agenda of the 16+1 summit in late November 2017 in reaction to the rise of protectionism 
and unilateral actions under President Trump. Meanwhile, no new major agreement was 
reached by the parties except scheduling another round of events and forums such as the 
3rd China-CEEC Ministerial Meeting on Promoting Trade and Economic Cooperation 
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what was held in Ningbo in 2018, the China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo on the 
margins of China International Consumer Goods Fair in Ningbo in 2018, the 4th meeting 
of China-CEEC Investment and Trade Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism,  the 
China Investment Forum in the Czech Republic or the fifth meeting of China-CEEC 
Business Council. Furthermore, the participants supported the establishment of 16+1 
Demonstration Zone for economic cooperation and trade in Ningbo and other Chinese 
cities and explored the possibility of the establishment of China-CEEC Economic and 
Trade Officials Exchange Mechanism. 
 
Connectivity 
The participants reaffirm support to the EU-China Connectivity Platform and to exploring 
synergies with the Belt and Road initiative and its connections to the Trans-European 
Transport Network. The Three Seas Initiative was mentioned once again in the document, 
but no further development was detailed. Croatia and Slovenia reached progress on the 
Mediterranean railway corridor from Port of Rijeka and Port of Koper towards other CEE 
countries. The guideline set forth further feasibility studies to explore the possibility of 
extending the Budapest-Belgrade railway line to the ports of Montenegro and Albania and 
to expand cooperation in development of container block trains services and combined 
mode transport solutions and to jointly examine options for better use of existing logistic 
centers and the establishment of new ones. 
When it comes to events, Budapest Guidelines slated the date of the 4th China-CEEC 
Transport Ministers' Meeting in Belgrade, and the first CEEC-China Civil Aviation Forum 
in the Czech Republic both held in 2018. Furthermore, China, Hungary, Serbia and 
Macedonia organised the 4th working group meeting and experts’ seminar on Customs 
Clearance Facilitation Cooperation on China-Europe Land and Sea Express as well in 
2018. 
 
Industry, energy, science and technology 
China and its Central and Eastern European partners expressed their will to promote 
supply chain development in their respective countries, based on their comparative 
advantages, therefore they supported joint research on energy cooperation by the National 
Energy Administration of China and CEE countries. The 3rd 16+1 Conference on 
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Innovation Cooperation was organized in Sarajevo in 2018. As a new element, smart cities 
were mentioned for the first time in the series of guidelines in the one published after the 




The participants welcomed the creation of Silk Road Fund by China and supported the 
Silk Road Fund’s potential investments in CEE countries. As another sign of Chinese 
intentions to merge the 16+1 with the BRI, the document lauded efforts made by China 
Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China to establish Belt and Road 
special loans, and the efforts by Silk Road Fund and European Investment Fund to 
establish the China-EU Co-Investment Fund. Another important international goal of 
China, the internationalization of the RMB got its sentence in the document too, as the 
participants pledged to explore the possibility of RMB financing of projects and supported 
the international use of the Chinese currency. The China Development Bank established 
a Secretariat of the Inter-Bank Association and the Hungarian Development Bank set up 
a Coordination Center. One more item on the long list of events: the China-CEEC Central 
Bank Governors' Meeting was held in Hungary in 2018. 
 
Agriculture, Forestry and Environment Protection Cooperation 
The relevant parties encouraged the promotion of Central and Eastern European 
agricultural and food products in China at agricultural expos, business missions and other 
trade promotion such as the China International Agricultural Products Fair. 
The list of events is remarkable in this field of cooperation: the 13th China-CEEC 
Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum, the 7th meeting of the Consultative Board 
of the Association for Promotion of Agricultural Cooperation between China-CEEC and 
the 22nd international AgroBalt, the 16+1 Agriculture Investment and Equipment 
Cooperation Fair in Mostar were all held in 2018. Furthermore, Bulgaria established a 
16+1 agricultural cooperation demonstration zone and organised the 16+1 International 
Agricultural Demonstration Park in 2018 in Plovdiv, the 2nd China-CEEC high-level 
conference on forestry cooperation were all slated. The China-CEEC Quality Testing 
Cooperation Dialogue and China-CEEC Trade Facilitation National Inspection 
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Examination Area in Ningbo and a China-CEEC Environmental Protection Cooperation 
Mechanism in Montenegro were all established. 
 
People-to-People Contacts 
As always, the secretariat for 16+1 cooperation continued to invite high-ranking officials 
from CEE countries to trips to China in 2018 as well. 
P2P relations naturally mean personal contacts between people, so multiple events were 
established to meet the requirements: the 2nd China-CEEC Spokespersons Dialogue was 
held in Hungary, the 6th China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and the 5th meeting of 
China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium, the 2nd China-CEEC Arts 
Cooperation Forum, the 2nd China-CEEC Experts-Level Forum on Safeguarding 
Intangible Cultural Heritage, the 1st China-CEEC Curators Forum of Libraries Union, the 
2nd 16+1 Winter Dance Camp and the 1st 16+1 Summer Jazz Camp were all held in China 
in 2018.  The 2nd China-CEEC Cultural Heritage Forum was held in China in 2019, and 
the parties agreed to continue with the regular organisation of the China-CEEC Political 
Parties Dialogue and the China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum. The 5th China-
CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks took place in Macedonia in 2018. The 4th 
China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation was held in Dubrovnik in 
2018. 
Bridge of the Future China-CEEC youth camp exchanges as well got the support of the 
summit. 
At finally yet importantly, the participants supported the China-CEEC Tourism 
Coordination Center in organising the 3rd China Information Day Conference in Budapest 
in 2018 to strengthen the touristic branding of CEE countries in China. 
 
Health Cooperation 
The guidelines set forth the establishment of the China-CEEC Human Resources for 
Health Cooperation Network, the China-CEEC Health Policy Research Network, the 
China-CEEC Public Health Cooperation Network as well as the launching of the official 
website of the China-CEEC Hospital Alliance. Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) 
became a focal point of health related cooperation, TCM centers had been established in 
the Czech Republic, Macedonia and Montenegro, while Hungary set up the Central and 
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Eastern European Medical, Education and Research Center for Traditional Chinese 
Medicine. Two major events were slated at the summit: the 4th China-CEEC Health 
Ministers' Forum and the China-CEEC Drug Regulatory Cooperation Forum. 
 
Local Cooperation 
The participants designated 2018 as Year of Cooperation between Local Governments and 
Local Enterprises. More and more CEE capitals, provinces, regions and municipalities 
established sister or twin city/region/municipality relations with their Chinese counterpart. 
Further events were set to boost local cooperation: the 4th China-CEEC Local Leaders' 
Meeting in Plovdiv, the 4th working group meeting of Local Provincial Governors 
Association and the 3rd China-CEEC Capital Mayors Forum in Serbia. (Secretariat for 
Cooperation between China and CEE Countries, 2017) 
 
8.7. Sofia Guidelines – First signs of disappointments (2018) 
According to the Sofia Guidelines, the parties remained committed to the principles of 
mutual respect, mutually beneficial cooperation and building an open world economy, 
making economic globalization more dynamic, inclusive and sustainable. That is, Chinese 
concerns about negative changes or world affairs and globalisations (i.e. Trump effect) 
had to be addressed by the 16+1 summit as well. Furthermore, the EU factor was another 
important element of concern, and the guidelines did not miss the opportunity to reiterate 
the importance of EU-China relations as the background of the 16+1 cooperation and that 
the format was in line with respective competences and existing commitments of EU 
members.  
 
Strengthening 16+1 coordination 
By 2018 many CEE countries have expressed their disappointment through unofficial 
channels. The Sofia Guidelines signals Beijing’s recognition of the problem, and its 
intentions to review existing 16+1 cooperation mechanisms and meetings to ensure 
efficient use of administrative resources of Participants and to establish a more focused, 
result oriented approach. Mentioning ‘result oriented approach’ is an obvious Chinese 
reaction to the small amount of tangible results of the 16+1 cooperation. 
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Practical Cooperation in Trade, Investment and Connectivity 
Likewise, the second chapter of the guidelines emphasizes the need for practical results in 
form of a more balanced economic partnership, based on the principles of level-playing 
field and equal opportunities. As always, a large number of events were meant to deepen 
the level of cooperation. In order to increase exports, CEE countries were invited once 
again to the 2nd China International Import Expo in Shanghai in 2019, while the 5th China-
CEEC Investment and Trade Expo was held in Ningbo in the same year. The summit 
supported the work of the China-CEEC Business Council in Poland and set forth the 
strengthening of China-EU Connectivity Platform and container block trains services and 
combined mode transport solutions. 
In the rest of the chapter the guidelines repeats a lot of programs mentioned in previous 
guidelines, such as the progress that has been made by China, Serbia and Hungary on the 
Belgrade-Budapest railway project, the Three Seas Initiative or the potential synergies 
between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Trans-European Transport Network. Even 
more events were slated for the sake of the cooperation, such as the China-CEEC Customs 
Cooperation Forum in Poland (2019), the 5 China-CEEC Transport Ministers' Meeting in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2019) or the 1st CEEC-China Civil Aviation Forum in the Czech 
Republic (2019). 
  
Science, Technology, Innovation, Finance, Green Environmental Protection, Agriculture, 
Energy, Forestry and Health 
Compared to previous guidelines the once published after the Sofia Summit took an 
unusual turn and squeezed science, technology, innovation, finance, environmental 
protection, agriculture, energy, forestry and health issues into one single chapter to repeat 
previous slogans and commitments and to propose many more conferences and events: 
the China-CEEC Science, Technology and Innovation Partnership; the China-CEEC 
Conference on Innovation Cooperation; the China-CEEC Innovation Capacity Building 
Working; the 16+1 Coordination Mechanism for SMEs, the China-CEEC SMEs 
Cooperation Zone and the 16+1 Environmental Protection Cooperation Mechanism, the 
16+1 Smart City Coordination Center, the 16+1 Fintech Coordination Center and the 16+1 
High Level Fintech Forum. The 4th 16+1 Agricultural Ministers' Meeting and the 14th 
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16+1 Agro-trade and Economic Cooperation Forum and the 4th China-CEEC Health 
Ministers' Forum also took place in 2019. 
 
People-to-People Exchanges 
The year of 2019 was declared the 16+1 Year of Education and Youth Exchange. In this 
framework, Beijing pledged to invite education officials and school principals to visit 
China for education capacity building training. In order to strengthen dialogue among 
CEEC and China`s universities, CEE countries were invited to participate in the China 
Education Expo in 2019. The establishment of a 16+1 Youth Development Center was 
slated, and the Bridge of the Future China-CEEC Youth Exchange Camp was organized 
in 2019. The 7th China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and the 6th meeting of China-
CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium were both held in 2019.  
Tourism and culture both remained important elements of the cooperation, thus the 5th 
China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation was held in Riga in 2019, 
while the 4th China-CEEC Ministers' Forum on Culture Cooperation was organised in 
Macedonia. When it comes to more relaxed events the 5th Summer Dance Camp and the 
3rd China-CEEC Dance Masters Workshop were held in China. Furthermore, the 4th 16+1 
Cultural and Creative Industry Forum took place in Hungary, and participants supported 
the establishment of a 16+1 Cooperation People-to-People Exchange Experience Center 
in China. The list of events is far from over yet: the 2nd China-CEEC Cultural Heritage 
Forum, a conference on the promotion of women entrepreneurship, and the 6th China-
CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks were all held in 2019. 
 
Local cooperation was another important element of the Sofia Guidelines, so the 6th 
working group meeting of Local Provincial Governors Association, the 4th China-CEEC 
Capital Mayors Forum and the 3rd China-CEEC Mayors Forum were all held in China in 
2019. 






8.8. Dubrovnik Guidelines – 2019 
 
The last summit of the 16+1 was held in Croatia in 2019, where the mechanism was 
expanded to the 17+1 as Greece joined the team of European participants. (The summit 
of 2020 was postponed due to the global pandemic). Like before, the Dubrovnik Guideline 
once again emphasised the importance of a sustainable and open world economy, 
globalization, the Paris Agreement and a rules-based multilateral trading system with the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) at its core, what can be seen as a reaction to the 
protectionist actions of the Trump administration. As always, the importance of EU-China 
relations was reiterated by the participants, just like the emphasis on a result-oriented 
approach. Therefore, the heads of governments called for a review of cooperation 
mechanism to ensure efficient use of resources. This meant a clear adjustment by the 
Chinese side to the complaints and criticism by CEE governments due to the lack of 
tangible results of the previous years. 
 
Connectivity 
Participants of the Dubrovnik Summit pledged to step up their cooperation with third 
countries to promote digital economy, efficient transport connectivity and smart, 
sustainable, safe and secure mobility, with a special emphasis on the Investment Plan for 
Europe, the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) and their extensions to the 
Western Balkans. The Guidelines stressed the importance of cooperation in railway 
projects and intermodal transport solutions and logistics. The EU-China Agreement on 
Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters and of the EU-
China Strategic Framework for Customs Cooperation was also mentioned in the document 
as an important point of reference.  
Furthermore, port cooperation between China and the Central and Eastern European 
countries, including inland waterways and the intermodal connections and the expansion 
of air connections between China and CEECs were mentioned in the document as 





Trade and investment 
The Participants agreed on holding of the 3rd China International Import Expo and the 4th 
China-CEEC Ministerial Conference on Economic and Trade Promotion and China-
CEEC Fair in China and the China Investment Forum in the Czech Republic in 2020. 
However, due to the pandemic most of these events had to be cancelled.  
On the technical side the heads of government noted the need to pursue policies facilitating 
access for CEEC products into China in to build a more balanced economic partnership 
between CEECs and China, that is to at least mitigate enormous trade deficits on the CEE 
side, as it has been taking its toll in terms of political confidence in the whole cooperation 
mechanism.  
As another possible Chinese reaction to US trade policies, the participants agreed to 
support necessary reforms of the WTO to address global trade challenges and to ensure 
its continued relevance and effectiveness. Furthermore, the participants recognized the 
importance of ensuring open, transparent and non-discriminatory procurement procedures 
and pledged that the awards of contracts would be in compliance with their respective 
regulations and international obligations. On the one hand such words may serve as a 
message to the EU that China is opening up its economy even more, on the other hand, it 
can be understood as a promise that Chinese infrastructure investment in the CEE region 
would not be hindered by protectionism or political machinations.  
What noteworthy is, that the chapter on trade and investment is surprisingly short 
compared to previous Guidelines’ similar chapters and does not propose tangible projects, 
what may mean that 17+1 was losing momentum. 
 
Financial cooperation 
The chapter on financial cooperation was even shorter and non-committal than the 
previous one. The parties greed on some general issues, like the strengthening of 
cooperation among government financial regulatory authorities and to diversify the 
currencies used by market participants in their respective countries in their economic 





Education, youth and sports cooperation 
In another anaemic chapter, the participants agreed on some education and sport related 
issues, such as the launching of the China-CEEC Education Capacity Building Project and 
the China-CEEC Joint Education Project of Institutions of Higher Education, and the 
China-CEEC Youth Development Center to be established in Albania. The strengthening 
of campus sports exchanges and cooperation including snow and ice activities and the 
establishment of the China-CEEC Coordination Mechanism for Sports in CEECs were 
among the listed activities and agreements as well.  
 
Scientific and Technological Innovation, Energy Cooperation 
According to Dubrovnik Guidelines, the participants agreed that the potential of 
cooperation between China and CEECs in the field of scientific and technological 
innovation provides opportunities and possibilities for joint projects in the fields of 
innovation-driven mutual investments. Furthermore, they supported mutually beneficial 
cooperation between China and CEECs in the energy sector and welcomed the 
establishment of the China-CEEC Energy Cooperation Dialogue. In addition, the 
possibility of launching the China-CEEC Smart City Coordination Center in Romania was 
also welcomed, just as the possibility of establishing the China-CEEC Blockchain Center 
of Excellence. The vague language of these commitments suggests that cooperation had 
become sluggish in these sectors as well. 
 
Health cooperation 
Besides praising previous achievements the Dubrovnik Guidelines mentioned healthcare 
cooperation in a very short chapter, where participants welcomed the idea that clinics, 
universities and research institutions in CEECs could find more cooperation opportunities 
with China on traditional Chinese medicine, but nothing substantial or concrete was 
agreed on. Of course, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased the importance of health 
cooperation ever since, as China has announced the establishment of a Health Silk Road 
and some of the members of the 17+1 held a video conference to exchange information 




Agriculture, forestry, water conservation and environmental protection 
Participants of the summit announced that 2020 would be the Year of China-CEEC 
Agricultural Diversity Cooperation, although the pandemic has certainly had a negative 
impact on such activities. The parties pledged to work for the expansion of market access 
for food products and to encourage China and CEE countries to cooperate through the 
Association for the Promotion of Agricultural Cooperation between China and the CEE 
Countries (APACCCEEC), to support mutual agricultural trade promotion activities and 
to encourage enterprises to participate in international agricultural trade fairs in China and 
CEE countries. 
Deepening of cooperation between government authorities on forestry research, trade, 
investment, and the cooperation of more Chinese and CEE universities and research 
institutions in the field of agriculture were among the proposed goals as well. A dialogue 
on water policy, and technical exchanges, experience sharing and exchanges of experience 
on water protection and environmental management and waste disposal were added to the 
list too. 
 
People-to-people exchanges and local cooperation 
The final part of the Dubrovnik Guidelines focused on P2P and local cooperation, and the 
first sentence of the chapter emphasised the importance of gender equality and women 
empowerment as a new element of cooperation, whatever it might mean. As always, 
Beijing reiterated its will to continue to invite high-ranking officials and journalists from 
CEECs to visit China. Since tourism and culture were considered one of the most 
important element of P2P activities, the parties agreed to have the 6th China-CEEC High-
level Conference on Tourism Cooperation in CEE countries, the 3rd China-CEEC Art 
Cooperation Forum in Serbia, the 3rd China-CEEC Expert Forum on Intangible Cultural 
Heritage Protection and the 2nd China-CEEC Library Union Forum in CEE countries in 
2020, though once again, the pandemic has most probably hindered the implementation 
of such programmes. From a theoretical point of view, the establishment of the China-
CEEC Association of Publishing Houses agreements on joint film production and joint 
program broadcasting, personnel training and TV or radio festivals with China may 
increase China’s soft power in the region, though its actual impact is probably very 
limited. 
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As to local cooperation, the Dubrovnik Guidelines offers a less than convincing sentence: 
“The participants positively comment the important role played by local cooperation in 
promoting the in-depth development of 16+1 Cooperation.” It seems this otherwise 
important element of the 17+1 framework had reached its limits by 2019 and the parties 
were unable to find meaningful new goals to boost local cooperation between China and 
its CEE partners. 
(Secretariat for Cooperation between China and CEE Countries, 2019) 
 
8.9. An overview of the cooperation mechanism based on the guidelines 
 
The extensive description of guidelines above may seem boring and repetitious, it is 
important, however, to understand the tools and methods of China in the 16+1 
cooperation. Many experts have argued in the recent years that the China-CEE 
cooperation is a major disappointment, and the lack of tangible results means an existential 
threat to the mechanism. These critical remarks are based on a Western approach, where 
results should manifest in the realms of the economy in a relatively short period. Western 
politicians, even in the CEE countries have to prove to their voters until the next elections 
that cooperation with China was an initiative what payed. Meanwhile, the Chinese 
approach is based on plans for long-term cooperation (with results in decades, instead of 
years), and on building connections. It is a common sense in the fields of cross-cultural 
management that the Chinese make friendship first and business later. When we look at 
the history of the 16+1 cooperation from a Chinese angle, it is a major success, as the 
parties have organised over four hundred activities (See Annex Nr. 1 and Figure 8.), 
ranging from summits of the heads of governments or presidents of the central banks, 
through the meetings of local leaders and universities to the somewhat funny but still 
important international dance and art events. It means that China has presented its success 
story and its capacities to thousands of Central European people, mostly to the elite of 





Figure 19: Number of 16+1 related events (2012-2019) 
 
Source: The author’s compilation 
 
As the table below presents (Table 5) the structure of guidelines published after each 
summit has not been carved into stone, the number of chapters and titles have changed 
from year to year. Still, the order of titles may offer some insight into the main motives 
and preferences of the involved parties. (Based on anecdotal sources of diplomats, the text 
has always been proposed by the Chinese side, and CEE governments recommended 
amendments. This implies that the text reflects mostly upon China’s interests and 
intentions.)  
First, the importance of the EU has been mentioned since the second summit in Bucharest, 
as a clear reaction to the criticisms by the EU. 
Second, connectivity, trade and investment have always been the topics mentioned first 
and in the longest form in the guidelines, followed by financial and other business related 
issues what suggest that the 16+1 cooperation was economic, and business oriented from 
the very beginning.  It is noteworthy that political cooperation has never been mentioned 
explicitly, though some of the events organised under the framework were inherently 
political (e.g. conferences of young political leaders) 
Third, people-to-people and local cooperation has always been at the very bottom of the 
agenda, though many events of the 17+1 focused on building personal connections 
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between the societies of the involved parties. This latter issue is particularly under-
researched and calls for higher levels of scholarly and political attention, as it may have 
long-term implications on China-CEE relations. Building guanxi (personal connections) 
is one of the primary goals of the Chinese foreign policy, and the West has barely paid 
attention to it.
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Table 5: The main structure of guidelines 
 Warsaw 
(2012) 
Bucharest (2013) Belgrade (2014) Suzhou (2015) Riga (2016) Budapest (2017) Sofia (2018) Dubrovnik (2019) 
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Scientific and Technological 
Innovation, Energy Cooperation 
6. 
- 
Cooperation at the sub-
national level 
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Agriculture, forestry, water 
conservation and environmental 
protection cooperation 
8. 
- - - - 
Local Cooperation Local Cooperation 
- 
People-to-people exchanges and 
cooperation 
9. - - - - - - - Local cooperation 
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9. Chinese investments and political strings 
 
The following section presents some thoughts on the links between political and 
economic relations with China in general. It is utmost important to present relevant 
literature on this specific topic, since one of the main concerns about the 16+1 cooperation 
has been potential correlation between Chinese investment in and the pro-China EU level 
policies of CEE-11 countries as it was described in the hypotheses. 
Fuchs and Klann’s paper on the ‘Dalai Lama effect’ on international trade provides 
an excellent initial approach to the political economy of bilateral relations with China. 
Based on their empirical analysis of links between trade and political relations, the authors 
conclude that deteriorating political relations with China (specifically brought about by 
high-level government meetings with the Dalai Lama) led to a considerable reduction in 
exports to China, mainly machinery and transport equipment. Their findings suggest that 
China does use economic (trade) sanctions in the event of political tensions with other 
countries, but the deterioration of trade exists predominantly for those goods that are sold 
in the course of state visits and trade missions to China paid by high-level representatives 
of the given countries. Meanwhile the Dalai Lama effect on raw materials or mineral fuels 
is weak or non-existent. The authors conclude that bilateral relations are of deep 
importance for trade with China, and that the increasing economic power of China is likely 
to result in the growing importance of trade as a foreign policy tool. Political relations do 
have an impact on bilateral trade, with the extent of this influence varying between 
political regimes. Governments in free market economies still set the rules as a legal 
framework under which firms import and export, while governments in managed 
economies directly negotiate the terms of trade case by case (Fuchs & Klann, 2010). 
Filippov and Saebi write about the three main motives of China's investment 
strategy. Macroeconomic reasons, such as the enormous quantity of foreign exchange 
reserves, impel China to engage in investment abroad. Business motives also play a part, 
since major Chinese companies seek international opportunities to expand, gain 
experience, and survive competition both at home and abroad. The third motive is 
political: China wants to build political influence around the world. According to the 
authors, Europe must acknowledge the perils inherent in the strong political influence that 
the Chinese government exerts over Chinese companies. Thus, Chinese investment in the 
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EU potentially exposes EU integration to political leverage from Beijing. (Filippov & 
Saebi, 2008) 
In their paper on political relations and Chinese outbound foreign direct 
investment, Li and Liang argue that international relations do play an important role in 
Chinese outbound investment. They identify the reasons and mechanisms by which 
China's political relations with potential hosts significantly influence firm investment 
decisions. According to their analysis, Chinese ODI is more likely to flow to countries 
with which the Chinese government has better political relations, as companies calculate 
that this will result in better treatment and protection of their investments. (Li & Liang, 
2012) 
Brown and Wood draw an even more worrying picture in their book on Chinese 
ODI. They believe that the Communist Party of China and thus the government of the 
PRC itself see investments abroad as a national strategic issue, not a purely economic or 
commercial one. Through their global investment patterns, Chinese enterprises pursue the 
interests of the party and the state as well, and strategic considerations are thus an 
important driving force behind the growth of Chinese ODI. (Wood & Brown, 2009) 
Sophie Meunier warned the EU in her report that Chinese OFDI may come with 
implicit strings attached and could potentially act as a Trojan Horse affecting European 
norms and policies. To avoid it, as she recommended Europeans should have presented a 
unified response so that China could not end up ruling by dividing and carving out 
concessions. (Meunier, 2012) Meunier and her co-authors pointed to a concerning 
development that the Czech Republic had shown signs of increasing distance from the 
Dalai Lama after years of close relations, thus providing circumstantial evidence that 
Chinese pressure there may be changing Prague’s behaviour — and maybe confirmation 
of the fears of political conditionality. (Meunier, et al., 2014) 
There have been reports on the potential connection between Chinese investment and 
political influence in other parts of the world as well. Actually, Africa or Southeast Asia 
may serve as a better test ground for such research, as China has been economically 
present in these regions for a much longer time. As Chheang writes about the political 
economy of Chinese investment in Cambodia, the country’s economic overdependence 
and power asymmetry have enabled China to exert political leverage, especially on 
international issues affecting China’s core national interest. Although Beijing has claimed 
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that their investment has no strings attached, there is a close link between economic ties 
and political influence. (Chheang, 2017) 
As Szunomár and Biedermann wrote in 2014, Chinese investment in Central and 
Eastern Europe constitutes a relatively small share of China’s total FDI in Europe and is 
quite a new phenomenon. However, we observe rising inflows of Chinese FDI into the 
region, which are currently expected to increase due to the recent political developments 
between China and several countries in the region, especially Hungary and Poland. 
(Szunomár & Biedermann, 2014) However, as the data presented in the next chapters 
proves, the once expected inflow of Chinese capital has never materialised in the CEE 
countries. Still, as it was presented above, the concerns about the potential of Chinese 
influence based on investment and other economic activities are valid. 
 
10. The EU factor: concerns of Brussels and other major Western countries 
 
The following chapter offers an insight into the concerns and suspicions of EU institutions 
and Western European EU member states. Given the political nature of these concerns, it 
is not easy to find relevant sources to cite on the matter. Still, based on media coverage 
and the public communication of EU institutions it is clear that the 16+1 cooperation and 
the increased level of Chinese activity has triggered some alarm bells in the EU, and 
contributed to a sometimes highly distorted and misguided or even biased discourse on 
the China-CEE cooperation. As Long Jing of the China Institute of International Studies 
writes: the EU was concerned that China might try to achieve the political objective of 
dividing the EU through economic means. The regrouping EU members according to their 
attitudes towards China meant to weaken the consistency of EU foreign policy. 
Furthermore, Germany, as a major power and the largest economic partner of CEE 
countries, has been paying close attention to China’s cooperation efforts in the region. 
(Long, 2014) 
Below I present some quotes from relevant EU level institutions and media outlets in 
which they expressed their concerns or thinly veiled accusations about the 16+1 
cooperation.  
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“Political relations with China may have ‘improved’ in the particular case of Hungary, 
as Orban openly declared China a success model while at the same time denouncing 
liberal democracy as a model for global competitiveness. Consequently, China may profit 
from such positions within the EU, as ‘good relations’ with a number of countries such as 
Hungary, may soften the EU’s trade policy and allow China to receive a proper market 
economy status from the EU, for instance. In any case, the EU’s challenge will be to reflect 
upon its major principles and values as much as its interests vis-à-vis China. Coordination 
among Member States and EU institutions will be key to a coherent approach that informs 
EU-China relations not only in the EU-China Strategic Dialogue, but also in the 
individual bilateral relations between EU Member States and China. At the same time, 
the Western Balkan countries which will eventually join the EU, should also feel embraced 
and convinced by the EU’s approach towards China.” (DG for External Policies, 2015) 
I was told personally, several times by Western colleagues and partners that China has 
“bought-off Central Europe”. As a Belgian diplomat phrased it in Brussels in November 
2013: “China and its CEE partners are building a new Berlin Wall across the EU”. 
Moreover, as a German industrial representative said once again in Brussels in December 
2017: “China has bought-off CEECs and these countries are puppets on the hand of 
Beijing.”  Such arguments are unfounded on the one hand but prove the depth of 
misunderstandings and suspicions about the 16+1 on the other. 
Researchers have echoed similar concerns. As Turcsányi wrote in 2014 relations between 
China and the Central and Eastern European countries had attracted attention around 
Europe for supposedly affecting the united stance of the EU and there were voices talking 
about the new dividing line in Europe and China’s ‘divide and conquer’ strategy. 
According to these voices, it was against the EU good practices to develop a separate 
institutionalised relation with a third state. (Turcsányi, 2014) 
European media has published numerous negative comments about the 16+1 as well. The 
Handelsblatt, a leading German daily wrote on April 17, 2018: “EU officials said China 
was trying to divide Europe to strengthen its hand in relations with individual member 
states. Countries such as Hungary and Greece, which both rely on Chinese investment, 
have in the past shown they’re susceptible to pressure from China.” 
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As the researcher of the European Parliamentary Research Service stated in 2017 the 16+1 
format was “controversial, given the concerns expressed about arrangements being in 
conflict with EU law and about a perceived erosion of EU norms, values and unity.” 
(Grieger, 2017) 
Another briefing of the European Parliament stated the 16+1 format was an attractive tool 
for China to increase its political influence on CEECs and allowed China to mould CEECs 
into political allies willing to support Chinese core interests at EU level. According to the 
briefing some EU members of the 16+1 have given priority to Chinese political interests 
over EU interests by holding dissenting positions on the South China Sea issue, the 
situation of human rights in China, the BRI, the market economy status issue and a 
potential EU-level FDI screening mechanism. Furthermore, some member states have 
used the 16+1 format as a bargaining chip within the EU and may have raised their profile 
in competition with other CEECs, to curry favour with China. (Grieger, 2018) 
The EP briefing presents the following table based on the work of Monica Oehler-Sincai 
(Oehler-Şincai, 2017) to explain the attitudes of CEE countries towards China. The 
Visegrad Four countries were regarded as the most EU sceptic and the friendliest to China 
at the same time. 
Table 6: CEE-11 cooperation intensity in the 16+1 and position as regards the EU 
 
Source: (Grieger, 2018) and (Oehler-Şincai, 2017) 
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11. Empirical Analysis 
11.1. Quality of political relations between China and the CEE countries 
To analyse the correlations between the economic and political relations of the CEE-11 
countries to China two types of datasets are in need. First, statistical data on trade and 
investment relations are relatively easy to find and to comprehend. The second type of 
data, however, is somewhat trickier, as it is not easy to quantify the quality of political 
relations. In order to understand China's assessment of its political relations with CEE 
countries, Liu Zuokui’s paper is a key source. Liu introduced a new ranking system to 
evaluate CEE countries from a Chinese perspective. Most relevant to this study is his 
‘bilateral relationship indicator’, which includes partnership treaties, top leader visits, 
mutual public favourability, and investment and trade treaties. The maximum score of this 
indicator is 30 points, thus Poland (28), Hungary (27) and Romania (26) have the best 
bilateral (political) relations with China, while Slovakia (21) is lagging behind, and the 
Czech Republic (18) sits at the bottom of the ranking (see Table 7). (Liu, 2014) This is 
not surprising, given the many political issues between Prague and Beijing in the fields of 
human rights and Tibet. (Fürst & Pleschová, 2010) Of course, such a ranking represents 
the situation in a certain period, but it certainly gives a proper foundation for further 
analysis, especially since the overall situation did not change until 2018 as it was presented 
in the chapters on bilateral relations above. 




Liu’s paper also provides insight into the motives for Chinese investment in CEE 
countries. According to his understanding, the turmoil in the EU triggered by the Greek 
debt crisis offered a ‘window of opportunity’ to China. Should the economic situation 
improve in the EU, CEE countries would turn back to their traditional Western European 
partners, the Eurozone would resume growth, and thus investment opportunities for non- 
EU countries like China would eventually diminish (as it actually did happen before the 
COVID-19 pandemic). Poland was the largest and therefore most appealing country for 
Chinese investors in the CEE region. Liu emphasises the economic and geographic 
advantages of CEE members of the EU. According to Liu, better political relations with 
China mean better investment opportunities for CEE countries like Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Romania and Serbia. He stresses that tensions in Czech–Chinese bilateral 
relations have had a negative effect on Chinese FDI flows into the country. It is important 
to note that EU membership was not necessarily attractive to Chinese companies, since it 
meant (and still means) more regulations, and China had some bad experiences with EU 
regulations in Poland when the Chinese construction company COVEC failed to deliver 
on its very first infrastructure-building project in Europe.4 Meanwhile non-EU member 
countries like Serbia could provide more opportunities, or at least low-hanging fruits. 
According to Liu, China did not invest in all CEE countries equally, as it was paying more 
attention to countries with better investment advantages, more balanced ‘composite 
indicators’, or with ‘geographical advantages’. EU members like Hungary and Poland 
attracted Chinese investment with the promise of further expansion opportunities into 
bigger EU markets. Hungary attracted more Chinese-funded institutions and Chinese 
business than any other country in the CEE region. (Matura, 2017) Liu mentions as well 
that some people believed that Chinese investment policies were politically driven and 
that CEE members of the EU would push Brussels to make decisions beneficial to China. 
The other most important paper on the political relations between China and individual 
CEE countries is the assessment of Chen and Yang, researchers at the CASS Institute of 
European Studies. Their paper uses econometric models to calculate the indicators in the 
‘Bilateral Relationship’ module, based on the numerical value distribution from ‘0’ 
 
4 For more details see: The motorway that China couldn’t build. Voxeurop (https://voxeurop.eu/en/con-
tent/article/716731-motorway-china-couldnt-build) 
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(worst) to ‘10’ (best). The indicator ‘Political Cooperation’ is based on the following third-
level indices: partnership; high-level relationships; diplomatic visits; and joint statements. 
Though their methodology is different from Liu’s assessment , the results and the priority 
order of countries in the fields of political relations with Beijing are mostly the same: 
Poland (10), Hungary (9.83), Serbia (9.81), Croatia (5.68), Albania (5.47), Czech 
Republic (5.46), Romania (5.23), Macedonia (3.74), Bulgaria (3.08), Bosnia & 
Hercegovina (2.2.), Slovakia (1.9), Lithuania (1.58), Estonia (1.54), Montenegro (0.93), 
Slovenia (0.79) and Latvia (0). (Chen & Yang, 2016) Since both Liu’s work in 2014 and 
the paper of Chen and Yang in 2016 came to the same conclusion, it seems valid to base 
correlation analysis on their numbers in the following chapters. 
 
11.2. Trade relations 
 
In the following paragraphs, I focus on the development of CEE-11 exports to China while 
I mostly omit import data. As it has been presented above, the 16+1 was perceived by 
most CEE-11 countries as an opportunity to boost their export opportunities to tackle the 
economic struggles of the global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis, thus import 
relations are less significant from our present point of view. 
Based on the trend witnessed in the past decade, the volume of trade between the 16+1 
region and China increased significantly, but that is characterised mostly by the serious 
adverse balance of the countries of the region. The reality of the trade deficit vis-à-vis 
China in the case of certain countries – including Hungary – is nuanced by the fact that a 
significant (though hard to measure) proportion of imported products ends up re-exported 
to Western Europe built into the product manufactured by the country in question. At the 
same time it is also true that the majority of the exports of states capable of showing more 
significant exports to China – Hungary among them – is generated by the multinational 
corporations present there, which allows one to conclude that the small- and medium-
sized company sector of the 16+1 is still hardly capable of meeting the challenges of the 
Chinese market.  
In the area of trade relations – unsurprisingly – essentially all of the Central European 
countries are struggling with an enormous foreign trade deficit in their trade with China. 
The eleven EU member states in the region on average import 6-7 times more from the 
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PRC than export, but in the case of China’s biggest regional trade partner, Poland the ratio 
is as much as 12:1. This is startling even if according to assessments a significant portion 
of Chinese import goods – though the exact proportion is unknown – ultimately end up 
re-exported westward as part of the products of Central and Eastern European countries.  
During the negotiations with Chinese leaders, the leaders of the states in the region one 
after the other received promises of a shift in foreign trade in a more balanced direction. 
The fulfilment of this, however, for the time being appears to be a vain hope: the so-called 
“empty container phenomenon,” that is, the nightmare of logistical experts, when the 
containers loaded with merchandise arriving from China head for home empty for lack of 
export items, apparently continues to exist. In vain does the Chinese market await Central 
and Eastern European goods, since there is hardly a local product that could be 
competitively exported to China. Yet it would be necessary to identify those gaps in the 
market through which the states of the region could become capable of increasing the 
export of their products to China, because the growth of their traditional western market 
is very slow. In the meantime, the Chinese relationship in the foreign trade of the Central 
and Eastern European countries – at least compared with the rhetorical zeal – represents a 
surprisingly small slice, merely 4 percent on average; in other words, there is plenty of 
room for growth, which occurs at a rapid pace – albeit mostly in the area of imports. At 
the same time, comprehensive research that also includes Germany in the equation could 
yield important results, since 30.7 per cent of total EU–China trade (and 48 per cent of 
EU exports) is transacted by Germany alone, while for the majority of Central European 
countries, too, Berlin is the most important foreign trading partner. (Eurostat, 2020) It is 
difficult to measure, but likely that some of Central European exports bound for Germany 
ultimately end up in China integrated into German products. Finally, it is worth making 
clear that the countries of the 16+1, especially its EU member states, form such an integral 
part of the European economy (they carry out 60–90 percent of their foreign trade with 
the EU) that not even a turn to the East and close cooperation with China is capable of 
actually changing this. 
 
Based on the literature, one might conclude that the deterioration of bilateral political 
relations means lower levels of bilateral trade between China and any given country. 
Conversely, better political relations seem to imply better trade relations, and CEE 
countries might therefore be eager to satisfy political requests from the Chinese side in 
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light of potential trade retaliation, such as the reduction of imports by China. Second, 
according to the findings of Fuchs and Klann (Fuchs & Klann, 2010) countries with higher 
levels of exports in the category of machinery and transport equipment are more 
vulnerable to potential Chinese trade sanctions, and thus these countries are more likely 
to accommodate themselves to Chinese political expectations or requests. In the following 
section, I analyse the dynamism and product structure of trade relations between the PRC 
and CEE countries in comparison with the three most important Western European 
economies, France, Germany and the United Kingdom between 2009 and 2018. This 
period starts with the first year of the global financial downturn, when CEE countries 
turned to China to offset the effects of the crisis. 
CEE countries more than doubled their exports to the PRC between 2009 and 2018. 
(UNCTAD, 2020) However, despite this seemingly rapid development the relative 
importance of China has barely increased, as its average share in CEE-11’s total export 
climbed from 0.97 per cent to a mere 1.3 per cent. At the same time Germany, France and 
the UK boosted their exports to China from 4.64 per cent to 7.07 per cent, from 2.36 per 
cent to 4.33 per cent and from 2.24 per cent to 5.69 per cent, respectively as a share of 
their total exports, and the EU-28 as a whole has experienced a similar trend as the share 
of China climbed from 2.52 per cent in 2009 to 3.86 per cent in 2018 (UNCTAD, 2020) 
Bulgaria has the highest level of export dependency (2.65 per cent) on China amongst the 
EU members of the 16+1  initiative as of 2018, and thus CEE-11 countries are far less 
dependent on China than any of the three major Western European economies. If we 
compare data over the years 2009 to 2018, the major CEE economy, Poland, slightly 
decreased its export dependency on China, though it was considered as one of the leading 
nations of the 16+1. As Figure 20 presents China was a less important export partner to 
all CEE-11 countries than to the rest of the EU and to Germany, France and the UK. 
Likewise, the dynamism of the growth of export dependency in CEE-11 countries lagged 
behind the EU average and the German, French and British case, that is, China has become 





Figure 20: The change of export dependency and export dependency in 2018 
 
Source: the author’s calculations based on (UNCTAD, 2020) 
 
When it comes to the changes in trade magnitude, the picture is somewhat different (see 
Figure 21 below). There are three groups to be identified on the figure. First, the biggest 
group consists most of the CEE-11 countries and France, Germany, and the UK. For all 
of these countries the importance of China as a trade partner had increased between 2009 
and 2018, though its overall level of significance is still limited. The two other groups 
have one single member. For Croatia China had become relatively less important, while 
for Czechia it become significantly more important than to any other CEE-11 countries. 
The case of Croatia can be simply explained by the fact that the overall trade of the country 
was growing faster than its trade with China. In the case of Czechia, the remarkable 
increase is due to the fast growth of imports from China, as its value increased by 150 per 
cent in the analysed timeframe. This, however, also explains why trade magnitude is a less 
valuable source of information from our present point of view. As it includes import data, 
it distorts and exaggerates the importance of China for the CEE-11 economies, as the 
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ultimate economic and political goal of CEE-11 countries is to increase their exports to 
China and not their imports. Therefore, I will focus on data based on export dependency 
in the following chapter, as it better grasps the issue what really matters to CEE-11 nations. 
 
Figure 21: Change of trade magnitude from and trade magnitude in 2018 
 
Source: the author’s calculations based on (UNCTAD, 2020) 
 
Have CEE member states worked to foster better political relations with China in hope of 
better trade relations, even though EU observers perceive this as a possible threat to 
cohesion of the EU’s stance on China?  If the answer is ‘yes’, there must be a clear pattern 
of the connection between political relations and the development of export relations vis-
à-vis China. Based on the CASS evaluation of bilateral political relations (Liu, 2014) and 
UNCTAD trade data on the period between 2009 and 2018, it is hard to find such a pattern. 
The following chart compares the strength of political relations based on the scale created 
by Liu Zuokui (to a maximum of 30 points) with the development of exports to China 
between 2009 and 2018 as a share of total exports for the CEE-11 countries (see Figure 
21). The correlation between political relations and trade development is weak, 
statistically insignificant and even negative! Thus, countries with the best political 
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connections to Beijing have experienced the lowest increase of exports to China, while 
other, politically low-ranking countries have enjoyed relatively high growth of export 
dependency on China. The figure has even slightly dropped in the case of Poland though 
it enjoys the highest score in terms of bilateral political relations. The reason I employ 
export dependency data instead of data on the growth of exports to China is to filter out 
the impact of the general growth of exports and to rather focus on the relative importance 
of China in the export structure of the CEE-11 countries. 
 
Figure 22: The strength of political relations vs. the growth of export dependency on 
China 
 
Source: the author’s calculations based on (UNCTAD, 2020) and (Liu, 2014) 
 
Consequently, I argue that the impact of the quality of political relations on the 
development of bilateral trade relations between China and the 16 CEE countries is either 
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very low or non-existent. This assumption can be bolstered by concrete cases: the Czech 
Republic has been considered a political troublemaker by the PRC, and the meeting of the 
Czech Prime Minister with the Dalai Lama in 2009 triggered deep concerns in Beijing and 
was followed by a three-year ‘cold period’ of bilateral relations. (Fürst, 2015) Still, Czech 
exports to China grew slightly in 2012, while total Czech world exports dropped by 3.7 
per cent. Poland also used to be politically more critical of China, and when the Dalai 
Lama visited Warsaw in 2008, the Speaker of the Senate welcomed him.5 Nevertheless, 
total Polish exports to China grew by 14.9 per cent from 2008 to 2009 and by 11 per cent 
from 2009 to 2010, while the exports of the ‘machinery and transport equipment’ product 
group — considered to be the most sensitive to direct punitive manipulation by Beijing 
according to Fuchs and Klann (Fuchs & Klann, 2010) — experienced a remarkable 29.3 
per cent increase. 
The lack of positive (-0.43) correlation between political relations and trade development 
is even more surprising when trade structure is also taken into consideration, especially 
with regard to ‘machinery and transport equipment’ as the most significant product group 
of most CEE countries’ exports to China, namely the top five partners of China in the 
region. The main export products of Slovakia (93.2per cent), Hungary (74.4per cent), the 
Czech Republic (63.3per cent), Romania (38.1per cent) and Poland (27.8per cent) all fall 
into this category. (UNCTAD, 2020) 
To confirm the importance of bilateral relations I verified the correlations between trade 
development and the three other CASS ranking factors. Political environment, economic 
environment and social environment all have a weak and negative, statistically 
insignificant (r= -0.33; -0.26; -0.5, respectively) correlation with trade development, 
which supports the assumption that none of these factors has had a considerable impact 
on China–CEE trade relations. 
 
5 Dignitaries Met 2005 – 2010, available at: https://www.dalailama.com/the-dalai-lama/events-and-
awards/dignitaries-met/dignitaries-met-2005-2010 accessed: 28 November 2018. 
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For instance, Beijing could not, or did not want to, retaliate against the Czech Republic 
for high-level meetings with the Dalai Lama, since any action would have had 
repercussions mainly for the Volkswagen Group of Germany rather than for genuine 
Czech interests. As Éltető and Toporowski  state, although Polish trade with Asia seems 
to be less influenced by global value chains, that is, there are less Polish exporters owned 
by multinational companies, while the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia are small, 
therefore their integration into multinational networks determines their trade. This 
undermines the presumption that, in pursuit of political gains, Beijing could blackmail the 
CEE member states of the EU with the threat of trade reduction. (Éltető & Toporowski, 
2013) 
 
Though it is not closely related to the hypotheses of the present dissertation one may also 
conclude that the 16+1 cooperation has failed to substantially boost the importance of 
China among the export partners of the CEE-11 countries. As Figure 22 presents, CEE-
11 countries barely increased the share of China in their total exports (blue line), although 
nominally they exported twice as much in 2018 than in 2009. However, their overall 
export performance was booming in the given period, thus the share of China increased 
slightly only. Meanwhile, the EU-28 was able to significantly increase the share of China 
in its total exports (orange line), while nominally, they also doubled their export volume 
to China, what means that the importance of other export partners had to decrease. The 
real proof of the failure of the 16+1 is represented by the grey line, as it shows that the 
CEE-11 countries could not significantly increase their share in total EU exports to China, 
To sum up, based on UNCTAD data and the CASS political ranking system, no 
positive correlation between the quality of political relations and the success of 
trade can be found after ten years of intensifying China – CEE relations. The most 
plausible explanation is that a large share of CEE exports of machinery and 
transport equipment to China is produced by (Western) multinational companies, 
and thus bilateral political or economic relations between China and any given CEE 
country cannot have any serious impact on the total volume of exports, since China 
does not want or dare to engage in a conflict with the home country of those MNCs. 
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as it had grown from 4.3 per cent in 2009 to 4.8 per cent in 2018, while the share of CEE-
11 countries in the total exports of the EU to the world amounted to 14.3 per cent in that 
year. 
 
Figure 23: Share of China in the total exports of CEE-11 and EU-28 and the share of 
CEE-11 in total EU exports to China 
 
Source: author’s calculation based on (UNCTAD, 2020) 
 
Meanwhile, the 16+1 seems to be more successful from the point of view of Chinese trade 
interests. While EU import from China increased by 55 per cent between 2009 and 2018, 
in the case of CEE-11 countries it skyrocketed by 103 per cent on average with extreme 
increases in the case of Poland (126%), Czechia (147%), Estonia (169%) and Latvia 
(193%). Consequently, the trade balance of most CEE-11 countries has nosedived in the 
past decade, the deficit doubled on average and reached USD 70 billion in 2018. 
 
11.3. Investment relations 
 
In their study, Haico Ebbers and Jianhong Zhang pointed out that the member states of 
the EU, including the Central and Easter European region, created a favourable investment 
environment in connection with the introduction of the Chinese “Going out” strategy in 
151 
order to attract as much Chinese capital as possible. The 16+1 was particularly interested 
in this opportunity, and this was why they attempted, with the help of tax concessions, 
relief from customs duties, industrial parks and agreements on avoiding double taxation, 
to strengthen their ability to attract operating capital. (Ebbers & Zhang, 2010) The Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania signed bilateral taxation agreements with China. 
Despite all this, Europe represented a quite small slice in the total Chinese foreign direct 
investment (5 percent according to Chinese figures), which was particularly striking if we 
take into consideration the EU’s weight in the global economy. The situation, however, 
has changed tremendously in subsequent years as it was presented in chapter 4.3. and 
Chinese investment skyrocketed in the European Union. Nevertheless, its spatial 
distribution was far from even, as Western European member states have received much 
more investment from China and CEE countries. (See Figure 3 in chapter 4.3) 
 
In connection with the correlation between economic and political relations (or the lack 
thereof, to be more precise), Rudolf Fürst and Gabriela Pleschová have reached an 
interesting conclusion. In their opinion, China’s relations with the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, and its activity in Central Europe in general, form part of that broader strategy 
that aims to strengthen bilateral relations with the smaller, less critical EU member states. 
Their truly noteworthy determination, however, is that ideological differences, and even 
the more critical tone, have no particular effect on business relations with China. While 
Prague previously had struck a substantially more forceful tone with China in connection 
with the defence of human rights or the question of Taiwan than had Bratislava, Czech–
Chinese economic relations suffered no disadvantage whatsoever compared to Slovak–
Chinese relations. (Fürst & Pleschová, 2010) All this is contradicted somewhat by the 
research of Andreas Fuchs and Nils-Hendrik Klann, according to which receiving the 
Dalai Lama, for example, sets back the given country’s exports to China by 8–16 percent, 
for a duration of about two years, as it has been mentioned before. (Fuchs & Klann, 2010) 
China’s activity in Central Europe gives cause for concern, according to one of the best-
known China researchers in Western Europe, Francois Godement. The professor at 
Science Po, who observes developments from a pan-European perspective, concluded in 
his article on the Warsaw summit, that the rapprochement of the Central European states 
to China is strengthening the forces pulling the Union apart. (Godement, 2012) Instead, a 
unitary, EU-level China strategy, to be worked out by the EC, would be needed; at the 
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same time, he acknowledges that the large member states – including the United Kingdom 
and Germany – keep mostly their own economic interests in view when it comes to their 
ties with China. 
A rare example of a regional-level overview of Chinese–Central European relations is the 
publication of the Polish Central &Eastern Europe Development Institute, which places 
mostly investment relations under the microscope. This study was one of the first tangible 
signs that Poland, shaking off its previous lethargy, is attempting full steam to make up 
for lost time in its relations with China. As the authors also frequently point out, it was 
surprising and at once unacceptable to the Polish side that although their homeland was 
striving for a regional leading role in every area, in Hungary substantially more Chinese 
investment(s) had come about thus far. The study makes no secret of the fact that 
Warsaw’s aim was to strive for primacy in the region. (Central & Eastern Europe 
Development Institute, 2012) In the interests of this goal, Polish foreign policy, which in 
any event has serious material and human resources at its disposal, was doing particularly 
much.  
 
Chinese investment motivations 
 
The question is what economic opportunities China sees in the Central European region 
(in the broad sense), meaning those sixteen countries whose leaders attended the summit 
meeting with the Chinese premier in April 2012 in Warsaw. It is an often mentioned and 
at once obvious fact that the EU membership of the Central European countries enhanced 
their political and economic role in the eyes of China. At the same time, it must also be 
pointed out that five of the participating countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) are not EU member states, nevertheless, from a 
Chinese viewpoint they are to be regarded as belonging to the region; in the Chinese 
foreign ministry they have significance in the work of the secretariat responsible for 
maintaining relations with the region, too. (People’s Daily, 2012) All the while Ukraine 
and Belarus did not figure on the list of invitees – probably not unrelated to their relations 
with Moscow. 
An additional, often voiced argument in connection with China’s role in the region is that 
it views the states of the region as a sort of gateway to the entire EU; indeed, the countries 
in the region themselves would like to portray themselves in this capacity in the eyes of 
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Beijing. The trouble with this approach is that it is nonsensical and uninterpretable, or at 
the very least, none of the parties concerned has given it any real substance. On the one 
hand, one of the biggest markets for Chinese goods has long been the European Union – 
the gateways of this trade are the large Western seaports and container terminals. That is, 
from this aspect there are already ample gateways and logistical centres. On the other 
hand, Chinese direct investments have also found their way to Western Europe, whereas 
up until now only a small proportion of this has arrived in the Central and East European 
region. It may also happen that Chinese companies, hoping for a laxer regulatory 
environment compared with that in the west (e.g., in the area of labour law) might move 
production to the new EU members states, availing themselves of the opportunities 
provided by the cheaper labour (although these expectations have failed to materialise in 
the past decade), or they might appear in the area of infrastructural investments, relying 
on the “tailwind” of local governments and the seductive power of their unrealistically 
low bids. Based on all this, at present the goals of certain CEE countries such as being 
“China’s centre in Central Europe” can hardly be viewed as anything more than a mere 
rhetorical device, if only because from a Chinese perspective nothing justifies 
concentrating on a single country instead of creating positions in every corner of the 
region. Taking into account the size of Central and Eastern Europe and the quantity of 
available Chinese resources, this easily fits within China’s means. 
In my view, the most realistic Chinese motivation was in fact the simplest solution: 
European economic players, weakened by the world economic and mainly the euro crisis, 
represented an excellent acquisition target for Chinese companies. In connection with the 
Central European region, it is worth adding that because of the crisis the previous 
financing arriving from western EU members dried up by 2012, meaning a sort of market 
vacuum formed in the region, which in an almost natural way attracted the Chinese side 
struggling with a capital surplus. According to news reports, the most enticing point in the 
business offers of the Chinese companies was frequently the fact that they at the same 
time might also bring the financial blueprint with them, naturally in the form of Chinese 
financial institutions. According to diplomatic sources, this process severely hurt western 
companies’ interests in the region because while traditionally it was them who supplied 
and implemented significant investments in Central Europe, the drying up of western 
financial resources played into the hands of the Chinese in the early 2010s, or at least 
many feared such consequences. 
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Looking at the overall picture, it should be noted that the Chinese were in fact not only 
willing to lend financial support and credit; it was an economic necessity as well for them. 
The enormous domestic savings rate, the huge foreign trade surplus of the previous 
decades and the PRC’s status as a net importer of capital had accumulated a currency 
reserve of nearly USD 3.300 billion by 2012, which eventually become inconvenient for 
the Chinese government. Although the exact figures constituted a state secret, experts 
agreed that at least 60–70 percent of these reserves were in dollar-based assets, while an 
additional 20–30 percent of them were in euros. (Hu, 2010) China could not invest a sum 
of this size even in its own economy – indeed, not even a fraction of this – without it 
ramping up the number one enemy, inflation. Nevertheless, they could keep a sum 
equivalent to twenty-three years of Hungarian GDP under the mattress: it is not safe, and 
with a sum of this size, the conservative asset management strategy generates enormous 
alternative costs. That is, it was a much more profitable decision (and, in the long run, one 
that generates considerable influence) to invest a substantial portion of the reserves in the 
real economy of foreign states than to keep it in state bonds barely earning interest. Amidst 
the above economic circumstances, the Chinese “Go Global” strategy, i.e., the global 
spread of domestic Chinese giant companies largely protected from market competition 
and strengthened in state-subsidised market conditions, was gaining momentum. It was to 
this process that the Chinese capital surplus could provide enormous help, and this was 
how Chinese companies were able through bank partners to also offer financial backing 
in addition to their business offers, and thanks to the extremely low Chinese lending rates 
easily finance their own activity as well. All this contributed in large part to the fact that 
China’s outward direct investment (ODI) was increasing dynamically year by year.  
According to research examining the overall picture of Chinese global investment activity, 
for the Chinese side the most important thing was to obtain new markets, access raw 
materials and energy sources, and carry out strategic acquisitions. According to Roland 
Berger’s survey, cited in Nicolas’s 2009 study, 56 percent of Chinese investors indicated 
seeking new markets as the main investment priority, while 16 percent of them indicated 
the acquisition of new technologies and brands. Regarding investments in Europe, 
obviously the main Chinese motivation may have been the desire for raw materials so 
much as it is to gain markets and acquire new technologies and know-how. Already quite 
early on, in 2005, the prestigious British car manufacturer MG was purchased by Chinese 
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investors, while a significant share of Volvo was acquired in 2009, just to mention only 
the most spectacular acquisitions. 
The EU’s crisis in the early 2010s, however, helped Chinese investors during their 
acquisitions not only through the weakening of companies, but also through the reduction 
of the EU’s cohesion. This phenomenon was perceptible in the Central European region 
as well, where a competition developed among the states of the region about which of 
them was capable of attracting more Chinese resources. Naturally, the leadership in 
Beijing was also aware of all this, but (as Godement also noted) preserving the unity of 
the EU was not part of the Chinese leaders’ job description. 
 
Contrary to common opinions and expectations, the number and value of executed 
Chinese investments in Central Europe continues to be insignificant compared to all of 
the invested capital. On the basis of the data of UNCTAD Stat, a total of about USD 827 
billion of FDI arrived in the eleven Central and Eastern European EU member states until 
2019, while the value of Chinese investments amounted to barely USD 7.5 billion dollars, 
meaning that their share was 0.9 per cent (though it has increased significantly from the 
level of 0.12 per cent in 2010). The inflow of Chinese capital greatly accelerated in the 
first half of the 2010s: whereas in 2010, Chinese capital invested in Hungary amounted to 
USD 465 million (according to Chinese sources), today that figure stands at EUR 2.5 
billion. (MOFCOM, 2011) (Kratz, et al., 2020) 
Of course, one must not overlook the fact that in the critical, capital-poor environment of 
the era of the global and Eurozone crisis, when the traditional sources of finance dried up, 
even the relatively little actual Chinese investment and capital inflow was perceived as a 
significant help to the Central and Eastern European economies. Once again, based only 
on the data of UNCTAD Stat, the decline of capital inflow into the Central European 
region is clearly visible: while in 2007 over 70 billion dollars arrived in the region, by 
2010 this sum had declined to 29.3 billion dollars. (UNCTAD, 2020) 
At the same time, the flow of capital from China into the region during the crisis may have 
meant great help in the area of creating or preserving jobs. In Warsaw, the Chinese premier 
offered the region a total credit line of EUR 10 billion, which, although not a negligible 
sum, would form only a small part of the operating capital normally arriving in the region. 
Especially if out of this EUR 10 billion Beijing in fact were to finance the investments of 
Chinese companies in the region, as certain reports indicate. 
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Beijing is in the comfortable position of being able to negotiate with many small countries, 
which compete with one another for Chinese investments. In the course of regional-level 
research those areas should be determined where the economies of the countries concerned 
are complementary, and thus could offer Chinese investors territorially and sectorally 
integrated packages, as well as the areas there is room for healthy competition. 
Meanwhile, it would be worth thinking on a regional level if for no other reason than 
because some of the production sectors preparing to withdraw from China due to the 
necessities of economic processes, COVID-19 responses and US-China tensions could be 
enticed to the 16+1 region. 
 
First, it is necessary to emphasise that available data on investment is ambiguous. 
Consequently, it is extremely difficult to provide a reliable picture of Chinese investment 
activities in Europe or the 16+1 region. Once again, in the case of Hungary the stock of 
Chinese FDI in the country is around USD 600 million according to EU and Chinese 
statistical bureaus, while the figure is likely to be closer to USD 2.5 billion, while the 
Hungarian government mentions USD 4.2 billion. (MOFAT of Hungary, 2019) Still, it 
can be stated that CEE-11 countries have received only a small fraction, 4.8 per cent of 
all the Chinese investment in the EU (see Figure23) When it comes to the share of Chinese 
investment as a share of total FDI, Finland has an exceptionally high level, followed by 
Greece, Portugal and Italy (see Figure 24), while CEE-11 countries are well below EU 
average, with the exception of Hungary. (Kratz, et al., 2020) 
 
Figure 24: Member states' share of Chinese investment in the EU 
 
Source: The author’s calculations based on (Kratz, et al., 2020) 
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Figure 25: Chinese investment as a share of total FDI stocks (2019) 
 
Source: The author’s calculations based on (Kratz, et al., 2020) & (UNCTAD, 2020) 
 
Based on the available data I present a chart comparing Chinese investment in CEE 
countries to their political relations with Beijing. Unlike in the case of trade relations, the 
picture is clear: there is a strong and positive, statistically significant correlation (r=0.81) 
between the two variables (see Figure 25). Countries with stronger political relations have 
higher levels of Chinese investment. The result is in line with the general findings of Li 
and Liang that Chinese investment is more likely to flow to countries with which the 
Chinese government has better political relations, in hope of better treatment and 
protection of their investments. (Li & Liang, 2012) It is also in line with Liu Zuokui's 
paper stating that better political relations with China mean better investment 
opportunities for CEE countries. (Liu, 2014) However, there is one important detail, which 
makes the picture less obvious: if timing is also taken into account, then Hungary appears 
as a special case. Even though Budapest has stronger political relations with Beijing than 
any other CEE-11 country and hosts by far the highest level of Chinese investment in the 
region, Hungary has barely received new, major Chinese investors since the beginning of 
its Eastern Opening Policy (a governmental attempt to attract more investment from 
emerging markets, and particularly from China to decrease the country’s dependence on 
EU markets) and since the establishment of 16+1 cooperation. Furthermore, the size of 
countries with higher level of Chinese investment may also have explanatory power. The 
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four bigger CEE-11 countries (Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Romania) have been more 
successful in attracting Chinese investors than the smaller member states of the region, as 
their bigger economies may have offered better investment opportunities to Chinese 
companies. This latter understanding may explain the curious case of Czechia, where 
Chinese investment is not insignificant despite the low quality of political relations. 
 
Figure 26: Stock of Chinese FDI and the strength of political relations to China 
 
 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on (Liu, 2014) & (Kratz, et al., 2020) 
 
It must be underlined, however, that results say nothing about causality between the two 
factors. The level of investment could be either a cause or a consequence of the quality of 
political relations, although the reality might be somewhere in-between. However, the 
ambiguity of the relationship between politics and investment might not restrain CEE-11 
politicians from offering political concessions in exchange for attracting new investment 
projects. This scenario obviously cannot be ruled out, therefore it is worth verifying the 
relative importance of the inflow of Chinese investment between 2010 and 2013 (see 
Figure 26). 
Among CEE countries, Romania and Hungary received, in relative terms, the most 
investment from China as a share of their total FDI inflow between 2010 and 2013. 
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(Heritage, 2015). It is important to mention that Hungary barely attracted new major 
Chinese investors after 2010. The inflow of Chinese FDI after 2010 is simply the 
prolonged result of investment decisions made by companies present in the country prior 
to 2010. However, Chinese investment did not contribute to a great extent to the FDI 
inflow in the CEE-11 countries except Romania, while it played an important role in 
Portugal, Greece, Sweden and France and in the United Kingdom in the years between 
2010 and 2013. 
 




To confirm the importance of investment relations, I verified the correlations between 
investment in individual CEE countries and the three other CASS ranking factors. The 
political environment has a weak, statistically insignificant and negative effect (r= -0.13); 
the economic environment has a weak but positive effect (r= 0.15); and the social 
environment has a weak and positive (r=0.10) correlation with investment, all statistically 
insignificant, which supports the assumption that bilateral relations have had by far the 






11.4. Voting habits as a form of political compliance on EU and global level 
 
11.4.1. Voting on EU anti-dumping measures against China 
Probably the strongest argument is to be derived from the statistics of votes and decisions 
on China in the Council of the European Union. Following EU public information rules 
instituted in Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 it was possible to receive voting data from 
the Directorate-General of Communication and Document Management of the Council of 
the European Union, although votes were kept secret for many years without clear legal 
explanations. (Nordström, 2011)  The following analysis is based on 191 relevant 
documents on anti-dumping votes between 2005 and 2014, that is to compare pre-16+1 
period with the period following the establishment of the 16+1 when expectations about 
the inflow of Chinese capital and new business opportunities were at their peak. (Council, 
2015) By processing the above-mentioned papers, 113 concrete cases were identified, 
where anti-dumping measures were proposed to be either imposed or extended. Member 
states cast almost 3000 votes altogether during this period, of which 600 opposed the 
implementation or extension of anti-dumping measures, while the rest is either supported 
or abstained. In order to evaluate the development of CEE EU members’ voting habits 
between 2005 and 2014, the opposing votes were divided into non-CEE and CEE 
members of the EU. Decisions on anti-dumping measures represent one of the rare cases 
where even CEE EU member states could influence EU–China relations, since each 
country has an equal say, that is, one vote. (European Council, 2004) At the same time, 
In summary, better political relations with China do indeed mean that CEE 
countries are better able to attract Chinese investment, but the overall level of 
Chinese investment in CEE-11 countries is minimal. It is also notable that the size 
of the host economy seems to be less relevant than other factors, except when it 
comes to very small countries. Poland, the largest economy in the region, has 
attracted only a fraction of the Chinese investment in Hungary, and Belgrade and 
Bucharest have also been more successful than Warsaw. The result is also in line 
with Liu’s statement (Liu, 2014) with regard to the impact of unfavourable Prague–




anti-dumping issues are of great importance to Beijing, and disputes are easily politicised. 
(Bièvre & Eckhardt, 2010) Thus, based on H3 (If China had had the political influence in 
CEE-11 countries to divide EU level China policies, the voting habits of CEE-11 countries 
on the level of EU or global issues would have changed as a sign of political compliance.) 
if China had ever tried to use its alleged political leverage over CEE countries, this would 
have had a visible impact on their voting habits in the period under study. A more pro-
China approach from CEE countries would have meant more ‘opposing’ votes, that is, a 
less protectionist standpoint following the establishment of the 16+1 cooperation. 
However, the data do not support this assumption. 
 
Figure 28: CEE and non-CEE EU member's opposing votes as a share of total votes 
 









Figure 29: Change of voting patterns vs. the quality of political relations to China 
 
 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on (Council, 2015) 
 
Two important conclusions can be drawn based on Figure 27. First, CEE EU members 
have generally always been more protectionist than other member states. Their share of 
‘opposing’ votes has always been below their potential group voting power (2004: 8/25; 
2007: 10/27; 2013: 11/28). Second, their tendency to reject proposals to impose anti-
dumping measures against China has not increased since the initial intensification of 
China–CEE relations and the actual establishment of the 16+1 initiative, that is, the first 
years of the 2010s. 
The picture becomes even more surprising if one considers country-level results. CEE 
countries with the worst bilateral political relations with China (18 points on the CASS 
scale) are the strongest opponents of imposing anti-dumping measures on China. 
Meanwhile, countries with the best bilateral political relations with Beijing have voted the 
least against anti-dumping measures. In other words, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovenia 
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and Estonia together were responsible for 85 per cent of all opposing CEE votes between 
2005 and 2013, while China’s ‘best friends’ Hungary, Poland and Romania represented a 
mere 5.5 per cent of opposing votes, based on the documents of the Council of the 
European Union I received for the purpose of this very paper. It is also important to note 
that all countries have a stable record of voting patterns: as either opponents or supporters 
of anti-dumping measures, their position remained more or less the same in the period 
2005-2014. In Figure 28, countries are positioned according to the change of their share 
in the total of opposing votes, comparing the period 2005–2009 to the period 2010–2013. 
The position of Poland, Hungary and Romania does not change significantly. Other 
countries less important to China, such Latvia or Estonia, become either slightly less or, 
on the contrary, more protectionist; however, the magnitude of change is very modest.  
 
11.4.2.  Voting habits of CEE-11 countries in the UN 
 
Since post-2014 data on EU anti-dumping measures are unfortunately unavailable for 
public research, I employ another method, following the footsteps of relevant literature to 
analyse the political behaviour of CEE-11 countries vis-à-vis China in the global context. 
Based on H3 political compliance of CEE-11 countries may have taken the form of 
increased level of support to China on the global stage, that is in the voting of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations  when China and the U.S. or the EU have different 
positions toward resolutions deemed important by the U.S. The work of Wu, Pan and Fu 
shows that the volume of trade or aid from China increases the likelihood of UN members 
to vote in line with China on issues when the U.S. deems important and yet China votes 
against the U.S. The authors state that China’s rising share and promising prospect in 
global economy makes a third state more likely to bid for China in the U.S. - China 
contestations. Furthermore, they argue that domestic citizens build foreign policy bonding 
with China, as their states are economically getting more dependent on China.  (Wu, et 
al., 2016) My results do not contradict their findings, but reinforce the result of the analysis 
of votes on anti-dumping measures, that is CEE-11 countries have not changed their 
attitude towards China in hope of economic benefits, and their foreign policy shows no 
sign of political compliance in the UNGA.  
The U.S. Department of State publishes an annual report titled United States Practices in 
the United Nations, where some of the UN resolutions are marked ‘important’ to express 
164 
the policy preferences of Washington. The analysis shows that in case of these important 
votes US and China tends to have diverging interests, as their votes coincided in a mere 
12.5 per cent of the cases between 2008 and 2018. Like in the case of anti-dumping votes 
I compared data of pre-16+1 years to post-16+1 year (between 2008 and 2018) to see any 
potential changes of voting habits of 16+1 countries as a possible sign of political 
compliance with China. In the analysis, I set CEE-11 countries vote for the UN resolutions 
important to the US and also the US and China cast the opposite votes. That is, CEE-11 
states are forced to choose between the US and China so that I can judge whether China 
successfully forced CEE-11 countries into political compliance or not. 
I have identified 144 cases between 2008 and 2014 earmarked important by the US State 
Department. Out of these 144 votes there were only 18 when the US and China cast the 
same votes, therefore the remaining 126 occasions offer ample source of data for statistical 
analysis. I coded altogether 2350 votes of the US, China, the CEE-11 states and EU’s Big-
3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), and filtered out the 18 occasions of US-
Chinese agreement (12,5 per cent of total occasions), and 9 occasions when the Big-3 did 
not cast the same ballot. As a result, I analysed the remaining 117 occasions and 2197 
votes, when US and Chinese votes diverged (thus CEE-11 had to choose sides) while the 
EU Big-3 voted the same. 
Figure 30: Voting coincidences in the UN 
 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on (US Department of State 2008-2018) 
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The results speak for themselves. CEE-11 countries supported the US side (or abstained) 
in 51 per cent of the votes (blue line), while supported China only in 15 per cent of the 
votes (red line) in the UNGA. Furthermore, as Figure 29 shows their attitude did not 
change in the post-16+1 period significantly until 2017-2018. However, the sudden drop 
in the share of CEE-11 votes favouring the US has nothing to do with political compliance 
for the sake of economic benefits from China. As it can be seen the CEE-11 has in almost 
every case voted together with the Big-3 of the EU (green and lilac lines), as Central and 
Eastern European countries and France, Germany and the United Kingdom have cast the 
same vote in 94 per cent of the cases. 
 
Figure 31: Voting coincidence of CEE-11 and the Big-3 in the UN 
 
Source: The author’s own calculations based on (US Department of State 2008-2018) 
 
As Figure 30 shows above, CEE-11 countries have closely followed the political 
directions of the core members of the EU, voting coincidence is either 100 per cent or 
close to it in most years, and the number of occasions when CEE countries diverged from 
the common EU position was very low, except the year of 2017.6 
 
6 The reason for the dip of voting coincidence between CEE-11 countries and the Big-3 is not clear, but 
there is a high probability of errors of data source of the US State Department. 
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12. Are CEE countries completely innocent? 
 
Even though the above presented findings suggest that CEE-11 countries have never really 
abandoned their pro-EU and pro-Western attitudes and their trade and investment relations 
are significantly lower than of most Western EU member states, there are some thorny 
political issues that support the idea of political compliance on their side. The following 
chapter attempts to explain such issues. 
As a briefing written to the European Parliament writes the 16+1 format has expanded 
China’s political influence in the CEE-11, as it has spurred the political alignment of some 
countries of the region to China’s core interest, including territorial integrity (no meeting 
with the Dalai Lama are allowed), sovereignty over the South China Sea and silence on 
human right issues. (Grieger, 2017) It is indeed true that some CEE-11 countries have 
taken positions at odds with the common position of the EU in certain cases. It was 
reported that Hungary (a landlocked country) and Croatia were the biggest obstacle when 
it came to the formulation of the EU’s response to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 
ruling against China on South China Sea issues. As Francois Godement of the European 
Council on Foreign Relations writes Hungary was determined to fight for China inside the 
Council, what may be an evidence of the success of Chinese bilateral lobbying. 
(Godement, 2016) Prime Minister Orbán announced in April 2015 that Hungary had 
decided to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), in spite of 
strong US efforts to prevent its allies joining the Chinese-led bank. Furthermore Hungary 
was the first EU member state to officially sign-up for China’s mega project, the Belt and 
Road Initiative in 2015, despite European scepticism about the project. (Chung, 2015) 
Hungary has engaged with China in the highly debated reconstruction of the Budapest-
Belgrade railway line, despite concerns of the EU. (Du Bois & Birtha, 2015) In 2016, 
In sum, based on the above presented data, it can be stated that CEE-11 countries 
have not changed their pro-Western attitudes in the post-16+1 period in the 
European Union nor in the United Nations General Assemly. Political compliance 
with Chinese interests cannot be observed, CEE-11 countries casted their votes 
according to EU and US interests in the analysed period. 
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Budapest openly supported the idea to afford China the market economy status by the 
European Union, though the EU itself rejected the proposal. (MOFAT Hungary, 2016) 
Once again, Hungary derailed the EU’s consensus to sign a joint letter about lawyers being 
reportedly tortured under arrest in China in March 2017 according to reports. (Torres, 
2017) A year later, the Hungarian ambassador in Beijing was the only one not to sign a 
document denouncing the Belt and Road Initiative of China for hampering free trade and 
giving an advantage to Chinese companies. All the other 27 ambassadors signed the 
document. (Elmer, 2018) As another briefing to the European Parliament frames the 16+1 
cooperation the 16+1 format allows China to mould CEE-11 countries into political allies 
willing to support Chinese core interests at EU level, while on the other side some 
countries of the region have used the 16+1 format as a bargaining chip within the EU. 
(Grieger, 2018) As Thorsten Brenner and his co-authors write in their report on the 
advance of authoritarianism in the EU: “Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who 
has openly advocated building an “illiberal state on national foundations” against the 
EU model of liberal democracy, is a prominent example. In October 2016, Orbán 
addressed the China-CEE Political Parties Dialogue in Budapest. In a speech openly 
critical of EU integration, he endorsed Beijing’s position, which rejects universal values 
and norms based on claims that each country needs a system that fits its unique national 
conditions. This view contrasts strikingly with the EU’s commitment to promote the 
universality of human rights. As such, Orbán’s remarks only thinly disguised his sympathy 
for China’s alternative illiberal-authoritarian model of governance.” (Benner, et al., 
2018) Although it is not Hungary alone getting closer to China, but the change in the 
political standing of Viktor Orbán over the last decades is the most remarkable across the 
region as it was presented in Chapter 6.2. 
To a lesser extent but other CEE-11 countries have expressed their support towards China 
as well. President Miloš Zeman of Czechia was the only EU head of state who attended a 
military parade in Beijing marking the end of World War Two, and he is one of the major 
advocates of pro-Chinese politics in his country, however, his power is limited and the 
rest of the political spectrum and the society has deep reservations about China as it was 
presented in Chapter 6.1. 
Though it is not one of the main questions of the present dissertation, still it is an 
interesting conundrum what makes certain CEE-11 countries interested in the cooperation 
with China despite the lack of substantial economic results. One possible answer what 
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deserves further research is that the main drivers of the pro-China policy of certain CEE-
11 countries are not economic or national strategic considerations but the individual 
political interests of their leaders. As it has been presented, CEE-11 societies do not 
support the pro-China attitude, economic results are disappointing, still Mr. Orbán, Mr. 
Zeman, Mr. Ponta of Romania and some other leaders tried to get closer to Beijing. It has 
to be noted, however, that most CEE-11 countries became disappointed by the 16+1 
cooperation by the last years of the 2010s, and many of them turned away from China. 
Even Mr. Zeman announced first to skip the next 16+1 summit due to the lack of economic 
result (though later he made up his mind). (Lau, 2020) 
 
 
In sum, the following actions of the CEE-11 countries may be considered as a sign of 
political compliance: 
- Some CEE-11 countries blocked the joint EU declaration on the South China Sea 
issue 
- Hungary has subtly supported the Chinese stance on the South China Sea issue 
- Hungary (and Greece, the most recent member of the 17+1) blocked EU 
statements criticizing China’s human right records. 
- Hungary refused to sign a joint letter denouncing the reported torture of detained 
lawyers in China. 
- Zeman, Orban et al. attended the Belt and Road Forum and signed agreements the 
EU did not support. 
- Hungary was the first EU country to join the BRI 
- The Hungarian ambassador refused to sign the BRI report of EU ambassadors in 
Beijing. 
 
As it can be seen, Hungary is one of the most problematic countries from the point of view 
of the unity of the EU. However, I have to point to the fact that none of the Hungarian 
political gestures to China is economic by nature. That is, Budapest has been ready to 
support issues important to China but not to the Hungarian government and does not cost 
a penny to the EU (and Germany in particular). This is perfectly in line with the theories 
of Knorr and Armstrong, as they argue that the probability of political compliance is 
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higher when the issue in question is important to the dominant country, but not important 
to the dependent one. (see Table 1.) 
13. Conclusions and recommendations 
 
13.1. Revisiting the theoretical background in light of the empirical findings 
In the following section, I review the theoretical foundations and how empirical results 
reflect on the theories employed in the present dissertation. The first layer of the 
theoretical construction is structural realism as it has been explained in Chapter 2.1. 
Structural realists have five assumptions about states. States are the primary actors of 
international politics and the international system is inherently anarchical by nature; the 
national interest is the maximization of power in order to ensure the state’s survival; states 
can never be certain about the intentions of other states; the primary goal of all states is 
survival, and finally all states are rational, that is, they are capable of successfully 
maximising their chances for survival. The international environment leaves little room 
for trust among states, even alliances are only temporary. (Dunne, et al., 2013) The global 
financial crisis and the Eurozone crises around the turn of the last decade posed serious 
economic threat to the region, and economic survival was at stake, while trust in the EU, 
other member states and the international environment in general diminished, thus CEE-
11 states rationally sought for new ways to maximize their economic security on their 
own, plus the desire for more even distribution or revival of economic power may also 
explain the decision of CEE-11 countries’ turn towards Beijing. Structural realism also 
explains how CEE-11 countries formed a temporary cooperation with China in which all 
states have been pursuing their own interests ever since. Furthermore, as it was presented, 
the European Union itself perceives the 16+1 initiative and Chinese activities in Europe 
as a zero sum game, where more China in the CEE region means less Europe, where China 
tries to ‘divide and rule’ the EU and Beijing poses a threat to the security of Europe. 
Furthermore, political actions of many CEE-11 countries clearly followed a realist 
approach, where states play the main role in their fight to maximize their power at the 
expense of other states. The most obvious examples were the actions of Hungary or 
Czechia to use China as a bargaining chip in its intra-EU struggles. 
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The second layer of the theoretical construction focused on the foreign policy behaviour 
of small states. As Szalai the neorealist school emphasises the importance of the 
international system as one of the most important influencing factors of the foreign policy 
of small states. The role of external forces is more important for small states than for big 
states. Likewise, the geographical location and their position in the international system 
have a major impact on their decisions as well. (Szalai, 2014) In case of the 16+1 the role 
of external forces is obvious. The EU, China and lately the US have all upped their 
presence in the region in the past decade, while the global financial and the Eurozone 
crisis both served as the ’original sin’ what pushed CEE-11 countries towards alternatives, 
first of all towards the PRC. As Wiwel and his colleagues write small states are more 
vulnerable not only to geopolitical or military threats but to economic threats (crises) as 
well, as small states tend to be more dependent on the global economy and trade. (Wivel, 
et al., 2014) Following the logic of Randall L. Schweller we may conclude that most CEE-
11 countries behaved like jackals, that is, they made (pseudo) alliances with big states, in 
our case with China, to maximize their profits. When it comes to the question of political 
compliance, the work of McGowan and Gottwald explains the pro-China attitude of CEE-
11 countries, as small states, both developed and less developed ones, tend to be more 
acquiscent in their foreign policy. (McGowan & Gottwald, 1975) As it has been presented, 
many CEE-11 government offered political gifts and gestures to China in the past decade, 
though these gestures were always political by nature, and did not harm the core economic 
interests of the EU. This ostensible contradiction is indirectly explained by the results of 
the empirical analysis: despite all efforts to boost their relations with China, CEE-11 
countries still belong to the Western alliance system in terms of trade and investment, 
public opinion and of course in terms of security and defense as well. Consequently, their 
affair with China is only temporary, a short lived opportunistic endeveour. 
The third layer of the theoretical construction focuses on the nexus between economic and 
political relations of states. According to the work of Armstrong dependence is based on 
the following three conditions: high magnitude of a nation’s investment controlled by 
another nation; the inability to find easy substitutes for a commodity or a trading partner 
and the intense demand for a commodity. Armstrong also argues that export relations are 
most important from the perspective of dependence than import ties, as it is generally 
easier to find import substitutes than new export markets. As it has been presented in the 
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empirical sections, none of the above mentioned three conditions play a significant role in 
China-CEE relations. Chinese investment in CEE-11 countries is marginal, China is not a 
major export partner of CEE-11 countries, and there is no commodity in bilateral trade of 
high importance. Of course, one may argue, that at the beginning of the 16+1 cooperation, 
the economic situation of CEE countries was so desperate that the potential of Chinese 
investment seemed to be the only source of foreign capital, it was hard to find substitute 
trading partners, and there was an intense demand for fianancial capital and trade 
opportunities in CEE-11 countries. 
Another aspect of the behaviour of CEE-11 countries can be perfectly explained by the 
theory of Armstrong and Knorr. Political gestures of CEE-11 governments to China were 
possible despite the lack of tangible economic benefits, because such issues (South China 
Sea, human rights, Western concerns about the BRI etc.) have low importance to CEE-11 
governments, while their importance is relatively high to China. In other words, it did not 
cost too much to Budapest or Prague to make some spectacular but cheap gestures to 
Beijing. Meanwhile, CEE-11 countries sticked to the Western interests when it really 
mattered, such as the case of anti-dumping proceedings or UNGA votes. 
Meanwhile, the work of Tesi and Keohane on the bargaining model and the ideas of 
Keohane and Nye on assymetry and power all explain how the 16+1 has actually failed to 
create real and substantial Chinese political influence in the region. As they argue the 
dominant state can promise greater economic benefits to the dependent country as a 
reward and as a result get the latter to comply with its wishes or demands. Or the 
dependent state's compliant behavior may be based upon the anticipation that compliance 
would induce the dominant state to increase the economic benefits it provides. As Tesi 
summarises the policy compliance is seen to be the price paid by a less developed country 
for its economic dependence on its more developed and economically powerful partner. 
(Tesi, 1990) (Keohane, 1967)  Keohane and Nye argue in their book that besides 
asymmetry and power, the relationship of the dominant and dependent states consists two 
more important factors: sensitivity and vulnerability. The first means the cost that the 
dependent state could suffer at the dominant state’s hands before making compensatory 
adjustment. The latter refers to the longer run costs that the dependent country would 
experience even after it had adjusted its policies to the changes wrought by the dominant 
state. (Keohane & Nye, 2012) China has simply failed or actually never intended to build 
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a substantial and tangible economic clout in the CEE-11 region, consequently CEE-11 
countries have never become dependent on or sensitive and vulnerable to China. Thus, 
their political compliance was limited and stopped on the level of lip-service. As 
Richardson writes in his paper, a dominant country is more interested in receiving foreign 
leaders' support on some issues than on others, and it would more forcefully seek the 
accord of its dependent partners on issues that it regards as important. Actually this 
political lip-service was the most China could get from CEE-11 leaders. (Richardson & 
Kegley Jr., 1980) 
 
13.2. Revisiting the hypotheses 
 
Based on the analytical section of the dissertation the following conclusions can be drawn 
about the hypotheses.   
H1: If China would have been buying political support in exchange of economic 
advantages, its proportional economic presence had been more significant in the CEE-11 
countries than in Western EU member states. 
As it was presented in the empirical analysis, despite the seemingly rapid development 
trade relations the relative importance of China has barely increased, as its average share 
in CEE-11’s total export climbed to a mere 1.3 per cent in the past decade. At the same 
time Germany, France and the UK boosted their exports to China 7.07 per cent, 4.33 per 
cent and to 5.69 per cent, respectively as a share of their total exports, and the EU-28 as a 
whole has experienced a similar trend as the share of China had climbed to 3.86 per cent 
by 2018. That is, the foreign trade of CEE-11 countries is far less dependent on China than 
any of the three major Western European economies. Likewise, the dynamism of the 
growth of export dependency in CEE-11 countries lagged behind the EU average and the 
German, French and British cases, consequently, China had become more important to 
the latter ones between 2009 and 2018 than to any of the CEE-11 countries. 
When it comes to investment relations data show a similar picture. The number and value 
of executed Chinese investments in Central and Eastern Europe are insignificant 
compared to all of the invested capital, as the value of Chinese investment stock amounted 
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to barely USD 7.5 billion dollars in 2019, meaning that its share was 0.9 per cent. 
Meanwhile other EU members attracted multiple times more Chinese investment in the 
last decade both in absolute and relative term. The Big-3, France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom hosts more than half of all Chinese FDI in the EU, while the share of the CEE-
11 is 4.5 per cent. In relative terms, Chinese capital plays a more important role in Finland, 
Greece, Portugal and Italy than in any CEE-11 countries, and the UK, Germany, Sweden, 
Luxembourg and France are also ahead of any CEE-11 countries but of Hungary. 
 
H2: If China had gained political influence in the CEE-11 countries, there would be a 
correlation between the quality of political relations and the quantity of economic 
relations with CEE-11 countries. 
First, the link between the development of export dependency on China and the quality of 
political relations is rather weak and even negative. Countries with better political ties 
have experienced considerably slower development of export growth to China compared 
to countries with less political capital in Beijing. Second, it is noteworthy that major 
Western European economies — for instance France, Germany and the UK — have 
experienced the fastest growth of exports to China and that their level of trade dependency 
is higher than that of any CEE-11 EU member states, therefore the assumption that CEE-
11 countries support the political agenda of Beijing because they are dependent on trade 
with China, is false. Furthermore, even specific cases prove the lack of political leverage 
of Beijing over CEE countries. The visits of the Dalai Lama to Warsaw in 2008 and Prague 
in 2013, did not result in deteriorating trade relations between China and either Poland or 
the Czech Republic. 
After checking the correlation of the other three factors (political, economic and social 
environment) used by the CASS ranking system, it is clear that none of those have had a 
considerable effect on China–CEE trade either.  
In sum it cannot be stated that China has bought political support of the CEE-11 
countries in exchange of economic benefits, as trade and investment relations 
between China and the CEE-11 countries are significantly less important than 




Better political relations, however, do have an impact on the level of investment relations 
with China. The correlation is strong, even though the special case of Hungary with its 
relatively high stock of Chinese capital somewhat distorts results. Even though the 
causality between the quality of political relations and the level of investments is not clear, 
it cannot be ruled out that CEE-11 politicians may have tried to attract more Chinese 
investment even at the price of political favours.  
 
H3: If China had had the political influence in CEE-11 countries to divide EU level China 
policies, the voting habits of CEE-11 countries on the level of EU or global issues would 
have changed as a sign of political compliance. 
Finally, even though EU decisions on anti-dumping votes are important to China, and 
CEE-11 have a reasonable say in these votes, it is impossible to find any visible evidence 
of Chinese influence on their voting habits. Their general approach is protectionist, though 
with different national-level approaches. Countries considered as ‘friends’ of China rarely 
voted in favour of Beijing, while countries whose political relations with Beijing were 
‘less friendly’ voted in favour of China in some cases. This apparently paradoxical pattern 
might be explained by overall national approaches toward trade issues and protectionism, 
rather than any specific policy towards China. What important from the point of view of 
the present research is the lack of evidence that Beijing successfully used its alleged 
political leverage to influence anti-dumping votes through its partners in the CEE region. 
The tendency of CEE-11 countries to reject proposals to impose anti-dumping measures 
against China did not increase following the initial intensification of China–CEE relations 
Available data and the literature partially support the idea that CEE member states 
of the EU might trade the political cohesion of the union for economic benefits 
from China. However, such an opportunistic approach is limited to a number of 
CEE-11 countries, particulary to the case of Hungary, while other members of the 
region have already started to abandon their temporary affair with Beijing, as most 
of the promised economic benefits have never materialised. Political compliance 
on the side of the CEE-11 has never gone beyond lip-service and never harmed the 
economic interests of the EU. The role and interests of individual political leaders 
in the region may also play a significant role in forging the pro-China policies of 
their respective countries, but this question is to be answered by further research. 
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and the actual establishment of the 16+1 initiative. On the global stage, CEE-11 countries 
supported the US side (or abstained) in 51 per cent of the votes, while supported China 
only in 15 per cent of the votes in the UNGA in the analysed period. Furthermore, their 
attitude did not change significantly in the post-16+1 period and CEE-11 countries voted 
together with the Big-3 of the EU in almost every case. 
So, is the 16+1 cooperation an economic necessity or a Trojan Horse to divide and rule 
the EU? Based on the above presented argument, the dilemma presented in the subtitle of 
the present thesis is invalid. The cooperation between China and the CEE-11 countries 
was driven by economic necessities following the double crises of the early 2010’s, but it 
has never fulfilled its promises, and thus it has been losing its significance lately. Alleged 
Chinese attempts to divide the EU through its cooperation with CEE-11 countries cannot 
be proven, as Beijing does not have the economic leverage in the region to exercise real 
political influence over the EU level policies of CEE-11 nations. Some CEE-11 
government, however, have tried to gain political and economic benefits through serving 
Chinese interests in certain cases, but these attempts have rather served the personal 
political interest of CEE-11 politicians than of the nation they are supposed to work for. 
Therefore, the source of Chinese influence in CEE-11 countries does not originate directly 
from Beijing but from the populist or illiberal political elite of some Central and Eastern 
European Countries. 
14. Limitations and further research 
 
The main limitation of the present dissertation is its reliance on the two CASS ranking 
systems of political relations, as presented in articles by Liu and Chen&Yang. The 
incorporation of other assessments on the quality of political relations between China and 
the 16 CEE countries would improve the strength of this analysis, but further data sources 
are not available. Having said this, CASS is the most important adviser to the Chinese 
In sum, based on the above presented data, it can be stated that CEE-11 countries 
did not change their pro-Western attitudes in the post-16+1 period in the European 
Union nor in the United Nations General Assemly. Political compliance with 
Chinese interests cannot be observed, as CEE-11 countries casted their votes 
according to EU and US interests in the analysed period. 
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government on the CEE region, and ‘16+1 cooperation’ in particular, and therefore its 
assessment can reasonably be viewed as an accurate reflection of the mind-set of relevant 
Chinese political actors. Meanwhile, chapter 6 presented ample evidence on the level and 
quality of bilateral political relations between China and the most important members of 
the CEE-11 group to complement the data of Liu and Chen&Yang. 
According to Nitsch there is empirical evidence that state and official visits have a trade-
increasing effect. (Nitsch, 2007) Therefore, the number and level of bilateral political 
meetings (and especially their impact on trade and investment relations) could be another 
indicator of the level of bilateral relations between China and the CEE countries. 
Ironically, it was the establishment of ‘16+1 cooperation’ itself that made it impossible to 
produce such an assessment. Since all top leaders meet each other automatically at the 
16+1 annual summits, and most high-level governmental officials have their own regular 
gatherings, it is no longer useful to count and evaluate bilateral meetings. 
Further research might bolster the assumption that since a large share of CEE-11 exports 
to China is produced by (Western) multinational companies, bilateral political or 
economic relations between China and any given CEE country cannot have any serious 
impact on the total volume of exports. Unfortunately, statistics on the role of multinational 
companies in the exports of individual CEE economies are either non-existent, or 
available only on request and for a fee. 
Likewise, it would be an exciting endeavour to chart what role individual political leaders 
of the CEE-11 countries have been playing in forging closer relations to Beijing despite 
the lack of tangible economic results and in spite the general anti-China mood of their 
constituencies. 
The Chinese ‘One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative might increase the importance of 
certain CEE-11 countries to China. The southern corridor of the land-based new ‘Silk 
Road’ will connect Western China through Central and South Asia and the Balkans to 
Europe. The ongoing negotiations about the railway line for freight trains between 
Budapest and Belgrade are part of this development. (Zalan, 2017) Further research is 
needed on how this huge infrastructure project will affect CEE-11 – China and EU – China 
relations in the future. 
177 
The counter-intuitive anti-dumping voting pattern of CEE countries is another topic that 
deserves further scholarly attention. The next step would be to examine voting patterns 
across all 28 EU member states and to identify the underlying reasons for protectionist 























Annex 1. List of 16+1 related events and initiatives (2012-2019) 
 
# Title of event or initiative Year 
1 
Secretariat for cooperation between China and central and eastern Euro-
pean countries (PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
2012 
2 investment cooperation fund 2012 
3 
expert advisory committee on the construction of transportation network 
between China and central and eastern European countries (PRC Minis-
try of Commerce) 
2012 
4 
a tourism promotion alliance between China and central and eastern Eu-
ropean countries (PRC Tourism Administration) 
2012 
5 








forum on cultural cooperation between China and central and eastern 
European countries 
2012 
8 China-CEEC meeting of heads of government every year 2013 
9 expo of CEEC commodities in China 2013 
10 China-CEEC symposium on macroeconomic policies in China 2013 
11 
China-CEEC investment promotion event at the China International Fair 
for Investment and Trade 
2013 
12 China-CEEC liaison mechanism for investment promotion agencies 2013 
13 China-CEEC association to promote agricultural cooperation 2013 
14 China-CEEC agricultural cooperation forum 2013 
15 China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund 2013 
16 China-CEEC association on infrastructure cooperation 2013 
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17 
Regular China-CEEC symposium to promote innovation, technological 
cooperation and international technology transfer, with the first sympo-
sium to be held in 2014 
2013 
18 
first China-CEEC high-level symposium of think tanks in China in De-
cember 2013 
2013 
19 mutual visits by 50 Chinese journalists and 50 CEEC journalists in 2014 2013 
20 
China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum and the China-CEEC Cul-
tural Cooperation Forum once every two years 
2013 
21 Regular China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue 2013 
22 Biannual China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting 2013 
23 China-EU Smart and Secure Trade Lanes (SSTL) Pilot Project 2014 
24 China-CEEC association on logistics cooperation 2014 
25 




Secretariat of the China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact 
Mechanism in Beijing, China 
2014 
27 




a China-CEEC investment and trade fair during the China International 
Consumer Goods Fair in Ningbo, China, in 2015 
2014 
29 China-CEEC association on promoting agricultural cooperation 2014 
30 
CEEC-China Forum during European Economic Congress in Katowice, 
Poland in 2015 
2014 
31 
meeting of the Central Bank Governors' Club of the Central Asia, Black 
Sea Region and Balkan Countries in China in 2015 
2014 
32 
China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and In-
ternational Technology Transfer in Slovakia in 2015 
2014 
33 Center for Dialogue and Cooperation (by Romania) 2014 
34 
expert forum on the protection of Chinese and CEEC cultural heritage 
to be held in Poland 
2014 
35 China-CEEC summer dance camp in China 2014 
36 Regular China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks 2014 
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37 China-CEEC think tanks exchange and cooperation center 2014 
38 
Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean Countries will organize mutual visits by 50 Chinese journalists 
and 50 CEEC journalists in 2015 
2014 
39 2nd China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum in China in 2015 2014 
40 
China-CEEC Association of Tourism Promotion Agencies and Busi-
nesses in Hungary 
2014 
41 
2nd China-CEEC High Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation in 
Slovenia 
2014 
42 China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium 2014 
43 Romanian film festival in China in 2015 2014 
44 China-CEEC high-level radio and television seminar 2014 
45 trip to China for senior CEEC officials in 2015 2014 
46 
1st China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks was held in 
Beijing, China 
2014 
47 In April 2014, a delegation of CEEC journalists visited China 2014 
48 
1st China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and 
International Technology Transfer was held in Shanghai, China 
2014 
49 
the inaugural conference of the China-CEEC Association of Tourism 
Promotion Agencies and Businesses was held in Budapest, Hungary 
2014 
50 
1st meeting of the China-Hungary-Serbia joint working group on 
transport infrastructure cooperation was held in Beijing, China 
2014 
51 
Central and Eastern European Countries' Products Fair (CEEC Fair) was 
held in Ningbo, China 
2014 
52 
High Level Conference on Transport, Logistics and Trade Routes: Con-
necting Asia with Europe was held in Riga, Latvia 
2014 
53 
2nd China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting was held in Prague, the Czech 
Republic 
2014 
54 China Investment Forum was held in Prague, the Czech Republic 2014 
55 
2nd China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks was held in 
Bled, Slovenia 
2014 
56 2nd China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue was held in Tianjin, China 2014 
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57 
the China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium was estab-
lished in Tianjin, China 
2014 
58 




China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism was 
announced in Xiamen, China 
2014 
60 China-CEEC investment promotion event was held in Xiamen, China 2014 
61 
a promotion event dedicated to CEECs was held in Guangzhou, China, 
during the 11th China International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair 
2014 
62 
the China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum was held 
in Bucharest, Romania 
2014 
63 




event dedicated to China-CEEC cooperation in environmental technol-
ogies was held in Poznan, Poland, during the PolEko fairs 
2014 
65 
2nd Meeting for the Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism 
of China and CEECs was held in Warsaw, Poland 
2014 
66 
a promotion event of Chinese and CEEC tourism products was held at 
the China International Travel Mart in Shanghai, China 
2014 
67 delegations of Chinese journalists visited CEECs 2014 
68 China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund 2014 
69 
16+1 National Coordinators' Meetings will be held in China and Latvia 
respectively in 2016 
2015 
70 
a mechanism of quarterly meetings between the Secretariat for Cooper-
ation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, its 
member organizations and CEEC embassies in China 
2015 
71 
the 2nd working group meeting and a workshop under the Framework 
Agreement on Cooperation in Facilitating Customs Clearance Among 
the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs in Budapest 
in 2016 
2015 
72 China-CEEC association on transport and infrastructure cooperation 2015 
73 China-CEEC secretariat on logistics cooperation 2015 
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74 
The 1st meeting of the Center for Dialogue (in energy-related projects) 
will be organized in Romania in 2016 
2015 
75 
China will attend the Brno International Engineering Fair in the Czech 
Republic in 2016 
2015 
76 The China Investment Forum will be held in the Czech Republic in 2016 2015 
77 
economic forum focused on infrastructure, tourism and industrial capac-
ity cooperation between China and CEECs, to be held in Sarajevo, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, in the first half of 2016 
2015 
78 
An exhibition area will be set aside for top-quality CEEC agro-products 




a free-of-charge exhibition space for top-quality CEEC wines and spirits 
at the National Agriculture Exhibition Center 
2015 
80 China-CEEC coordination mechanism for forestry cooperation 2015 
81 
The 1st China-CEEC High-Level Meeting on Cooperation in Forestry 
will be held in Slovenia in May 2016 
2015 
82 
The 3rd China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation 
and International Technology Transfer will be held in China in 2016 
2015 
83 
virtual China-CEEC technology transfer center, and the role of the sec-
retariat will be assumed by the relevant Chinese and Slovak institutions 
2015 
84 
CEEC health professionals will be invited to visit China in 2016 and to 
participate in seminars 
2015 
85 
CEEC medical and health businesses will be invited to China for exhi-
bitions on health services and medical devices 
2015 
86 
The Secretariat will continue to invite senior CEEC officials for a trip to 
China in 2016 
2015 
87 the 3rd meeting of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium 2015 
88 China-CEEC forum on cooperation 2015 
89 The 2nd China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp 2015 
90 
CEEC artists and composers as well as artistic directors of international 




The 1st China-CEEC Cultural and Creative Industries Forum will be held 
in Belgrade, Serbia, in 2016 
2015 
92 
The 1st China-CEEC Experts' Forum on Intangible Cultural Heritage 
will be held in Krakow, Poland, in 2016 
2015 
93 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in leading the efforts to establish 
a China-CEEC think tanks network 
2015 
94 mutual visits by Chinese and CEEC journalists in 2016 2015 
95 China-CEEC seminar of sinologists will be held in 2016 2015 
96 
Travel 2016 expo and the related professional conference in March 2016 
in Budapest, Hungary 
2015 
97 




3rd China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation will 
be held in Croatia in 2016 
2015 
99 
3rd China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting and the China (Hebei) Interna-




the customs clearance facilitation cooperation mechanism for the China-
Europe Land-Sea Express Line among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian, 
Macedonian and Greek Customs was officially established 
2015 
101 Chinese Art Festival was held in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia 2015 
102 
launch ceremony of the Year of Promotion of China-CEEC Tourism Co-
operation was held in Budapest, Hungary 
2015 
103 
1st working group meeting under the Framework Agreement on Coop-
eration in Facilitating Customs Clearance Among the Chinese, Hungar-
ian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs was held in Shanghai, China 
2015 
104 
1st meeting of the China-CEEC Business Council was held in Katowice, 
Poland 
2015 
105 3rd ASEM Transport Ministers' Meeting was held in Riga, Latvia 2015 
106 
1st Customs Control Techniques Workshop for the China-Europe Land-
Sea Express Line among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedo-




33rd Meeting of the Central Bank Governors' Club of the Central Asia, 
Black Sea Region and Balkan Countries was held in Shanghai, China 
2015 
108 
1st Meeting of China-CEEC Association of Provincial Governors was 
held in Hebei, China 
2015 
109 
heads of customs of China, Hungary, Serbia and Macedonia met in 
Xi'an, China, and signed the Cooperation Action Plan for 2015-2016 
2015 
110 
the Chinese Ministry of Culture organized Chinese performing arts or-
ganizations to purchase programs from Hungary, Serbia and Romania 
2015 
111 
a delegation of CEEC journalists visited Zhejiang Province, Henan 
Province and Beijing, China 
2015 
112 1st China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo was held in Ningbo, China 2015 
113 
the launch ceremony of the China-CEEC Association on Promoting Ag-
ricultural Cooperation 
2015 
114 1st Meeting of Ministers of Agriculture was held in Sofia, Bulgaria 2015 
115 
1st China-CEEC Health Ministers' Forum was held in Prague, the Czech 
Republic 
2015 
116 1st TCM center in the Czech Republic 2015 
117 




a delegation of senior CEEC officials visited Sichuan Province, Yunnan 
Province and Beijing, China 
2015 
119 Bank of China Prague Branch 2015 
120 
2nd China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation was 
held in Bled, Slovenia 
2015 
121 
10th China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum was 
held in Budapest, Hungary 
2015 
122 
3rd China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and the 2nd working consul-
tation of the China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium were 
held in Warsaw, Poland 
2015 
123 
2nd China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and 




an exhibition area dedicated to CEECs was created at the 11th China 
International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair in Guangzhou, China 
2015 
125 
Workshop on Customs Clearance Procedures of Transit Goods and Risk 
Management among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian 
Customs was held in Skopje, Macedonia 
2015 
126 a delegation of artistic directors of CEEC jazz festivals visited China 2015 
127 
the Seminar on Radio and Television Program Production for Central 
and Eastern European Countries was held in Shanghai and Hunan, China 
2015 
128 








3rd China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks will be held in 
Beijing, China 
2015 
131 China Investment Forum will be held in the Czech Republic in 2017 2016 
132 
3rd working group meeting in Serbia 2017 under the Framework Agree-
ment on Cooperation in Facilitating Customs Clearance among the Chi-
nese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs 
2016 
133 
The first edition of the 16+1 Energy Fair and Expo will be held in Bu-
charest in the first quarter of 2017 
2016 
134 
2nd China-CEEC Conference on Innovation Cooperation will be held in 
CEEC in 2017 
2016 
135 
China-CEEC Technology Transfer Center established in Bratislava, Slo-
vakia 
2016 
136 Sino-CEE Finance Holding Company Ltd. 2016 
137 12th China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum 2016 
138 
5th Meeting of the Consultative Board of the Association for the Promo-
tion of Agricultural Cooperation between China and CEECs 
2016 
139 
CEEC delegations’ participation at the 15th China International Agricul-
tural Trade Fair 
2016 
140 Regular China-CEEC High-level Meeting on Cooperation in Forestry 2016 
141 senior CEEC officials for a trip to China 2016 
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142 3rd China-CEEC Culture Cooperation Forum will be held in China 2016 
143 
4th China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks will be held in 
China 
2016 
144 Forum on Cultural Heritage will be held in Serbia in 2017 2016 
145 
3rd China-CEEC Young Political Leaders’ Forum will be held in Roma-
nia in 2017 
2016 
146 2nd China-CEEC Literature Forum will be held in 2017 2016 
147 
The All-China Youth Federation will invite young people from CEECs 
to participate in the Bridge of Future youth campus and workshop 
2016 
148 China-CEEC Association on the Promotion of Health Cooperation 2016 
149 4th China-CEEC Local Leaders’ Meeting will be held in Bulgaria 2016 
150 
the “Treasures of Romania” Exhibition was held at the National Mu-
seum of China in Beijing, China 
2016 
151 
1st Quarterly Meeting of 2016 between the Secretariat for Cooperation 
between China and Central and Eastern European Countries and CEEC 
embassies in China was held in Beijing, China 
2016 
152 
News Conference for the 2016 year of China-CEEC people-to-people 
and cultural exchanges was held in Beijing, China 
2016 
153 
2nd meeting of the China-CEEC Association on Promoting Agricultural 
Cooperation was held in Sofia, Bulgaria 
2016 
154 




the eRegions on the New eAmber and New eSilk Roads Think Tank 
Meeting was held in Ljubljana, Slovenia 
2016 
156 
2nd Quarterly Meeting of 2016 between the Secretariat for Cooperation 
between China and Central and Eastern European Countries and CEEC 
embassies in China was held in Beijing, China 
2016 
157 Sarajevo Business Forum 16+1 was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016 
158 
the Conference of the Presidents of the Supreme Courts of China and 
CEECs was held in Suzhou, China 
2016 
159 




160 1st China-CEEC Transport Ministers’ Meeting was held in Riga, Latvia 2016 
161 
officials from tourism authorities of CEECs attended the 1st World Con-
ference on Tourism for Development in Beijing, China 
2016 
162 
1st China-CEEC High-Level Meeting on Cooperation in Forestry and 
China-CEEC Forestry Business Forum were held in Ljubljana, Slovenia 
2016 
163 1st China-CEEC Literature Forum was held in Budapest, Hungary 2016 
164 
a delegation of CEEC journalists visited Guangdong province, Jiangxi 
province and Beijing, China 
2016 
165 
2nd China-CEEC Ministerial Conference on Promoting Trade and Eco-
nomic Cooperation 
2016 
166 China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo 2016 
167 
3rd Meeting of the China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Con-
tact Mechanism were held in Ningbo, China 
2016 
168 3rd China-CEEC Local Leaders’ Meeting 2016 
169 
2nd Working Meeting of the China-CEEC Association of Provincial 
Governors were held in Tangshan, China 
2016 
170 2nd China-CEEC Health Ministers’ Forum was held in Suzhou, China 2016 
171 








Chinese Performing Arts delegation paid the fourth visit to Slovenia, the 
Slovak Republic and Croatia to purchase programs 
2016 
174 painters from CEECs visited Guizhou province, China 2016 
175 2nd China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp 2016 
176 a delegation of senior CEEC officials visited Fujian and Ningxia, China 2016 
177 
the Beijing International Book Fair with CEECs being the main guests 
of honor was held in Beijing, China 
2016 
178 
5th meeting of the China-Hungary-Serbia joint working group on 
transport infrastructure cooperation was held in Belgrade, Serbia 
2016 
179 
China-CEEC Forum of Capital City Mayors was held in Sofia, Bulgaria 




3rd Quarterly Meeting of 2016 between the Secretariat for Cooperation 
between China and Central and Eastern European Countries and CEEC 
embassies in China was held in Beijing, China 
2016 
181 4th China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue 2016 
182 3rd meeting of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium 2016 
183 
Poland and Bulgaria participated in the China International Small and 
Medium Enterprises Fair held in Guangzhou, China 
2016 
184 




1st China-CEEC Experts’ Forum on Intangible Cultural Heritage will be 
held in Krakow, Poland 
2016 
186 
China attended the Brno International Engineering Fair in the Czech Re-
public in October 2016 
2016 
187 China-CEE Countries Political Parties Dialogue was held in Budapest 2016 
188 
8th China-CEEC National Coordinators’ Meeting was held in Riga, Lat-
via 
2016 
189 China-CEEC Dance Culture Union was established in Plovdiv, Bulgaria 2016 
190 
the side events of the 5th CEEC-China Summit — the 6th 16+1 Business 
Forum, the International Forum of China and Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Countries and the Seminar on Sinology Research and Chinese 




11th China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum will be 
held in Kunming, China 
2016 
192 
3rd meeting of the China-CEEC Association on Promoting Agricultural 
Cooperation will be held in Kunming, China 
2016 
193 
China-CEEC Conferences on Innovation Cooperation will be held in 
Jiangsu, Nanjing, China 
2016 
194 The technology transfer virtual center of China and CEECs 2016 
195 
Health Qigong Team will visit Slovenia and Serbia to hold promotional 




China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation will be 
held in Croatia 
2016 
197 
4th Quarterly Meeting of 2016 between the Secretariat for Cooperation 
between China and Central and Eastern European Countries and CEEC 
embassies in China 
2016 
198 
the closing event of the Year of China-CEEC people-to-people and cul-
tural exchanges be held in China 
2016 
199 
Bulgaria will hold 16+1 National Coordinators' Meeting during the sec-
ond half of the year 
2017 
200 China Investment Forum will be held in the Czech Republic in 2018 2017 
201 The fifth meeting of China-CEEC Business Council will be held in 2018 2017 
202 16+1 Coordinating Secretariat for Maritime Issues in Poland 2017 
203 
China, Hungary, Serbia and Macedonia will hold the 4th working group 
meeting and experts’ seminar on Customs Clearance Facilitation Coop-
eration on China-Europe Land and Sea Express in 2018 
2017 
204 16+1 SMEs Center in Croatia 2017 
205 China-CEEC Inter-Bank Association 2017 
206 Secretariat of the Inter-Bank Association (China Development Bank)  2017 
207 








16+1 Agriculture Investment and Equipment Cooperation Fair during 
the economic and trade fair in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2018 
2017 
210 China-CEEC Quality Testing Cooperation Dialogue 2017 
211 
China-CEEC Trade Facilitation National Inspection Examination Area 
in Ningbo, China 
2017 
212 China-CEEC Environmental Protection Cooperation Mechanism 2017 
213 
The Secretariat for 16+1 cooperation will continue to invite high ranking 
officials from CEECs to visit China in 2018 
2017 
214 
hosting of Secretariat of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutions 




2nd China-CEEC Experts-Level Forum on Safeguarding Intangible Cul-
tural Heritage 
2017 
216 1st China-CEEC Curators Forum of Libraries Union 2017 
217 2nd 16+1 Winter Dance Camp 2017 
218 4th Summer Dance Camp in CEECs 2017 
219 China-CEEC Coordination Center for Cultural Cooperation 2017 
220 Music Academy Union 2017 
221 China-CEEC Arts Creation and Research Center 2017 
222 Regular China-CEEC Political Parties Dialogue 2017 
223 Bridge of the Future China-CEEC youths camp 2017 
224 China-CEEC Tourism Coordination Center (TCC) 2017 
225 3rd China Information Day Conference in 2018 in Budapest 2017 
226 China-CEEC Human Resources for Health Cooperation Network 2017 
227 China-CEEC Health Policy Research Network 2017 
228 China-CEEC Public Health Cooperation Network 2017 
229 
Central and Eastern European Medical, Education and Research Center 
for Traditional Chinese Medicine in Hungary 
2017 
230 




4th China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting will be held in Plovdiv, Bul-
garia in 2018 
2017 
232 China-CEEC Winter Dance Camp was held in Shenzhen, China 2017 
233 
opening ceremony of China-CEEC Year of Media Cooperation in Bei-
jing, China 
2017 
234 Film Exhibition of CEEC was held in Beijing, China 2017 
235 




China-CEEC Agricultural Products and Wine Exhibition was held dur-
ing the Economic and Trade Fair in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
April 2017 
2017 
237 China-CEEC Cultural Season 2017 
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238 
meeting between the Secretariat for China-CEEC Cooperation and em-
bassies of the 16 CEECs in China was held in Beijing, China 
2017 
239 2nd China-CEEC Cultural and Creative Industries Forum in Beijing 2017 
240 
6th meeting of the China-Hungary-Serbia Joint Working Group on Infra-
structure Cooperation was held in Budapest, Hungary 
2017 
241 3rd Investment and Trade Exposition was held in Ningbo, China 2017 
242 Seminar of CEEC scholars was held in Beijing, China 2017 
243 2nd China-CEEC Dialogue on Quality Control Cooperation in Ningbo 2017 
244 3rd China-CEEC Health Ministers Forum was held in Budapest 2017 
245 
4th batch of journalists from CEEC visited Beijing, Shanghai and Shen-
zhen, China 
2017 
246 9th China-CEEC National Coordinators Meeting was held in Beijing 2017 
247 China-CEEC Political Party Dialogue was held in Bucharest, Romania 2017 
248 




Spokespersons from CEEC visited China and China-CEEC Spokesper-
sons Dialogue was held in Beijing, China 
2017 
250 3rd China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp was held in Chengdu, China 2017 
251 
China-CEEC Forum on Think Tanks Building was held in Shijiazhuang, 
China 
2017 
252 China Investment Forum was held in Prague, the Czech Republic 2017 
253 2nd China-CEEC Agricultural Ministers Forum in Brdo, Slovenia 2017 
254 12th China-CEEC Agro-trade Forum was held in Brdo, Slovenia 2017 
255 
Delegation of high-ranking officials from CEEC visited Beijing, Gansu 
and Hunan, China 
2017 
256 
1st China-CEEC Youth Exchange Camp of Future Bridge was held in 
Beijing and Xi'an, China 
2017 
257 1st China-CEEC Development Forum was held in Warsaw, Poland 2017 
258 3rd China-CEEC Form on Cultural Cooperation was held in Hangzhou 2017 
259 5th China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue in Novi Sad, Serbia 2017 
260 
4th meeting of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutions Consortium 








3rd Working Group Meeting on Customs Clearance Facilitation Cooper-




Delegations from CEEC took part in the 15th China International Agri-
cultural Products Fair held in Beijing, China 
2017 
264 




3rd working meeting of China-CEEC Local Provincial Governors Asso-
ciation was held in Plovdiv, Bulgaria 
2017 
266 




2nd China-CEEC Transport Ministers Meeting & Business Forum was 
held in Warsaw, Poland 
2017 
268 
27 SMEs from CEECs took part in the 14th China International Small 
and Medium Enterprises Fair held in Guangzhou, China 
2017 
269 6th China-CEEC Leaders’ Summit was held in Budapest, Hungary 2017 
270 
3rd China-CEEC High-Level Meeting on Tourism was held in Sarajevo, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
2017 
271 
China-CEEC Energy Ministerial Conference and Energy Fair and Expo 
was held in Bucharest, Romania 
2017 
272 




4th China-Central Eastern European Countries Tourism Cooperation and 
Exchange Conference was held in Ningbo, China 
2017 
274 
China-CEEC Business Council and Business Support Organizations 
was held in Riga, Latvia 
2017 
275 1st China-CEEC Customs Cooperation Forum was held in Ningbo 2017 
276 
China-CEEC Meeting on E-Commerce within the framework of Belt 








1st '16+1 e-Commerce Logistics Hub and Pavilion for Agricultural and 
Other Products' was established in Plovdiv, Bulgaria 
2017 
279 CEEC exhibition pavilion in Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone 2018 
280 fifth meeting of China-CEEC Business Council will be held in 2019 2018 
281 




1st CEEC-China Civil Aviation Forum will be held in the Czech Repub-
lic in 2019 
2018 
283 Regular China-CEEC Conference on Innovation Cooperation 2018 
284 International Working Group on Export Credits 2018 
285 16+1 Smart City Coordination Center 2018 
286 16+1 Fintech Coordination Center 2018 
287 16+1 High Level Fintech Forum will be held in Lithuania 2018 
288 first council meeting of China-CEEC Inter-Bank Association 2018 
289 3rd China-CEEC Agricultural Ministers' Meeting in Lithuania 2018 
290 4th 16+1 Agricultural Ministers' Meeting will be held in China 2018 
291 




China will be the partner country of the International Economy Fair in 
Mostar in 2019 during which an event related to the 16+1 cooperation 
will be held 
2018 
293 Global Partnership Center of CEECs and China in Bulgaria 2018 
294 
The Secretariat for Cooperation between China and CEECs will con-
tinue to invite high-ranking officials and press corps from CEECs to visit 
China 
2018 
295 Bridge of the Future China-CEEC Youth Exchange Camp in 2019 2018 
296 16+1 Youth Development Center in a CEEC 2018 
297 
16+1 winter festival for college students will be organized in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in 2019 
2018 
298 5th Summer Dance Camp will be held in China 2018 
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299 Fieldtrip to China by CEEC Painters will be held in China 2018 
300 3rd China-CEEC Dance Masters Workshop will be held in China 2018 
301 4th 16+1 Cultural and Creative Industry Forum will be held in Hungary 2018 
302 2nd 16+1 Summer Music Camp will be held in CEEC 2018 
303 
16+1 Cooperation People-to-People Exchange Experience Center in 
China 
2018 
304 1st China-CEEC Cultural Heritage Forum co-hosted by Serbia and China 2018 
305 regular China-CEEC Spokespersons Dialogue 2018 
306 
6th working group meeting of Local Provincial Governors Association 
will be held in 2019 
2018 
307 3rd China-CEEC Mayors Forum will be held in China in 2019 2018 
308 
exhibition of Chinese companies and the China-CEEC Agriculture In-
vestment and Equipment Cooperation Fair were held during the Eco-
nomic and Trade Fair in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
2018 
309 China-Bulgaria Commercial Law Cooperation Council 2018 
310 




The Belt and Road and Regional Financial Cooperation Seminar of 








2nd meeting of the liaison group of China-CEEC coordination mecha-
nism on forestry cooperation 
2018 
314 China-CEEC Forestry Research Cooperation Seminar 2018 
315 China Brand Show (Central Eastern Europe) was held in Budapest 2018 
316 13th China-CEEC Agro-trade and Economic Cooperation Forum 2018 
317 6th China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue was held in Shenzhen 2018 
318 
5th meeting of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium was 




Experts Seminar on Customs Clearance Facilitation Cooperation on 
China-Europe Land and Sea Express of China, Hungary, Serbia and the 
Republic of Macedonia  
2018 
320 
4th Working Group Meeting Customs Clearance Facilitation Coopera-
tion on China-Europe Land and Sea Express of China, Hungary, Serbia 
and the Republic of Macedonia 
2018 
321 The second group of composers from CEEC visited China 2018 
322 2nd China-CEEC Senior Dancers Workshop 2018 
323 2nd China-CEEC Arts Cooperation Forum was held in Chengdu 2018 
324 meeting on cooperation in maritime issues was held in Szczecin, Poland 2018 
325 




3rd China-CEEC Ministerial Meeting on Promoting Trade and Economic 
Cooperation in Ningbo, China 
2018 
327 
4th China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo with Latvia as the Guest of 
Honor in Ningbo, China 
2018 
328 2nd China-CEEC Mayors Forum were held in Ningbo, China 2018 
329 
2nd Bridge of the Future China-CEEC youths camp exchanges was held 
in Chinese cities such as Shanghai, China 
2018 
330 




International Think-Tank Conference "Advancing 16+1 Cooperation 
Platform — the Way Ahead" in Sofia, Bulgaria 
2018 
332 1st 16+1 Summer Jazz Camp will be held in Changchun, China 2018 
333 








China-CEEC Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Cooperation Forum 
will be held in Cangzhou, China 
2018 
336 
5th China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks will be held in 
the Republic of Macedonia 
2018 
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337 3rd China-CEEC Transport Ministers' Meeting will be held in Serbia 2018 
338 1st China-CEEC Library Union Forum will be held in Hangzhou 2018 
339 China-CEEC Qigong Health Forum will be held in Serbia 2018 
340 




China-CEEC Central Bank Governors' Meeting will be held in Buda-
pest, Hungary 
2018 
342 China Investment Forum will be held in the Czech Republic 2018 
343 4th meeting of China-CEEC Business Council 2018 
344 
16+1 International Agricultural Demonstration Zone will be established 
in Plovdiv, Bulgaria 
2018 
345 "Martial Arts Silk Road" Training Camp in 2018 2018 
346 5th China–CEEC Transport Ministers' Meeting in Croatia 2019 
347 
4th China–CEEC Ministerial Conference on Economic and Trade Pro-
motion and China–CEEC Fair in Ningbo, China 
2019 
348 China Investment Forum in the Czech Republic 2019 
349 3rd China–CEEC SME Cooperation Forum in Cangzhou, China 2019 
350 6th meeting of the China-CEEC Business Council 2019 
351 8th China–CEEC Education Policy Dialogue in the Czech Republic 2019 
352 
7th China–CEEC Higher Education Institutions Consortium in the Czech 
Republic 
2019 
353 China–CEEC Education Capacity Building Project 2019 
354 
China–CEEC Joint Education Project of Institutions of Higher Educa-
tion 
2019 
355 China–CEEC Youth Development Center in Albania 2019 
356 China–CEEC Coordination Mechanism for Sports in CEECs 2019 
357 
China–CEEC Information and Communication Technology Coordina-
tion Mechanism in Croatia 
2019 
358 5th China–CEEC Conference on Innovation Cooperation in Slovakia 2019 
359 
China–CEEC Energy Cooperation Dialogue among energy authorities 
of China and CEECs 
2019 
360 China-CEEC Smart City Coordination Center in Romania 2019 
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361 




Association for the Promotion of Agricultural Cooperation between 
China and the CEE Countries (APACCCEEC) 
2019 
363 
3rd China–CEEC High-level Conference on Forestry Cooperation in 
CEECs 
2019 
364 5th China-CEEC Meeting of the Ministers of Agriculture 2019 
365 
15th Agro-trade and Economic Cooperation Forum and relevant sessions 
of the Meeting of the Consultative Board of the Association for the Pro-
motion of Agricultural Cooperation between China and CEE Countries 
(APACCCEEC) 
2019 
366 China–CEEC Environmental Protection Cooperation Mechanism 2019 
367 2nd China–CEEC Ministers’ Conference on environmental cooperation 2019 
368 
the Secretariat of 16+1 Cooperation will continue to invite high-ranking 
officials and journalists from CEECs to visit China 
2019 
369 
6th China-CEEC High-level Conference on Tourism Cooperation in 
CEECs 
2019 
370 3rd China-CEEC Art Cooperation Forum in Serbia 2019 
371 
3rd China-CEEC Expert Forum on Intangible Cultural Heritage Protec-
tion in CEECs 
2019 
372 2nd China-CEEC Library Union Forum in CEECs 2019 
373 5th China-CEEC Cultural and Creative Industries Forum in Slovenia 2019 
374 Tourism Award Marco Polo within the framework of 16+1 Cooperation 2019 
375 China-CEEC Creative Hub in Montenegro 2019 
376 




The China-CEEC Association of Publishing Houses was formally estab-
lished in Beijing, China 
2019 
378 4th Dance Summer Camp was held in Hungary and Croatia 2019 
379 
4th China-CEEC High-level Conference on Tourism Cooperation was 




China-CEEC Expert Forum on Intangible Cultural Heritage Protection 
was held in Hangzhou, China 
2019 
381 China-CEEC Literature Forum was held in Ningbo, China 2019 
382 
China-CEEC Dialogue and Cooperation Center on Energy Projects sent 
working groups to Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia 
2019 
383 3rd China-CEEC Capital Mayor’s Forum was held in Belgrade, Serbia 2019 
384 1st China-CEEC Qigong Health Forum was held in Serbia 2019 
385 5th China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks 2019 
386 
special event of China-CEEC Multipurpose Forest Management for 
Green Future was held in Beijing, China 
2019 
387 China Investment Forum was held in Prague, the Czech Republic 2019 
388 China-CEEC Library Union was established in Hangzhou, China 2019 
389 2nd Customs Cooperation Forum was held in Budapest, Hungary 2019 
390 1st China-CEEC SME Cooperation Forum was held in Cangzhou, China 2019 
391 




Shenzhen CEEC Agricultural Cooperation Matchmaking Conference 
was held in Shenzhen, China 
2019 
393 
China-CEEC Agricultural Products E-commerce Logistics Center and 
its exhibition hall at Yantian Port in Shenzhen, China 
2019 
394 
7th meeting of the Consultative Board of the Association for Promotion 




2nd China-CEEC Logistics Secretariat Focal Point Meeting, including 
China-CEEC logistics cooperation seminar in Chengdu, China 
2019 
396 
The Secretariat with an exhibition stand in China Chengdu International 
Supply Chain and Smart Logistics Expo was held in Chengdu, China 
2019 
397 12th China-CEEC National Coordinators’ Meeting was held in Beijing 2019 
398 
China-CEEC Veterinary Research Center in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina 
2019 
399 13th China-CEEC National Coordinators’ Meeting was held in Zagreb 2019 
400 China-CEEC Global Partnership Center was established in Bulgaria 2019 
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401 
The Economic and Trade Fair in Mostar was held in Bosnia and Herze-
govina 
2019 
402 5th meeting of China-CEEC Business Council will be held in Croatia 2019 
403 2nd China-CEEC Cultural Heritage Forum will be held in Luoyang 2019 
404 




2nd meeting of the Board of Directors of China-CEEC Inter-bank Asso-
ciation was held in Croatia in 2019 
2019 
406 




3rd meeting of the liaison group of China-CEEC coordination mecha-
nism on forestry cooperation will be held in Poland 
2019 
408 2nd China-CEEC Culture and Art Carnival will be held in Beijing 2019 
409 7th China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue 2019 
410 
6th meeting of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium will 
be held in Timisoara, Romania 
2019 
411 The China-CEEC Expo will be held in Ningbo, China 2019 
412 
4th China-CEEC Customs Inspection and Quarantine Dialogue will be 
held in Ningbo, China 
2019 
413 
5th working group meeting of Association of Provincial Governors will 
be held in Dalian, China 
2019 
414 3rd China-CEEC Mayors Forum will be held in Ningbo, China 2019 
415 4th China-CEEC Health Ministers’ Forum will be held in Sofia, Bulgaria 2019 
416 




5th China-CEEC High-level Conference on Tourism Cooperation and 
the first Marco Polo Tourism Award ceremony will be held in Riga, Lat-
via 
2019 
418 4th China-CEEC Capital Mayors Forum 2019 
419 China-CEEC Capital Business Association Roundtable 2019 
420 
the annual meeting of the China-CEEC Tourism Association will be 




1st China-CEEC Civil Aviation Forum will be held in the Czech Repub-
lic in October 2019 
2019 
422 2nd China-CEEC SME Cooperation Forum will be held in Cangzhou 2019 
423 
4th China-CEEC Ministers’ Forum on Culture Cooperation will be held 
in the Republic of North Macedonia 
2019 
424 




China-CEEC High-level Fintech Forum will be held and the Fintech Co-
ordination Center will be established in Lithuania 
2019 
426 
2nd Seminar on Financial Cooperation of the China-CEEC Inter-bank 
Association will be held in China 
2019 
427 




China-CEEC winter sports festival of university students will be held in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
2019 
429 Bridge of the Future China-CEEC youths camp 2019 
430 
5th China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp, China-CEEC Creation Activi-
ties 
2019 
431 2nd China-CEEC Jazz Summer Camp will be held in China in 2019 2019 
432 
4th China-CEEC Cultural and Creative Industry Forum will be held in 
Hungary 
2019 
433 3rd China-CEEC Spokespersons Dialogue will be held in China 2019 
434 
4th Meeting of China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact 
Mechanism will be held in Poland 
2019 
435 
5th Working Group Meeting and Experts Seminar on Customs Clearance 
Facilitation Cooperation on China-Europe Land and Sea Express 
2019 
436 3rd Focal Point Meeting for the China-CEEC Logistics Secretariat 2019 
437 
First China-CEEC women entrepreneurship meeting will be held in Ro-
mania in 2019 
2019 
438 China-CEEC Youth Knowledge Contest will be held in China 2019 
439 China-CEEC Youth Art Photography Competition in China 2019 
201 
440 
The Education Development and Publishing Innovation Forum will be 
held by the China-CEEC Association of Publishing Houses in Beijing 
2019 
441 6th China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks 2019 
442 
The Conference for the Launching of the Terms of Reference and Action 
Plan for the Center of Excellence in the field of Smart Cities will be held 
at Transylvania University of Brasov 
2019 
443 


















Annex 2. Export and import volumes between China and the CEE-11 countries and France, Germany, and the UK 
 
 
Source: (UNCTAD, 2020) 
 
Merchandise trade matrix – exports in thousands of United States dollars, annual Total all products Partner: China 
YEAR 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
CEE-11 5019919 6703649 8864900 8725571 10308676 10473793 8633296 9377068 11457673 11982507 
Bulgaria 160425,6 249994 406915 763992,4 860037,3 708859,7 610640,7 517257,8 768928,2 882241,7 
Croatia 41090,66 37695,2 54692,46 45866,13 76376,17 68087 77335,85 83844,6 125966,2 158419,7 
Czechia 843971,4 1214996 1667836 1670840 1916665 2038260 1849510 1913741 2414363 2583494 
Estonia 79652,6 155430 304682,3 137708,6 157436,6 204038,1 171253,5 189099,9 248274,9 221646,5 
Hungary 1214685 1530089 1687531 1810642 1997307 2156227 1796784 2246493 2663852 2371481 
Latvia 22110,91 33143,02 55811,17 59850,23 111071,7 139931,6 120295 133130,5 161527,1 187633,1 
Lithuania 30631,18 36946,34 80564,18 85932,94 117270,6 135361,8 113455,1 136305,9 202222,4 222729 
Poland 1469610 1627488 1860864 1748875 2119659 2251000 2017344 1911143 2304985 2501427 
Romania 296544 410080,8 543968,4 494395,5 663628 759441,4 581787,5 682482,9 827062,7 883553,9 
Slovakia 770748 1287942 2075224 1733466 2120498 1826105 1130399 1262891 1381406 1609662 
Slovenia 90450,21 119844,8 126810,6 174001,7 168727,5 186481,7 164491,3 300677,6 359086,8 360219,6 
EU-28  1,16E+08 1,52E+08 1,91E+08 1,86E+08 1,98E+08 2,19E+08 1,89E+08 1,88E+08 2,22E+08 2,48E+08 
France 10943269 14551262 18745449 19383272 19572699 21469260 19909795 17705737 21292096 24618001 
Germany 52262376 71552785 90642574 86102711 89316350 99196126 79426902 85350436 97474476 1,11E+08 
UK 8053613 11293784 14088514 15688191 18119205 26235500 27625409 18142280 21379905 27701128 
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Merchandise trade matrix – imports of individual economies in thousands of United States dollars, annual Total all products Partner: China 
YEAR 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
CEE-11 40146658,64 50535076 57678906 52180847 54414490 61338533 61365524 61843601 69079394 81638337,93 
Bulgaria 1267441,295 652850,1 945232,7 974318,4 1019015 1147400 1070873 1150823 1255929 1555556,564 
Croatia 1441495,746 1440729 1604812 1487851 769747 588802,2 578390,8 645480,5 777789,8 952397,644 
Czechia 10546001,99 15332149 18905321 15672786 15486206 17426277 18998267 17648830 20498182 26052061,14 
Estonia 418537,319 672917,4 1102667 1128684 1082640 1142177 955413,9 951229,1 1028073 1127425,671 
Hungary 4949087 6173901 6079151 5412283 5360437 5140097 4776877 4866966 5291355 6377348,262 
Latvia 197208,831 286302,3 413577,4 447466,4 445521,2 468103,3 460768,3 444783,8 498130,7 577822,797 
Lithuania 451762,785 570238,9 628314,7 681588,1 750783,9 884211,9 806015,9 784256,8 929395,7 1009313,53 
Poland 13914394,2 16514374 18116250 17258096 19300516 22992572 22380369 23447667 26474287 30972443,61 
Romania 2646079,648 3381517 3524775 2687505 2620886 3149705 3205017 3818301 4252802 5210995,873 
Slovakia 3122115,151 4034006 4757512 4883761 6115467 6674067 6464427 6344740 6106804 5543249,52 
Slovenia 1192534,675 1476091 1601294 1546509 1463270 1725121 1669105 1740524 1966644 2259723,329 
EU-28 347461515,8 4,34E+08 4,76E+08 4,3E+08 4,34E+08 4,71E+08 4,52E+08 4,49E+08 4,85E+08 539309887,1 
France 41 252 583 48 872 682 57 431 106 53 458 273 54 221 963 56 416 480 51 871 364 51 032 598 55 401 050 59 036 933 
Germany 79 318 156 103 800 346 112 601 120 102 393 093 100 312 728 107 580 164 103 334 228 105 738 827 116 477 747 126 750 945 
UK 52 101 299 61 733 672 66 039 714 56 267 400 57 587 865 64 147 254 62 979 614 59 575 883 59 860 984 63 391 697 
 




Annex 3. FDI Statistics 
Foreign direct investment: Inward stock, US dollars at current prices in millions 2019 
ECONOMY Total FDI stock Chinese FDI % 
          Finland 78352,65 12000 15,3% 
          Greece 40512,87 1900 4,7% 
          Portugal 161640,2 6000 3,7% 
          Italy 445740,6 15900 3,6% 
          Hungary 97841,17 2400 2,5% 
          United Kingdom 2075271 50300 2,4% 
          Germany 953306,1 22700 2,4% 
          Sweden 339542,8 7300 2,1% 
          Luxembourg 128422,2 2400 1,9% 
          France 868690,7 14400 1,7% 
          Slovenia 18134,78 300 1,7% 
          Croatia 29865,95 400 1,3% 
          Romania 97094,89 1200 1,2% 
          Denmark 105748 1200 1,1% 
          Bulgaria 51856,43 400 0,8% 
          Spain 751510,4 4600 0,6% 
          Poland 236506,3 1400 0,6% 
          Czechia 170682,1 1000 0,6% 
          Netherlands 1749779 10200 0,6% 
          Latvia 17947,54 100 0,6% 
          Austria 205634,1 1100 0,5% 
          Lithuania 20411,02 100 0,5% 
          Belgium 566115,8 2300 0,4% 
          Malta 205757,5 800 0,4% 
          Estonia 27476,34 100 0,4% 
          Ireland 1120301 3100 0,3% 
          Slovakia 59750,12 100 0,2% 
          Cyprus 445091,3 200 0,0% 
  




Annex 4. Number of anti-dumping votes of CEE-11 between 2005 and 2013 
 
 
BG HR CZ EST HU LT LIT PL RO SK SLO SUM 
2005 N/A N/A 1 5 0 1 2 1 N/A 0 2 12 
2006 N/A N/A 1 2 0 3 0 1 N/A 0 0 7 
2007 N/A N/A 6 5 1 3 3 0 N/A 0 6 24 
2008 1 N/A 9 3 0 8 2 0 0 0 3 26 
2009 1 N/A 7 5 1 5 0 1 1 1 4 26 
2010 0 N/A 5 0 2 3 1 0 0 1 2 14 
2011 2 N/A 8 5 0 11 1 0 0 1 5 33 
2012 0 0 4 3 0 7 0 0 0 0 4 18 
2013 1 0 8 2 0 5 0 0 2 0 5 23 
SUM 5 0 49 30 4 46 9 3 3 3 31 183 
 




Annex 5. Number of anti-dumping votes of EU-17 between 2005 and 2013 
 
 
AU BE CY DK FI FR GER GR IR IT LX MT NET POR ESP SW UK SUM 
2005 0 0 0 8 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 1 1 9 3 44 
2006 1 2 1 4 5 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 5 4 32 
2007 1 3 0 7 6 0 0 1 3 1 2 1 6 0 0 6 7 44 
2008 2 5 1 6 6 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 8 0 0 10 9 53 
2009 1 6 1 9 7 0 0 0 3 1 1 2 5 2 1 9 7 55 
2010 0 3 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 0 6 2 25 
2011 1 10 2 11 8 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 7 0 1 14 10 73 
2012 0 7 4 7 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 7 7 45 
2013 1 5 4 5 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 8 0 0 9 5 46 
SUM 7 41 13 60 57 2 3 2 8 2 9 14 61 5 4 75 54 417 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on (Council, 2015) 
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Annex 6. UN voting coincidences 2008-2018 








with BIG-3 in 
agreement (11) 
US N N N N N US+CH Y Y Y N N N Y 13 1 N/A 
China  Y Y Y Y Y US+CH N N N Y Y Y N 1 12 N/A 
Bulgaria  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A A Y 5 1 11 
Croatia  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A A Y 5 1 11 
Czechia Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A N Y 6 1 11 
Estonia  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A A Y 5 1 11 
Greece  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A A Y 5 1 11 
Hungary  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A A Y 5 1 11 
Latvia  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A A Y 5 1 11 
Lithuania  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A A Y 5 1 11 
Poland  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A N Y 6 1 11 
Romania  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A N Y 6 1 11 
Slovakia Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A A Y 5 1 11 
Slovenia  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A A Y 5 1 11 
France  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A A Y 5 1 N/A 
Germany  Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A A Y 5 1 N/A 
UK Y A A A A US+CH Y Y Y N A N Y 6 1 N/A 
(Y: yes; N: no; A: abstained; CH+CH: all countries voted in unison.) Source: (US Department of State, 2008) 
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2009 Total number of votes: 12 
Votes in fa-




CEE-11 votes with 
BIG-3 in agree-
ment (8) 
US N N N Y US+CH N N N Y Y US+CH Y 12 2 N/A 
China  Y Y Y A US+CH Y Y Y N N US+CH N 2 9 N/A 
Bulgaria  Y A A Y US+CH A A N Y Y US+CH Y 5 1 8 
Croatia  Y A A Y US+CH A A N Y Y US+CH Y 5 1 8 
Czechia Y A A Y US+CH A N N Y Y US+CH Y 6 1 8 
Estonia  Y A A Y US+CH A A N Y Y US+CH Y 5 1 8 
Greece  Y A A Y US+CH A A N Y Y US+CH Y 5 1 8 
Hungary  Y A A Y US+CH A A N Y Y US+CH Y 5 1 8 
Latvia  Y A A Y US+CH A A N Y Y US+CH Y 5 1 8 
Lithuania  Y A A Y US+CH A A N Y Y US+CH Y 5 1 8 
Poland  Y A A Y US+CH A N N Y Y US+CH Y 6 1 8 
Romania  Y A A Y US+CH A N N Y Y US+CH Y 6 1 8 
Slovakia Y A A Y US+CH A A N Y Y US+CH Y 5 1 8 
Slovenia  Y A A Y US+CH A A N Y Y US+CH Y 5 1 8 
France  Y A A A US+CH A A N Y Y US+CH Y 4 1 N/A 
Germany  Y A A Y US+CH A N N Y Y US+CH Y 6 1 N/A 
UK Y A A Y US+CH A A N Y Y US+CH Y 5 1 N/A 
(Y: yes; N: no; A: abstained; CH+CH: all countries voted in unison) Source: (US Department of State, 2010) 
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with BIG-3 in 
agreement (11) 
China  N  N  N  A  A  US+CH N  Y  N  N  N  N  N  1 9 N/A 
Bulgaria  N  N  N  Y  Y  US+CH N  Y  Y  A  A  N  A  4 5 4 
Croatia  N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  A  Y  6 2 11 
Czechia N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  7 2 11 
Estonia  N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  7 2 11 
Greece  N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  A  Y  6 2 11 
Hungary  N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  A  Y  6 2 11 
Latvia  N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  7 2 11 
Lithuania  N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  7 2 11 
Poland  N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  7 2 11 
Romania  N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  7 2 11 
Slovakia N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  7 2 11 
Slovenia  N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  A  Y  6 2 11 
France  N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  A  Y  6 2 N/A 
Germany  N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  7 2 N/A 
UK N  A  A  Y  Y  US+CH A  N  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  7 2 N/A 
(Y: yes; N: no; A: abstained; CH+CH: all countries voted in unison.) 
Source: (US Department of State, 2011) 
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with BIG-3 in 
agreement (9) 
China O A O O A O A O A 0 5 N/A 
Bulgaria O S A A S A S S S 5 1 9 
Croatia O S X X S A S S S 5 1 7 
Czechia O S A A S A S S S 5 1 9 
Estonia O S A A S A S S S 5 1 9 
Greece O S A A S A S S S 5 1 9 
Hungary O S A A S A S S S 5 1 9 
Latvia O S A A S A S S S 5 1 9 
Lithuania O S A A S A S S S 5 1 9 
Poland O S A A S A S S S 5 1 9 
Romania O S A A S A S S S 5 1 9 
Slovakia O S A A S A S S S 5 1 9 
Slovenia O S A A S A S S S 5 1 9 
France O S A A S A S S S 5 1 N/A 
Germany O S A A S A S S S 5 1 N/A 
UK O S A A S A S S S 5 1 N/A 
(O: opposed the US position; S: supported the US position; A: abstained.) 
Source: (US Department of State, 2012) 
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with BIG-3 in 
agreement (6) 
China O O O O O O O A  0 7 N/A 
Bulgaria O A A A A S S S 3 1 6 
Croatia O A A A A S S S 3 1 6 
Czechia O S A A A S S S 4 1 6 
Estonia O A A A A S S S 3 1 6 
Greece O O A A A S S S 3 2 6 
Hungary O A A A A S S S 3 1 6 
Latvia O A A A A S S S 3 1 6 
Lithuania O A A A A S S S 3 1 6 
Poland O A A A A S S S 3 1 6 
Romania O A A A A S S S 3 1 6 
Slovakia O A A A A S S S 3 1 6 
Slovenia O A A A A S S S 3 1 6 
France O O A A A S S S 3 2 N/A 
Germany O A A A A S S S 3 1 N/A 
UK O A A A O S S S 3 2 N/A 
(O: opposed the US position; S: supported the US position; A: abstained.) 
Source: (US Department of State, 2013) 
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with BIG-3 in 
agreement (8) 
China O O O US+CH US+CH A O O O O US+CH 0 7 N/A 
Bulgaria O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
Croatia O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
Czechia O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
Estonia O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
Greece O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
Hungary O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
Latvia O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
Lithuania O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
Poland O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
Romania O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
Slovakia O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
Slovenia O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 8 
France O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 N/A 
Germany O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 N/A 
UK O A A US+CH US+CH S A S S S US+CH 4 1 N/A 
(O: opposed the US position; S: supported the US position; A: abstained; CH+CH: all countries voted in unison.) Source: 
(US Department of State, 2014) 
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with BIG-3 in 
agreement (12) 
China O O O A A US+CH O A O O O A O 0 8 N/A 
Bulgaria O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 12 
Croatia O A A S S US+CH A S S S S X O 6 2 10 
Czechia O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 12 
Estonia O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 12 
Greece O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 12 
Hungary O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 12 
Latvia O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 12 
Lithuania O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 12 
Poland O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 12 
Romania O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 12 
Slovakia O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 12 
Slovenia O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 12 
France O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 N/A 
Germany O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 N/A 
UK O A A S S US+CH A S S S S S S 8 1 N/A 
(O: opposed the US position; S: supported the US position; A: abstained, CH+CH: all countries voted in unison.) Source: 
(US Department of State, 2014) 
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CEE-11 votes with 
BIG-3 in agreement (8) 
China O US+CH O O US+CH US+CH O A O O O US+CH O 0 8 N/A 
Bulgaria O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 8 
Croatia O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 8 
Czechia O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 8 
Estonia O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 8 
Greece O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH A 4 1 7 
Hungary O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 8 
Latvia O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 8 
Lithuania O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 8 
Poland O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 8 
Romania O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 8 
Slovakia O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 8 
Slovenia O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 8 
France O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 N/A 
Germany O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S X US+CH S 4 1 N/A 
UK O US+CH A A US+CH US+CH A S S S A US+CH S 4 1 N/A 
(O: opposed the US position; S: supported the US position; A: abstained; CH+CH: all countries voted in unison.) Source: 
(US Department of State, 2016) 
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with BIG-3 in 
agreement 
(12) 
China  O  O  US+CH O  O  O  US+CH O  O  A  O  O  O  O  2 11 N/A 
Bulgaria A A US+CH S S S US+CH A S S S S S S 9 0 12 
Croatia  A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 12 
Czechia A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 12 
Estonia  A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 12 
Greece  A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  A  S  S  S  8 0 11 
Hungary  A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 12 
Latvia  A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 12 
Lithuania  A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 12 
Poland  A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 12 
Romania  A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 12 
Slovakia A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 12 
Slovenia  A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 12 
France  A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 N/A 
Germany  A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 N/A 
UK A  A  US+CH S  S  S  US+CH A  S  S  S  S  S  S  9 0 N/A 
(O: opposed the US position; S: supported the US position; A: abstained; CH+CH: all countries voted in unison.) Source: 
(US Department of State, 2017) 
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with BIG-3 in 
agreement 
(13) 
US US+CH N  US+CH N  Y  N  N  N  Y  Y  Y  N  N  Y  US+CH Y  N  17 3 N/A 
China US+CH Y  US+CH Y  N  Y  Y  Y  N  N  N  Y  Y  A  US+CH N  Y  3 13 N/A 
Bulgaria US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 5 7 
Czechia US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  A  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 4 6 
Estonia US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 5 7 
Greece US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 5 7 
Croatia US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  A  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 4 6 
Hungary US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  A  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 4 6 
Lithuania US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 5 7 
Latvia US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  A  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 4 6 
Poland US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  A  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 4 6 
Romania US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  A  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 4 6 
Slovakia US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 5 7 
Slovenia US+CH A  US+CH A  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  US+CH Y  A  6 5 7 
UK US+CH Y US+CH Y Y N N Y Y Y A Y Y Y US+CH A Y 6 6 N/A 
Germany US+CH Y US+CH Y Y N A Y Y Y A Y Y Y US+CH A Y 5 6 N/A 
France US+CH Y US+CH Y Y N A Y Y Y A Y Y Y US+CH A Y 5 6 N/A 
(Y: yes; N: no; A: abstained; CH+CH: all countries voted in unison.) Source: (US Department of State, 2018) 
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with BIG-3 in 
agreement (19) 
US N Y N N Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N N N N Y Y 20 0 N/A 
China Y A Y Y A N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N 0 18 N/A 
Bulgaria Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 9 18 
Croatia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 10 19 
Czechia Y Y N A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 8 8 18 
Estonia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 10 19 
Greece Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 9 19 
Hungary Y Y N A Y Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 10 8 16 
Latvia Y Y A A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 8 18 
Lithuania Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 9 19 
Poland Y Y N A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 8 8 18 
Romania Y Y A A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 8 18 
Slovakia Y Y X A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 8 18 
Slovenia Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 10 19 
UK Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 9 N/A 
Germany Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 10 N/A 
France Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y A A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y 7 9 N/A 
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